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"Why worry
There should be laughter after pain
There should be sunshine after rain
These things have always been the same
So why worry now
Why worry now.
"
Dire Straits "Why worry"
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Summary
This thesis explores family and labour economics issues in the context
of different countries, the unified motive is to gain policy implication
by applying diversified micro-econometric tools into different datasets.
The UK has experienced the 1999 Working Family Tax Credit and
the 2003 Working and Child Tax Credit reforms. The first chapter
provides the first piece of evidence on the effect of single mothers being
eligible to income transfer programmes on early childhood outcomes
in the Britain. Using the Millennium Cohort Study (MCS), various
children’s production functions are used to deal with endogeneity
of inputs and unobserved heterogeneity problems. Findings suggest
that mothers entitled to in-work benefit has positive effects on both
children’s cognitive and non-cognitive outcomes, comparing to the
mothers live on welfare.
The second chapter presents new evidence on the child quantity-
quality (Q-Q) trade-off based on the 1% sample of 1990 Chinese census.
The main contribution of this chapter comes from applying a novel
Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) approach that accounts for
the non-linear distribution of both outcome and endogenous variables.
The identification strategy exploits variation in family size that is
induced by twin births and first child gender, which allows the test
of Q-Q trade-off in a wide range of fertility distribution. I find
significantly negative effects of fertility on educational outcome of
children, and this trade-off nonlinearly decreases with family size and
shows heterogeneous effects by birth order. This chapter provides
technique foundation for policies that attempt to reduce contraceptive
costs, control population growth and subsidize families with fewer
children.
The third chapter examines the retirement consumption puzzle using
the Chinese Household Income Project data. A failure to smooth the
consumption upon retirement would arise considerable concerns for the
well-being of elderly people and adjustments of public policies. This
chapter employs a regression discontinuity approach and shows that
elderly households are able to maintain stable consumption onset of
retirement by adjusting expenditure across sub-aggregated categories
and household behaviour. This study confirms the prediction of Life
Cycle Model and have important implications for using disaggregated
consumption data to test the existence of retirement consumption
puzzle and for testing consumption theories.
Chapter 1
On Welfare or In Work: Perspective from Single
Motherhood and Early Childhood Outcomes
Abstract
This paper provides the first piece of evidence on the effect of being eligible to
receive in-work benefit (WFTC and WTC/CTC) on the early development of
children using single mothers from the UK Millennium Cohort Study (MCS).
The treatment and control groups are defined based on the tax credit eligibility
according to benefit rules. Various children’s production functions are used to
deal with endogeneity of inputs and unobserved heterogeneity problems. Findings
suggest that mothers entitled to in-work benefit has positive effects on both
children’s cognitive and non-cognitive outcomes, comparing to the mothers live
on welfare. Possible mechanisms through which the outcome has been improved
are provided. In particular, an increase in formal childcare that is induced by
entitlement to in-work benefit increases children’s cognitive scores, and an increase
in maternal time inputs improves children’s non-cognitive skill. However, this
paper fails to document any eligibility induced income effect. Additionally, the
positive impact of being eligible to in-work benefit on non-cognitive score only
exists if mothers work no more than 30 hours, which casts doubts on the 30 hour
element of the in-work benefit policies. This study also suggests that the effect of
being eligible to 2003 WTC/CTC are consistent with the 1999 WFTC, under a
difference-in-difference framework.
Key Words: in-work benefit reform, tax credit, eligibility, child production function,
cognitive outcome, non-cognitive well-being
JEL Classification:: C23, C52, H31, I24, J13
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1.1 Introduction
Some developed countries—including the US, UK, Germany and Canada—have
experienced origins and expansion of in-work benefit reforms in last twenty years.
These reforms tend to increase the labour market participation of low-middle income
households who rely on welfare and to reduce the inequality among children. The effects
of those reforms have been widely analysed, especially in the sociology and economics
literatures. Previous research has focused on the impacts on labour market outcomes
and behavioural responses of the socio-economically disadvantaged individuals.
The UK has experienced two in-work benefit reforms in the last 20 years. First,
the Family Credit (FC) was replaced by the Work Families’ Tax Credit (WFTC) in
October 1999. It has been concluded that WFTC gives more incentive for labour market
participation than FC in various aspects (Brewer et al., 2009). In April 2003, the Work
Tax Credit (WTC) and Child Tax Credit (CTC) have been introduced and replaced
WFTC(figure 1.1). This paper regards 2003 WTC/CTC reform as a pure successor of
1999 WFTC for the following reasons. First, this paper focuses on the in-work incentive
element of the reform, i.e. the sample considers lone mothers who receive WFTC and
who receive both Working Tax Credit and Child Tax Credit later on as eligible, thus
the differences between WFTC and WTC/CTC benefit rules are not expected to affect
the sample. Second, this paper employs difference-in-difference approach and finds that
the effects of being eligible to 2003 WTC/CTC on children’s outcome is consistent with
the effect under WFTC regime (robustness check session).
While researchers have explored wide questions that were raised by the in-
work benefit reforms, there is very limited knowledge about the intergenerational
consequences of those welfare reforms. Economists have recently contributed a few
papers (Francesconi et al., 2008; Gregg et al., 2009) to addressing this issue in the UK.
Unlike the impact on employment, the expected effects on next generation responses
are ambiguous. On one hand, increasing parental investment driven by increased
employment rates and higher income would have a positive effect on child’s outcome. On
the other hand, decreased parent-child interactions and parental supervisions resulting
from spending more time working would have a negative effect on child’s outcome.
Additionally, increasing childcare usage induced by labour supply adjustment has
ambiguous impacts on child outcome. Both theoretical predictions and empirical work
provide evidence that family economic conditions at age 5 are more strongly associate
with their adolescence education achievement than at child age 6 to 15 (Duncan et al.,
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1998; Shonkoff et al., 2000). Heckman (2006) also provides evidence on the impacts of
early inputs on the achievement of child, adolescent, and adult. Although life cycle skill
formation is a dynamic process, early environments strongly affect the productivity of
later inputs. Thus changes in parental economic and employment circumstances at the
early stage development of children are likely to affect their early and later on outcomes.
Since there has been far less analysis of the effect of these reforms on children’s
outcomes, this study aims at filling in this gap by providing the first piece of evidence
on the effects of being eligible to the 1999 WFTC and later on 2003 WTC/CTC policies
on children living in lone parent households. In particular, this paper focuses on young
children’s cognitive achievements and emotional outcomes that are critical to children’s
development and are also key predictors of later life achievements.
There are four reasons that this paper focuses on children of lone parents. First,
there is an increasing trend of lone parenthood families in the UK. Lone parents with
dependent children accounted for about 22% of all families with dependent children in
1996, increased to 25% in 2005 and 2015. Women represented 90% of lone parents with
dependent children in 1996 and this percentage has barely changed since then1. Second,
lone mothers are among the main target of in-work benefit policies, and literature has
shown that the employment rate of lone mothers were increased by around 5 percentage
points from 1993 to 2004 and working hours among those already in work have also
increased (Gregg et al., 2009). Thus low-paid single mothers are most likely to be lifted
out of poverty by tax credit policies supplementing their wages. This group is the most
relevant for studying whether the tax credit reform reduces welfare dependency (Eissa
and Liebman, 1996). Third, there is less to worry about the joint labour supply decision
of other family members. There is evidence that the probability of participation is
reduced for the secondary earner through income effects in a two-parent family. Fourth,
children in lone parents families have lower extent of happiness, self-esteem, lower quality
relationships with the mother and worse behaviour problem (Gregg et al., 2009).
It is useful to understand whether those children of single mothers who benefit
from these reforms have better outcomes than those of welfare families in the early
childhood perspective. Since children in the sample were born in September 2000-2001,
they were exposed to the implementation effects of the WFTC reform at 9 months
and age 32, and affected by WTC/CTC at 5 and 7 years old. Therefore, lone parent
1This information is obtained from Families and Households 2015 report of Office for
National Statistics(ONS).
2Due to different interview date, the information documented at wave 2(age 3) could refers
to the outcome at before/after the implementation of 2003 WTC/CTC.
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households are the relatively vulnerable group in the society and also the main target
group of these reforms. The children growing up in this environment are likely to be
affected in a wide range of aspects. However, due to the highly under reported number
of actual recipients of in-work benefits, moreover, due to the fact that no available
dataset in Britain contains both comprehensive measurement of child outcomes and
good quality family background information, before and after the 1999 WFTC reform,
this paper identifies the effect of being eligible to in-work benefit on children’s outcomes,
irrespective of take up. It captures the differences on the development of children among
three groups of households. The treatment group is low-income in-work group, which is
defined according to the benefit eligibility, i.e. lone mothers who work at least 16 hours
per week and have income below the eligibility threshold. This paper considers two
control groups. The first control group is low-income on-welfare group, which consists
of those mothers who are not in the labour market or work less than 16 hours per week.
It is ineligible to in-work benefit because mothers must work no less than 16 hours in
order to get WFTC tax benefit. Under the WTC/CTC reform, CTC is also available
to families without requirement on labour market participation. Since this paper is
interested in in-work benefit, mothers who are only eligible to CTC are included in this
control group. The second control group is the middle-income in-work group. Mothers
of this group work no less than 16 hours but are ineligible for receiving tax credit due to
their income is beyond the income threshold. This paper does not consider high income
households since they are likely to have considerable different inputs in children. Details
on the eligibility rule are provided in the section 1.2.1 policy background.
By comparing the children of three groups of mothers, it is informative on whether
mother is eligible to receive in-work benefit improves next generation’s well-being to the
extent that income, working hours, maternal time input and childcare usage affect child
achievement. If the cut-off of benefit eligibility is not fully overlapping with observed and
unobserved differences among groups, a positive effect found on the treatment group,
with the first control group as the reference group, would suggest a positive association
between the tax benefit and children’s outcome. Moreover, under the assumption that
the observed and unobserved differences of characteristics are fixed over time, it is
possible to attribute any effects found to the treatment effects under a child fixed effect
framework.
This paper contributes to the literature in several dimensions. First, it provides
the first piece of evidence on the effects of being entitled to in-work benefit—1999
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WFTC and 2003 WTC/CTC—on early childhood outcomes for single mothers using
longitudinal data drawn from the Millennium Cohort Study (MCS). The impact of
those two policies on very young children has not been examined, to the best of
my knowledge. By using longitudinal structure, this study is able to control for
changing sample composition over time, which is resulting from changes in tax credit
rules. Results suggest that entitlement to in-work benefits improve children’s cognitive
outcomes by 0.078 and non-cognitive well-being by 0.071 of one standard deviation,
comparing to children of on-welfare mothers. Second, this paper also explores several
mechanisms through which the outcome has been improved. In particular, an increase
in formal childcare that is induced by entitlement to in-work benefit increases children’s
cognitive score by 0.132 of a standard deviation, and an increase in maternal time
inputs improves children’s non-cognitive skill by 0.051. Third, the results suggest no
differential improvement of children’s outcome that is due to different location at the
income distribution of treatment group. It is in contrast with the finding of Miller
and Zhang (2009) and Dahl and Lochner (2012) that the income effects are larger for
children from poorer family. Forth, further investigation shows that the positive impact
of being eligible to in-work benefit on non-cognitive score only exists if mothers work
no more than 30 hours, which casts potential concern on the 30 hour element of the
in-work benefit policies. Fifth, this study also suggests that the effect of being eligible to
2003 WTC/CTC are consistent with the 1999 WFTC, under a difference-in-difference
framework. It is probably due to the fact that the changes in policy parameters have
negligible effect on working status of lone mothers.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 presents the
literature review on the analysis of welfare reform effects. Section 1.3 states the
theoretical framework that this paper focuses on. Section 1.4 describes the data source
and descriptive statistics. Section 1.5 provides main results and robustness checks.
Finally, Section 1.6 draws conclusion.
1.2 Policy Background and Literature Review
1.2.1 Policy Background
The UK government has launched two in-work benefit reforms to try to help individuals
with low income in the last 20 years. A timeline of these two reforms and sample
observation periods are indicated in figure 1.1. The key objectives of those in-work
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benefits are to increase in-work incentives of low-income groups and reduce child poverty.
First, the Family Credit (FC) was replaced by the Working Families’ Tax Credit
(WFTC) in October 1999. Prior to 1999, FC is the benefit that supports low-income
working families. The successor WFTC is referred to as tax credit rather than a benefit,
and the eligibility depends on working hours and existence of dependent child(ren) in
the household. Specifically, families with dependent children1 and with at least one
adult work more or equal to 16 hours per week are entitled to claim tax credit2. The
amount of credit varies with number of dependent children, earnings, working hours
and savings. The first income(net) threshold was initially £90 per week with taper rate
55%, an extra credit can be earned if at least one adult worked at least 30 hours per
week.
WFTC was more generous than its predecessor in four aspects (Adam and Brewer,
2005; Brewer et al., 2009). First, it provided higher credits, especially for those younger
children age 0-10. Second, the net income threshold was increased substantially. Third,
the taper rate (tax rate on earnings) at which the maximum credit was reduced is lower.
Fourth, it provided a large separate childcare tax credit. Under FC, the childcare costs,
up to £60(£100) per week could be disregarded from the calculation of total net income
for families with 1 child(2 children). WFTC offered a separate childcare tax credit rather
than an income disregard, and it covered 70% of childcare costs up to £100(£150) per
week for 1 child(2 children).
In April 2003, the Work Tax Credit (WTC) and Child Tax Credit (CTC) have been
introduced and replaced its predecessor WFTC. WTC differs from WFTC in that the
former provides in-work support to families without children as well. CTC is not an in-
work benefit, i.e. it is a means-tested benefit and provides childcare benefit to families
with no members working as well. Since this paper fails to document any impact of
the transitioning from WFTC to WTC/CTC benefit on the employment rates of lone
mothers, this paper assumes that these two reforms are coherent and can be regarded as
post FC in-work benefits in general. Another important difference between and WFTC
and WTC/CTC is the change in the definition of recipient. The claimant received the
credit under WFTC, while the childcare element of WTC and CTC are made to the
main carer of the child(ren). The main carer is identified by the couple themselves.
Similarly, the WTC credit is paid to the main earner who works more than 16 hours
1In the UK, a dependent child is defined as younger than age 16 or younger than age 19 if
in full-time non-university education.
2The eligibility rule also depends on family savings and capital.
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per week. The couple must decide who is the main earner if both work 16 hours or
more. Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) decides mother as the main carer
and father as the main earner if couples do not decide by themselves or cannot reach
an agreement. Since my subject of interests are children of lone parents, this difference
should be minor. Thus this paper will not distinguish the effects of being eligible to
receive either WFTC or WTC/CTC.
For ease of understanding the parameters of the reform, the tax credit entitlement
can be calculated in the following formula:
Credit = A−max(Y − ∨, 0) ∗ T (1.1)
where Credit is the amount of entitlement, A is the maximum amount of tax credit a
family can be awarded, Y is family net income, ∨ is the income threshold above which
tax credit would be withdrawn, at taper rate T .
This paper defines treatment and control group depending on the sample eligibility
of tax credit entitlement, as shown in equation 1.1. As tax credit is decreasing in
net income, a level of income can be obtained at which entitlement reaches zero for
the average family in the sample (Fisher, 2016). Under the WFTC regime, tax credit
was withdrawn at a rate T=55% from net earnings, an average lone mother family is
characterized as 1.78 children, £13.67 weekly childcare costs, tax credit reaches zero for
a weekly net income of £314.791, according to table 1.1. Under the WTC/CTC reform,
tax credit has a taper rate of 33% from gross earning, an average family with 2.02
children, £18.01 weekly childcare costs, WTC/CTC credit reaches zero for a weekly
gross income of £400.14 and CTC credit reaches zero for a weekly gross income of
£400.032, based on table 1.2. Due to the slight change in benefit rules, the treatment
and control groups are varying across time.
Note that the actual treatment is made based on family earnings, number and age of
dependent children, childcare costs, level of savings and hours of work, thus the actual
entitlement is family-specific. There could be cases that families are assigned to control
group but in fact they are eligible to claim tax credit, and cases that treated group are
in fact receive no tax credit. One way to minimize the contamination effect is to exclude
those observations at the eligibility margin.
1Apply 2001-2002 WFTC rule.
2Apply 2003-2004 WTC/CTC rule.
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1.2.2 Literature Review
There are variety of studies exploring the effect of welfare-to-work policies on individual’s
outcomes, theoretically and empirically. Some studies find that the responses on
labour market participation are as expected, while some report unintended or negligible
consequences in partnership and child well-being. For the US, empirical work has
focused on various aspects—especially labour market behaviour—of the in-work benefit
and work-conditioned programmes (Grogger et al., 2009; Grogger and Karoly, 2009).
While for the UK, limited evidence about other behaviour responses beyond employment
changes has been provided (Brewer et al., 2009).
One of the key objectives of all the tax-benefit policies or programmes mentioned
above is to improve work incentive and increase employment rate of low-income families,
especially single mothers. Both structural model and difference-in-difference model
(Blundell et al., 2005; Francesconi and Van der Klaauw, 2007; Gregg et al., 2009) show
an increase in the employment rate of lone parent, at about a 4-7 percentage points,
which was driven by both high rates at which they entered in the labour market and
high rates at which they remained in it. WFTC also led to a significant increase in lone
mothers’ hours of work, which makes them become eligible for the benefit. Blundell
et al. (2008) also point out that job changes contribute mostly to the labour supply
adjustment. These evidence on labour market outcomes draw researchers’ attention to
the perspective of next generation.
For the US, a number of previous studies use the National Longitudinal Survey
of Youth (NLSY) data to evaluate the policy impact on children’s cognitive outcome,
but fail to reach a consensus on the estimated results (Bernal, 2008). In fact, most of
them fail to control for the endogeneity problem that some unobserved characteristic
of mothers affect their employment and affect children’s cognitive ability as well. Past
research has found the impacts of in-work benefit and work-conditioned programmes
vary by children’s development periods. Duncan et al. (2000) and Zaslow et al.
(2002) find favourable effects on school-age children in terms of cognitive and academic
outcomes, through improvement of family economic status, while unfavourable effects
on adults in terms of behavioural problem. In contrast, programmes without effects
on parental income have few effects on school-age children (Clark-Kauffman et al.,
2003). However, their results simply based on an OLS regression. The unobserved
characteristics of mother and child that correlated with employment and welfare reforms
might also affect changes in child outcomes.
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Bernal (2008) introduces a structural model of single mothers’ decisions about
work and child care use, and how these decisions affect child cognitive outcomes.
In general, single mother’s utility is derived from consumption, employment, child’s
outcome and welfare participation. Results imply negative and sizeable effects of
maternal employment and child care on cognitive outcomes. An additional year of
full-time work and child care involves a 1.8 percent reduction in cognitive test score.
And this effect is greater on high ability child in the sense that spending time with high
ability children has higher technological return than time spent with low ability children.
Building on this work, Bernal and Keane (2010) construct a quasi-structural model to
take into account both the exogenous variation in employment and child-care decisions
of mothers induced by the variation in welfare rules and child’s production function.
They find a 2.7% reduction (0.14 standard deviation) on child’s cognitive ability score
if the mother works full-time and uses full year child care. Similarly, but based on
a reduced form framework, Bernal and Keane (2011) deal with endogeneity problem
by constructing a set of welfare policy variables and using local demand conditions.
Basically, they exploit the exogenous variation in income and childcare time that is
derived from welfare policy rules. They find that child cognitive scores decrease 2.1%
by a year of child care, and that formal child care has no adverse effect, but informal
care has significant negative effects.
Grogger and Karoly (2009) provide a theoretical framework to explore the effects
of work-conditioned transfer programmes on child well-being. Their idea, essentially,
is to maximize single mother’s utility subject to a budget constraint and a production
function which associate child ‘quality’ to parental time and goods purchase (Becker
and Tomes, 1976). Mother decides the time/income allocation between children and
work/consumption goods. They also find that the effects vary with the age and outcome
of interest of the children, due to the trade-off between increased family income and
reduced parental supervision.
Miller and Zhang (2009) estimate the long-run effects of Earned Income Tax
Credit (EITC) on the academic performance of children in low-income families. Their
identification comes from comparing low-income and middle-income groups, where the
former consists of students who are eligible for federal free lunches, and the latter group
are not eligible. Based on a difference-in-difference method, they find the improvement
rate of maths score of low-income family children is bigger than that of middle-income
family. The same results have been found in their value-added framework.
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Dahl and Lochner (2012) identify the effect of family income on child achievement
based on the large, non-linear and exogenous changes in the Earned Income Tax Credit
(EITC). They find that child test scores increase 6% of a standard deviation by raising
1,000 dollar in income from the contemporaneous model. Dynamic models find small
effects from past period income while contemporaneous income has the largest effect on
achievement. By estimating separate regressions for various subgroups, results suggest
that the income effects are larger for children living in more disadvantaged households,
younger children, and boys.
In Canada, the study of policy effect on children is mainly based on the National
Longitudinal Survey of Children and Youth (NLSCY). Dooley and Stewart (2004) use
OLS and fixed effects models to estimate the effects of family income on children’s
test scores. Their findings are similar to the result of Blau (1999) in that they find a
small relationship between income and test scores. Based on an instrumental strategy,
Milligan and Stabile (2011) examine the effects of family income on child well-being by
exploiting changes in child benefits in Canada. In particular, they use the variation
in child benefits across province, time, and family type. They find that child benefit
programs have significant positive effects on test scores and mental health. Their finding
also suggest that the policy effect varies with child gender: child benefit effects are bigger
on mental health outcomes for girls, and on educational outcomes and physical health
outcome for boys.
Results above give strong incentives to evaluate the impacts of being eligible to
receive tax benefit on children’s outcomes in the UK. Unfortunately, there have been far
less analyses of the effect of tax-benefit reforms on early childhood outcomes, however,
this is a crucial question from a policy point of view.
Francesconi et al. (2008) applies the bargaining household models (Chiappori, 1992)
to characterize the noncooperative behaviour of divorced parents, and shows adverse
effects of tax-benefit policies on those parents and their children’s well-being. This is
due to the fact that the in-work benefit policy increases mother’s effective wage and
reinforces the inefficiencies induced by noncooperation.
Using data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) youth files, Gregg et al.
(2009) include mother’s mental health as an explanatory variable in the difference-in-
difference regression. With the introduction of the WFTC, the policy effect on children
is mixed. They find positive effects on boys, while no significant impacts on girls. In
fact, WFTC has profoundly improved child well-being—self-esteem, unhappiness scores,
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smoking and planning to leave school at age 16 — in lone parent families through
increased maternal employment and mental health. However, their estimation focus on
adolescent children age from 11 to 15 years old.
Previous research provides estimation of welfare reform effects at various aspects,
while this paper tries to extend existed knowledge about the effects of tax-benefit policies
on child’s cognitive and non-cognitive outcomes in the UK, with a particular focus on
very young children.
1.3 Econometric Method
This section begins with introducing the identification strategy followed with various
specification of child production function. The main interest of this paper is to
understand the relationship between 1999 and 2003 in-work benefit rules and cognitive
and non-cognitive outcomes at early stage of child development. On the one hand,
one would expect child’s outcome to be improved through increased family income(paid
formal childcare use) or role model effects; on the other hand, the decline in maternal
time inputs may severely damage child’s early stage development and may have adverse
consequences on child’s achievement in the long run. The prediction and existing
empirical finding on this relationship is ambiguous.
This paper defines treatment group as low-income in-work group, and the first
control group as low-income on-welfare group and the second control group as middle-
income in-work group. The second control group is more similar to the treatment
group on one dimension—they have similar working hours—but less on another: they
have much higher income(figure 1.2). Due to the lack of pre-reform data, it is difficult
to separate income effects from policy changes and tease out any other contemporary
policy changes. Additionally, this paper assumes full take-up rate due to the fact that
individuals highly under-report actual benefit receipt and an exact calculation of the
entitlement is beyond the scope of this paper’s attempt. This paper aims to bridge the
gap that there is far less evidence on the effect of in-work benefit eligibility on early
childhood outcomes in the UK.
This paper compares the outcomes of children whose mothers were eligible for
WFTC or later on WTC/CTC to other mothers who are ineligible, where the
identification comes from differences in the intensity of treatment between the treatment
and two control groups. Under this framework, the treatment and control groups are
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defined regardless of the treatment they actually received, and the subsequent deviation
from eligibility or withdrawal from treatment1 (Fisher et al., 1989). Arguably, the
comparison among three groups provides some upper and lower bound estimation of
the effect. The identification is derived in the following steps:
Build on Angrist and Pischke (2008), the observed differences in child outcome are
given by
E(Yi|Di = 1)− E(Yi|Di = 0) =
E[Y1i − Y0i|Di = 1] + E[Y0i|Di = 1]− E[Y0i|Di = 0]
(1.2)
Where Y1i represents child i’s outcome of lone mother families that have a high intensity
of getting treated, Y0i means child i’s outcome of single mother families that have a low
intensity of being treated. D is an indicator for treatment. This assumption is correct
if the treated and control groups had the same propensities for child development and
faced the same environments, except for the presence of in-work benefits received by
the treated group. The first part of the right hand side gives the average treatment
effects on those get tax credit, and the second part provides a selection bias. If those
who get tax credit would have better child outcome anyway, comparing to those who
have low income but ineligible to tax credit(low-income on-welfare group), then the
naive comparison E(Yi|Di = 1) − E(Yi|Di = 0) would exaggerates the benefits of the
reform. Likewise, if those treated would have worse child outcome anyway, comparing to
higher income ineligible working group(middle-income in-work group), then the simple
comparison would underestimate the effects.
To control for intrinsic differences in group-specific compositional changes over time,
a set of demographic controls are included in all the specifications, i.e. child gender,
child birth weight, number of siblings, birth order, mother age at child birth and
age square, education level of mother, ethnicity and region of residence. Under the
conditional independence assumption, selection bias disappears conditional on observed
characteristics Wi. Formally, this means
Y0i, Y1i ⊥ Di|Wi (1.3)
Given this assumption holds, the observed average differences in child outcome are
1This assumption will be relaxed in the robustness check session.
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identified by
E(Yi|Wi, Di = 1)− E(Yi|Wi, Di = 0) = E[Y1i − Y0i|Wi] (1.4)
The empirical framework that is adopted for the estimation of cognitive achievement
production function conceptualizes child development as a cumulative process.
Conventionally the test score gap is accounted for by including the historical or/and
current family inputs, school inputs, parents’ ability and child unobserved endowments.
Todd and Wolpin (2007) show that family inputs are significant determinants of
children’s cognitive test scores. As it is suggested by Todd and Wolpin (2003, 2007),
this paper includes maternal treatment status1 and other characteristics that determine
children’s outcome. Let Yit denotes the observed test score measure for child i at age t
and it is determined by group dummies Dit, a set of observed inputs Xit up to age t and
unobserved inputs Zit up to age t, as well as children’s ability endowment µi. The main
variables of interest are Dit and its values at previous period. it is the measurement
error. Under the assumption that the production function is linear, the regression is
specified as follows:
Yit =Ditδ1 +Dit−1δ2 + · · ·+Di1δt +Xitα1 +Xit−1α2 + · · ·+Xi1αt
Zitβ1 + Zit−1β2 + · · ·+ Zi1βt + δtµi + it
(1.5)
The empirical challenge for estimating equation 1.5 comes from three aspects.
First, children’s ability endowments are unobserved. Second, the full history inputs
are likely to missing. Third, the measurement error in test scores. In order to
address these problems, a variety specifications of equation 1.5 have been adopted
in previous literature (Todd and Wolpin, 2003, 2007; Andrabi et al., 2009, 2011).
In particular, Andrabi et al. (2009) try to correct measurement error problem by
using the heteroskedastic standard error of each test score returned by Item Response
Theory2, and Andrabi et al. (2011) correct this problem by using alternate subjects as
instruments. Both methods provide similar results.
1Childcare usage and maternal time inputs are not included at the main regression, as they
might be potential outcomes of the in-work benefit eligibility. Those inputs are included later
on as mechanisms through which eligibility to WFTC or WTC/CTC might affect children’s
development.
2Item Response Theory calculates standard error for each test score from an estimation
based inverse information matrix.
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1.3.1 Contemporaneous Specification
A bunch of early economics studies focus on current inputs by placing very strong
restrictions on equation 1.5. Equation 1.6 gives the contemporaneous specification.
Yit = Ditγ1 +Xitα1 + eit (1.6)
The error term can be rearranged by combining equation 1.5 and equation 1.6,
eit = Dit−1γ2 + · · ·+Di1γt +Xit−1α2 + · · ·+Xi1αt
Zitβ1 + Zit−1β2 + · · ·+ Zi1βt + δtµi + it
(1.7)
Equation 1.7 indicates that the assumption required to consistently estimate γ1 and α1
is that all the omitted factors including observed lagged inputs, unobserved current and
past inputs, initial endowment, and measurement error are uncorrelated with included
inputs Dit and Xit.
1.3.2 Cumulative Specification
Based on the contemporaneous specification, there are two main specifications which
are cumulative specification and value added specification. In general, all the other
variations are derived from them.
Cumulative specification augments the contemporaneous model by including past
observed inputs.
Yit = Ditγ1 +Dit−1γ2 + · · ·+Di1γt +Xitα1 +Xit−1α2 + · · ·+Xi1αt + eit (1.8)
The error term can be derived by combining equation 1.5 and equation 1.8.
eit = Zitβ1 + Zit−1β2 + · · ·+ δtµi + it (1.9)
It works under the assumption that any omitted inputs and initial endowments are
uncorrelated with included inputs.
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1.3.3 Value Added Specification
Value added specification augments the contemporaneous model by including lagged
outcome, which can be viewed as a sufficient statistics for the omitted past
inputs,including any past unobserved endowments. It is often adopted when data on
past inputs are partly or completely missing.
Yit = Ditγ1 +Xitα1 + θYit−1 + eit (1.10)
By multiplying lagged outcome Yit−1 with θ, I get
θYit−1 =θDit−1γ1 + θDit−2γ2 + · · ·+ θDi1γt−1 + θXit−1α1 + θXit−2α2 + · · ·+
θXi1αt−1 + θZit−1β1 + θZit−2β2 + · · ·+ θZi1βt−1 + θµiδt−1 + θit−1
(1.11)
Then subtracts equation 1.5 with θYit−1 in both sides,
Yit − θYit−1 =γ1Dit + (γ2 − θγ1)Dit−1 + · · ·+ (γt − θγt−1)Di1+
α1Xit + (α2 − θα1)Xit−1 + · · ·+ (αt − θαt−1)Xi1+
β1Zit + (β2 − θβ1)Zit−1 + · · ·+ (βt − θβt−1)Zi1+
(δt − θδt−1)µi + (it − θit−1)
(1.12)
The error term in equation 1.10 can be expressed as
eit =(γ2 − θγ1)Dit−1 + · · ·+ (γt − θγt−1)Di1+
(α2 − θα1)Xit−1 + · · ·+ (αt − θαt−1)Xi1+
β1Zit + (β2 − θβ1)Zit−1 + · · ·+ (βt − θβt−1)Zi1+
(δt − θδt−1)µi + (it − θit−1)
(1.13)
Equation 1.13 indicates that this specification also imposes a set of restrictions on
estimating the production function. First, the coefficients on the past observed inputs
and the coefficient on all the unobserved (current and past)inputs are age-invariant (i.e.
γt = θγt−1, αt = θαt−1, βt = θβt−1 for all t). Second, the error term include child
heterogeneity in learning, and we assume that the heterogeneity enters through a one-
time process. According to δt = θδt−1, the coefficient associated with child endowment
is constant scross age. Third, as suggested by Todd and Wolpin (2003, 2007), in order
to consistently estimate γi and αi, it must be serial correlated in a way that makes
t − θt−1 become an i.i.d shock. Otherwise, Cov(Yit−1, eit) = 0 is violated.
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Since dynamic panel model does not address measurement error in test scores on
its own, Andrabi et al. (2011) state that the measurement error in the value added
specification will bias the estimated effect on inputs and lagged outcome. In particular,
the measurement in the lagged test score will cause an attenuation bias. Letting
Yit = Y
∗
it + uit denote the observed outcome, where Y
∗
it is the true outcome and uit
is the measurement error in test scores. Equation 1.10 could be rewritten as
Y ∗it = Ditγ1 +Xitα1 + θY
∗
it−1 + eit + uit − θuit−1 (1.14)
Therefore, the measurement error in the test score causes a downward bias specified as
plimθ = θ(1− σ
2
u
σ2y∗ + σ
2
u
) (1.15)
Ideally, a valid instrument for lagged one period test score would be previous period
test scores Yis(s <= t − 3). Due to the restriction of the data availability, outcome
Yit−1 could be instrumented by alternative outcomes, assuming that they are subject
to different sources of measurement error.
1.3.4 Cumulative Value Added Specification
Cumulative value added specification relaxes the assumption required by value added
model in the sense that the cumulative value added specification does not need the
age-invariant effects of the observed inputs. Cumulative value added specification
also relaxes the assumption requires by cumulative specification in the sense that the
value added cumulative specification allows the effects of past observed outcomes. It
is reasonable that parents chooses current inputs based on past observed outcomes.
Cumulative value added specification can be expressed as
Yit = Ditγ1+Dit−1γ2+ · · ·+Di1γt+Xitα1+Xit−1α2+ · · ·+Xi1αt+θYit−1+eit (1.16)
The error term is obtained by multiplying equation 1.5 with θ and then subtract equation
eit =β1Zit + (β2 − θβ1)Zit−1 + · · ·+ (βt − θβt−1)Zi1+
(δt − θδt−1)µi + (it − θit−1)
(1.17)
The error term given by equation 1.17 indicates the restriction imposed in this
specification is same as value added model except allowing for the effect of observed
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inputs to change across time.
1.4 Data Source
The data for this study is from the UK Millennium Cohort Study (MCS), which began
as a longitudinal study of 18,819 babies in 18,533 households in the UK. All of these
children were born between 1 September 2000 and 31 August 2001 in England and
Wales, and from 23 November 2000 to 11 January 2002 in Scotland and Northern
Ireland. The first sweep of the survey was conducted during 2001-2002 and collected
from parents when the babies were about 9 months old. The sample design allowed
for over-representation of individuals from ethnic minorities and families living in areas
with high rates of child poverty. The families were followed up at approximately two-
year interval. Subsequently, the second sweep was carried out when the children were
aged about 3 years, and the third one was collected when they were aged about 5 years
old. When children were 7 years old, the information was collected in the fourth sweep.
For ease of understanding, figure1.1 indicates each sample collection period and the
introduction of each in-work benefit policy. This dataset provides repeated measurement
and assessment of children which allows me to account for unobserved child fixed effects,
and it includes rich information on mother’s and child’s characteristics, sources and
amount of family income, and various family inputs.
The sample consists of natural mothers who are the main respondent across the
four interviews and who give birth to only one cohort child(multiple births are not
considered). The sample is further restricted to mothers who are single (legally
separated, single never married, divorced and widowed) during the 7 years’ observation
period1 and at least 16 years old at child birth, and of whom the child has at least two
cognitive or non-cognitive measures at age 3, 5 and 7. After pooling all 4 waves, the
resulting sample for cognitive score and noncognitive score is 4775 and 4820 observations,
separately.
As mentioned in section 1.1, this paper considers three groups of single mothers
depending on tax credit eligibility, which are the low-income in-work group(treatment
group), on-welfare group (the first control group) and middle-income in-work group(the
second control group).
This paper uses the British Ability Scales (BAS) to measure children’s cognitive
1This means the mother is reported to be single at interview across 4 waves.
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outcomes. BAS have been administered to test cognitive abilities and educational
performance for children aged from 2 years 6 months to 7 years 11 months, which are of
great importance in helping us to understand the core aspects of child’s ability: verbal,
picture reasoning and spatial abilities. This study uses the BAS Naming Vocabulary
Test to measure cognitive outcome at age 3 and 5, and uses BAS Word Reading at
age 7. To provide comparability in outcomes across studies, this paper transforms the
ability scores into Z-score, with mean 0 and standard deviation 1, which is adjusted for
age and difficulty of the questions.
The MCS uses the Strength and Difficulties Questionnaire (SDQ) to measure
children’s behavioural development. The SDQ is a behavioural screening questionnaire
for children aged from 3 to 16. It measures five sub-scales—emotion symptoms, conduct
problems, hyperactivity, peer problems and pro-social behaviour—each of the sub-scale
consists of 5 items. This study employs the Total Difficulty Score, which is obtained by
summing up the first four sub-scales, to measure children’s non-cognitive outcomes. The
Total Difficulty Score ranges from 0 to 40 and higher scores represent more problematic
behaviour. For the ease of interpretation, this paper reversely codes the SDQ score –
higher non-cognitive score means less behavioural problems. To provide comparability
in outcomes across studies, the Total Difficulty Score are standardized with mean 0 and
standard deviation 1.
The control variables included in this paper are child age at interview date, gender,
birth weight, number of siblings, birth parity, ethnicity, region of birth, mother’s
education level, age at child birth.
Mother’s working hour and income level by group and child age are provided in
figure 1.2. The treatment group has an income about 3000 pounds more per year than
low-income on-welfare group, and this income gap is persistent across years. Treatment
group earns annual income about 10000 pounds less than the middle-income in-work
group(panel (a)). Panel (b) shows that the average working hours for the treatment
group are approximately 22 hours, and middle-income in-work group are about 36 hours.
The on-welfare group barely works.
Figure 1.3 provides children’s scores by child age and single mother’s working status,
respectively. Panel (a) presents the cognitive test score gaps among three groups of
lone mother status. There is a persistent cognitive test score gap between children of
on-welfare mother and in-work mothers. For example, children of low-income in-work
mothers(treatment group) have cognitive test scores around 0.16 standard deviation
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higher than those of on-welfare mothers, but 0.12 standard deviation lower than those
of middle-income in-work mothers at age 3. The cognitive score gap between the low-
income in-work and middle-income in-work mothers is relatively smaller than the gap
between low-income in-work and low-income on-welfare group.
Panel (b) of figure 1.3 presents persistent non-cognitive score gaps among three
groups of lone mother’s working status. Children of low-income in-work mothers have
0.22 standard deviation higher than those of on-welfare families, but a 0.36 standard
deviation lower than those of middle-income in-work mothers at child age 3. The non-
cognitive skill gaps between the low-income in-work mothers and low-income on-welfare
is also smaller then the gap between low-income in-work mothers and middle-income
in-work mothers
Table 1.3 shows that children of on-welfare mothers always have the lowest cognitive
test scores and the highest problematic behaviour compared to the in-work mothers. In
general, low-income on-welfare mothers are less likely to use childcare arrangement, and
middle-income in-work mothers slightly use more of formal childcare than low-income
in-work mothers. Family learning environment measures the learning activity mother
involved with child, low-income on-welfare mothers have the lowest score. Birthweight
of cohort baby is monotonically increasing from low-income on-welfare group to middle-
income in-work group. As for family structure, on-welfare group has significantly higher
number of children in the household than in-work groups. When it comes to the
education level, middle-income group has much higher proportion of mothers with first
degree or above than the low-income groups.
Due to the changing definition of in-work benefit eligibility, table 1.4 shows the
transition matrix of working status of mothers across the whole sample period. Panel a
shows that most mothers stays in the same group across 4 waves. Among the mothers
start as low-income non-working group, 81.68% of them stay in the same group and
the majority of the rest (17.91%) move to low-income in-work group(eligible group).
There are 75.32% of the low-income in-work group stays as eligible, 19.96% move to
non-working group and 4.72% move to middle-income group. 73.30% of the middle-
income in-work group stay in the same group, 23.30% move to the eligible group and
3.40% move to the on-welfare group. A simple regression (1.5) shows that mothers
with more children are less likely to transition into eligible group or stay at the eligible
group, while they are more likely to move to lower income and less working hour/out of
labour market status. Mother’s age at child birth is not correlated with transitioning
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into or transitioning out of middle-income in-work status, while older mothers tend to
transition into or stay as the eligible group. Mothers with first degree are more likely
to transition into middle-income group and are less likely to stay as low-income group.
There is also evidence of regional effects found for London, South East and South West1.
For instance, mothers living in London tend to move out of eligible group and transition
into middle-income in-work group.
1.5 Empirical Results
This section firstly presents estimated effect of being entitled to in-work benefit
on children’s development for each specification and explores the reliability of each
model for out-of-sample forecasting performance using cross-validation criterion. Then
it provides various robustness check and tests possible channels through which the
treatment group is affected.
1.5.1 Main Specifications
This subsection presents estimation results based on specifications mentioned in section
1.3: the contemporaneous specification, the cumulative specification, the value-added
specification, value-added with IV specification and value-added augmented with
cumulative specification. The intergenerational effect of being eligible to the in-work
benefit is given by the coefficient on low-income in-work, with low-income on-welfare
and middle-income in-work as reference groups, separately, conditional on demographic
characteristics and regional fixed effects. Results on cognitive outcome and non-
cognitive outcome refer to slightly different sample, due to the missing.
Table 1.6 reports the in-work reform effects on children’s cognitive achievements.
Column (1) shows the results of contemporaneous specification, which is the baseline
model. It is found that mothers who receive in-work benefit are more likely to
improve children’s cognitive achievements than those mothers living on welfare, the
treatment group increases cognitive outcome significantly by about 0.058 of a standard
deviation(Panel a). Surprisingly, there is no significant effect found for the eligible group
with middle-income in-work group as the reference group (Panel b). Nonetheless, the
contemporaneous specification requires strong restrictions on the production function.
1There are in total 12 regions included in the regression. They are North East, North West,
Yorkshire and the Humber, East Midlands, West Midlands, East of England, London, South
East, South West, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. The reference group is North east.
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For this specification to make sense, it assumes that test scores are only determined by
current working status conditional on observed characteristics.
To test the implication of contemporaneous specification, this paper includes
historical status in column (2). Only lagged one period status is considered due to
the data restriction. As indicated in column (2) of panel a, the estimated effects of
current working status decreases to 0.044 of a standard deviation but the effects of
past working status is not significant. Panel b shows an insignificant current treatment
effect of 0.021 and past treatment effect of -0.018 of a standard deviation, comparing
to the middle-income in-work group. The null hypothesis of cumulative specification is
rejected, which implies the in favour of contemporaneous specification.
According to the value added specification in column (3), treatment improves
cognitive outcome by 0.052 of a standard deviation comparing to the low-income non-
work group, while no significant effect found comparing to the middle-income in-work
group. In panel a, past test scores significantly increase children’s cognitive outcome by
0.317 of a standard deviation. Panel b shows a significant effect of 0.262 of a standard
deviation. It may imply that the past test scores capture the effects of omitted current
and past inputs, and unobserved endowment or shocks. Note that this specification
implicitly allows for measurement error in test scores and heterogeneity in children’s
learning ability. By instrumenting lagged one period outcome by lagged two period
outcome, column (4) of panel a finds that the treatment effect rises from significant 0.052
in the value-added model to 0.079 and the persistence parameter increases from 0.317
to 0.739 of a standard deviation. This is consistent with equation 1.15 that attenuation
bias exists in the value added specification. Similarly, panel b shows an increase in
the persistence parameter, rising from 0.262 to 0.690 of a standard deviation. Notice
there is an additional issue with the value-added model. Estimates of the persistence
parameter are biased due to both measurement error in test scores and unobserved
child-level heterogeneity in learning. As specified in equation 1.13, past test scores fully
capture individual heterogeneity only if it enters through a one-time process, but this
assumption will be violated if talented children also learn faster. The positive correlation
between this unobserved heterogeneity and lagged past scores will lead to an upward
bias of parameter θ. Therefore, the direction of expected bias resulting from a simple
value-added model depends on the relative magnitude of two sources of bias.
Column(5) shows the estimation result when controlling for both historical working
status and and children’s past cognitive outcomes. The effect of current working status
21
decreases to insignificant 0.010 comparing to the low-income no-work group, while the
lagged working status picks up the significant effect of 0.078. With the middle-income
in-work group as the reference group, both current and past working status effect are
insignificant. The persistence parameter on the lagged outcome is similar to the value
added model.
In general these models show that girls have positive effects on cognitive test scores
than boys, increasing outcome by 0.059 to 0.106 of a standard deviation in panel a, 0.079
to 0.112 of a standard deviation in panel b. Birthweight positively predicts test score,
with association ranges from 0.029 to 0.120. In terms of family structure, more siblings
not necessarily reduce the cognitive score, and higher birth order adversely affects
outcome, ranging from 0.036 to 0.090. Higher-educated mothers improve children’s
cognitive outcome. Having a first degree or above considerably increases test score by
0.024 to 0.154 of a standard deviation in panel a and by 0.002 to 0.088 of a standard
deviation in panel b.
Table 1.7 provides evidence of the in-work benefit effect on children’s non-cognitive
outcomes. Generally, the treatment effect on non-cognitive score is, in magnitude,
greater than the effect on cognitive score. Under the contemporaneous and cumulative
specification, mothers currently receiving tax credit have significantly positive effect
on children’s non-cognitive behaviour than mothers living on welfare(Panel a). For
example, column (1) provides evidence that treatment group has non-cognitive outcome
significantly higher by 0.152 of a standard deviation. The cumulative specification gives
similar results on the effect of current working status, while the effect of past working
status is insignificant and small in magnitude. The value-added model gives smaller
treatment effect, 0.071 of a standard deviation. Instrumenting the lagged non-cognitive
score increases the persistence parameter from 0.544 to 0.901 (column (4)). It seems
that the current working status has no significant effect and it is absorbed by the effect
of lagged non-cognitive score. The effect given by cumulative value-added specification
is consistent with the value-added model, with no effect captured by lagged working
status.
Departure from no effect on cognitive scores, treatment group shows significantly
adverse effect on non-cognitive scores comparing to the middle-income in-work group,
under some specifications(Panel b). The magnitude of treatment effect ranges from
insignificant -0.002 to -0.224 of one standard deviation. While the past working
status has no significant effect on non-cognitive outcomes, the persistence parameter
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is around 0.496, increasing to 1.074 of a standard deviation when the lagged test score
is instrumented.
In general, girls have less problematic behaviours than boys, and birthweight
positively predicts non-cognitive score, with association range from 0.018 to 0.080. In
other words, children with one unit higher birthweight (which corresponding to one
standard deviation higher) reduce problematic behaviour by 0.018 to 0.080 of a standard
deviation. The number of siblings and birth parity seem to matter less for non-cognitive
outcomes than cognitive outcomes. The effect of mother having a first degree or above
considerably increase children’s non-cognitive score. Ethnicity seems to have no effect
on child’s behavioural performance.
Overall, the estimation results differ by underlying model assumptions and outcome
variables. However, the treatment effect shows an improvement on both child cognitive
test scores and non-cognitive well-being, comparing to the low-income non-work group.
With the middle-income in-work mothers as the reference group, the treatment effect
is insignificant for cognitive outcome and negative for non-cognitive scores. Due to the
possibility of selection into treatment and intrinsic differences between treatment and
control groups, all the estimators give only suggestive evidences but not causal effects.
1.5.2 Model Selection
Given all these specifications and discussion of estimation results, an important issue
is to select among competing specifications which have good representation of results.
Referring to Todd and Wolpin (2003) and Del Bono et al. (2016), this paper evaluates
and compares models by applying cross-validation method in addition to conventional
specification tests. It is useful for testing among non-nested models and non strictly
preferred null hypothesis. This method compares the performance of different models
and select the one with the best goodness fit for the available data on the basis of an
out-of-sample root-mean-squared error (RMSE) criterion.
This paper chooses the K-fold cross-validation which is the basic form of cross-
validation to implement our selection. The process is as follows. First, the sample
is partitioned into six nearly equally sized sub-samples. Note that there are three
categories of single mothers on the sample, the data need to be stratified prior to
being divided into six sub-samples in order to ensure that each sub-sample is a good
representative of the whole. Subsequently six iterations of estimation and validation are
performed for each model such that within each iteration five sub-samples are used for
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estimation while the remaining one sub-sample is held-out for validation. In other words,
the estimation results from the five sub-samples are used to construct the RMSE for
the one held-out sub-sample. In order to avoid coincidence, the RMSE is constructed
from four different initial randomizations and then average the four RMSE for each
specification.
Table 1.8 provides the RMSE for each specification and for both cognitive outcome
and non-cognitive outcome models. For the first control group, the first column favours
the cumulative value-added specification for the cognitive outcomes and the second
column selects the value-added model for non-cognitive outcomes(panel a). The second
control group chooses the value-added specification for both cognitive and non-cognitive
outcomes(panel b).
Referring back to the estimation results shown in table 1.6 and table 1.7, the
specification with the lowest RMSE suggests that lagged in-work benefit eligibility
significantly increases children’s cognitive outcomes by 0.078 of a standard deviation,
and improves non-cognitive skills by 0.071 of a standard deviation, comparing to the
mothers living on welfare.
1.5.3 Robustness Check
This subsection presents additional findings from following perspectives: alternative
definition of groups; child fixed effects to allow employment to be endogenous with
respect to unobserved endowment and time-invariant maternal characteristics; possible
mechanisms; the consistency of two in-work benefit reforms on child outcomes. The
robustness check is only focus on baseline specification and the specification with the
lowest RMSE as selected in table 1.8.
1.5.3.1 Alternative Definition of Groups
If mothers endogenously adjust labour supply with respect to changes in tax credit
eligibility, then it would be preferred to define the treatment and control groups before
the implementation of in-work benefit reform or define groups by variables that are not
directly related to benefit eligibility. This subsection firstly defines groups based on the
first wave of the available data, that is the pre 2003 WTC/CTC reform period. Thus the
treatment group and control groups are selected based on the 2002-2003 welfare rule.
For a lone parent family with characteristics at the sample means (1.78 children, £13.67
weekly childcare costs), tax credit reaches zero for a weekly net income of £314.79. In
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addition, education level would be a good candidate for defining treatment and control
groups.
The size of the on-welfare group increases, the size of the treatment group increases
in the second wave but decreases in the third and fourth wave, comparing to the sample
size in the main regression. Figure 1.4 shows the labour supply status of treatment and
control groups. The middle-income in-work group has lower income than that is shown
in figure 1.2. Figure 1.5 presents child cognitive and non-cognitive outcomes by child
age and groups, and there are persistent gaps across groups across time. Comparing
with figure 1.3, the non-cognitive score gap between treatment group and middle-income
in-work group is 0.18 of a standard deviation smaller at age 3, 0.05 smaller at age 5, and
0.13 smaller at age 7. The non-cognitive score gap is also smaller than shown in figure
1.3 between the treatment group and the non-welfare group, with 0.04 of a standard
deviation smaller at age 5 and 0.07 at age 7.
Table 1.9 provides estimation results of the treatment effect. There is no significant
effect found on the cognitive test scores under the baseline, irrespective of the control
group. Value-added specification shows a significant 0.041 of a standard deviation
increase in the cognitive test score, comparing to the low-income non-work group.
This is similar to the estimation result of value-added specification in table 1.6.
Non-cognitive score is significantly improved within the treatment group under the
baseline specification, but the estimates significantly reduced under the value-added
specification, with the second control group as the reference group. This is in contrast
with the main regression result of a significant 0.071(table 1.6). One candidate
explanation is the change in sample composition and smaller non-cognitive gap between
the treatment and the second control group, when the treatment and control groups are
fixed at the beginning period.
Table 1.10 offers evidence on an alternative definition of treatment and control
groups—the education level. Specifically, the treatment group includes mothers who
work at least 16 hours per week and have education level above O-level but below
bachelor level. The reference group is comprised of mothers who work less than 16
hours per week with the education level above O-level but below bachelor level. The
second control group is mothers who work no less than 16 hours per week and have at
least bachelor education degree. Results are similar to table 1.9.
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1.5.3.2 Child Fixed Effects
Above main specifications include a set of demographic variables to control for potential
differences in group-specific compositional changes over time. However, those models
deal with the effects of unobserved time-invariant characteristics by making strong
assumptions. Here I try to relax those assumptions by employing child fixed effects. It
allows employment choice to be endogenous with respect to unobserved child endowment
and compositional changes in unobserved characteristics.
Panel a of table 1.11 shows that baseline estimator gives a significant treatment
effect of -0.105 on cognitive scores by using the first control group, the magnitude
reduces to 0.041 once the preferred cumulated value added model controls for past
working status and outcome. Surprisingly, the persistent parameter gives negative value
for non-cognitive outcome in panel b. Under the child fixed effects specification, child
endowment and unobserved time-invariant variables are no longer captured by past
child outcome any more. The child fixed effects account for time-invariant differences
between treatment and control groups, under the assumption that maternal employment
is endogenous only with respect to time-invariant characteristics. Child fixed effect
model fails to document any significant treatment effect in the preferred specification,
with the on-welfare group as the reference group.
1.5.3.3 Mechanism
In order to examine the mechanisms through which eligibility to in-work benefits
might affect children’s outcomes, this paper is particularly interested in the potential
adjustments in usage of childcare, maternal time inputs, increased income and working
hours (Duncan et al., 2000; Zaslow et al., 2002; Bernal and Keane, 2011). It has been
well documented that in-work benefit reform encourages usage of child care service, and
Bernal and Keane (2010) find that one more year of child care decreases child cognitive
score by 2.1%. Both the WFTC and WTC/CTC policy contains an important childcare
compensation parameter. Both table 1.12 and table 1.13 show that the treatment effect
turn insignificant once controlling for childcare usage and maternal time inputs.
Column(1) and (3) of table 1.12 find that formal child care increases child
cognitive outcome by 0.092 and improves children’s emotional skill by 0.061 of a
standard deviation, with respect to the first control group. Cumulative value-added
models(column (2)) show that lagged formal child care significantly improves cognitive
scores by 0.132 of a standard deviation, while no childcare effects found for non-
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cognitive outcomes under the value added model(column(4)). Table 1.13 shows no
significant effect of formal childcare but a negative effect of informal childcare of -0.263
of a standard deviation for cognitive skill development under the baseline specification.
There is no significant effect of childcare on children’s non-cognitive skill. These evidence
may suggest that treatment group improves children’s outcome through more formal
childcare usage, comparing to the low-income non-work group.
Del Bono et al. (2016) shows a positive relationship between maternal time inputs
and child cognitive and non-cognitive outcomes. If being eligible to the in-work benefit
adjusts mother’s time allocation, then the treatment effect will partly work through the
maternal time inputs. The MCS dataset provides a rich measurement of maternal time
inputs(family learning environment) which foster children’s development. At age three,
mothers reported a range of activities that she spent with the child, including reading,
going to the library, drawing, playing music, teaching numbers or counting, learning
alphabet. These activities are reported in a frequency scale, ranging from“7 times a
week" to“none at all". At age 5 and 7, the MCS provides more broad range of activities,
including reading, going to the library, drawing, playing music, telling stories, doing
sports, playing games/toys, going to the park. Based on the work of Del Bono et al.
(2016), the indicator of maternal inputs is constructed by using principal component
analysis. This study retains a single common factor which with eigenvalues greater
than one according to the Kaiser criterion. This explains about 42.3 percent of the
total variance at age 3, 32.6 percent at age 5 and 33.7 percent at age 7.
As it indicated in table 1.3, on-welfare group are less likely to interact with their
children than the in-work mothers. Table 1.12 shows that family learning environment
significantly improves children’s cognitive score by 0.028 and non-cognitive skill by
0.096 of a standard deviation under the baseline specification. The effect reduces
to insignificant 0.006 and significant 0.051, separately for cognitive and non-cognitive
outcomes, under the RMSE-selected model. There is no effect of past family learning
environment for children’s outcome. Table 1.13 shows that lagged maternal time inputs
have significant effect for children’s non-cognitive outcomes.
Miller and Zhang (2009) and Dahl and Lochner (2012) exploit the effect of Earned
Income Tax Credit(EITC) on the test scores of child and find that the improvement rate
of children from low-income family are bigger than middle-income family. If this also
applies to the context of UK welfare systems, then I would expect that children of lower
end of income distribution of eligible group are more likely to be positively affected by
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the reforms, comparing to children of higher end of income distribution of eligible group.
For the estimation of income effect, I explore the income and working hour effects by
using interaction term rather than directly control for them since treatment status is
defined based on income and working hours. The net annual income band that ranges
from 2 (Less than £1,050) to 18 (£34,600 less than £52,000). Table 1.14 shows that the
additional one more unit of income band is insignificantly associated with treatment
group, irrespective of the reference group and specification. Thus it fails to provide any
evidence on the income channel. Column (1) of table 1.15 shows that an additional
hours of working reduces children’s cognitive score by 0.013 of a standard deviation,
comparing to the low-income non-work group. However, there is no evidence of working
hour channel under the other specification and for non-cognitive outcomes.
To investigate further the effects of working hours on child outcome that are induced
by eligibility to tax credit, the sample is split by working hours above or below 30
hours per week, which is another threshold for obtaining additional tax credit. Single
claimants, which applies to the case of lone mothers, who work at least 30 hours per
week are qualified to have the 30 hour element included in the award. Specifically, the
low-income in-work group is divided into two subgroups—low-income in-work less than
30 hours group and low-income in-work no less than 30 hours group. Likewise, the
middle-income in-work groups have been divided into two subgroups by working hours.
According to the RMSE-selected models of table 1.16(panel a), lagged treatment group
has significant effect on children’s cognitive outcome, irrespective of working hours.
In-work benefit eligible mothers who work less than 30 hours has significant effect on
improving non-cognitive skills by 0.088 of a standard deviation, while treatment group
with working hours more than 30 hours shows no significant effect. Table 1.16(panel b)
show that treatment group has no significant effect on children’s outcome under RMSE-
selected models. Thus the positive treatment effects found in the main regression on
non-cognitive score is partly explained by in-work benefit eligible mothers who work
less than 30 hours per week.
1.5.3.4 Difference-in-difference Estimations
In order to check the consistency of 1999 WFTC and 2003 WTC/CTC reform effect on
children, a measure of pre 2003 WTC/CTC child outcome is needed. Table 1.6 and 1.7
show that child birth weight is a good predictor for later cognitive and non-cognitive
outcomes. Thus I use standardized birthweight as a proxy for pre 2003 WTC/CTC child
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outcome. The sample is restricted to treatment group and the first control group—the
low-income on-welfare mothers. A difference-in-difference approach is employed to check
the effect of 2003 WTC/CTC reform on child outcome. Under the baseline framework,
the difference-in-difference approach can be formalized as follows
Yit = φ1Dit + φ2Postit + φ3Dit ∗ Postit + φ4t+Xitα1 + eit (1.18)
where Postit is an indicator for post 2003 WTC/CTC reform, φ3 is the parameter of
interest that captures the treatment effects. φ2 represents a common shift in the average
value of Yit for both treatment and control groups. In other words, it captures the effects
of all the other contemporaneous policies changes that occurred at the implementation
of 2003 WTC/CTC. φ4 represents a linear time trend common to both groups. Column
(1) and (4) of table 1.17 show that there is no significant difference in the treatment
effect before and after the 2003 WTC/CTC reform.
Additionally, I relax the common trend assumption that is imposed on equation
1.18, to allow for child outcome of treatment group to evolve differently from those of
control group regardless of the in-work benefit reform,
Yit = φ1Dit + φ2Postit + φ3Dit ∗ Postit + (φ41 + φ42Dit)t+Xitα1 + eit (1.19)
where φ42 captures the differential time trend between treatment and control group.
Column (2) and (5) of table 1.17 show no effect of policy changes on both child outcomes
once conditional on different time trend.
Child fixed effects specification is also adopted to allow for the endogeneity between
changes in mother’s labour supply choices and the policy.
Yit = φ1Dit + φ2Postit + φ3Dit ∗ Postit + (φ41 + φ42Dit)t+Xitα1 + Ci + eit (1.20)
where Ci represents the child fixed effects. It takes advantage of the panel structure and
allows for compositional changes in unobserved characteristics. Column (3) and (6) of
table 1.17 display insignificant policy effects.
The results confirm the consistent effect of being eligible to 2003 WTC/CTC with
1999 WFTC on children’s outcomes, therefore it should alleviate, to some extent, the
concern of estimation bias that is resulting from treating eligibility to those two policies
indifferently in this paper.
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1.6 Conclusion
The Working Family Tax Credit(WFTC) replaced the Family Credit(FC) as the main
source of in-work support for low-income families with dependent children in the UK in
October 1999. In April 2003, Working Tax Credit and Child Tax Credit(WTC/CTC)
then replaced the WFTC, while main features of WFTC have remained. This paper
provides the first piece of evidence on the effect of being eligible to post 1999 in-work
benefit policies on children’s early stage development in Britain. To be specific, it
studies the effect of the in-work benefit element of 1999 WFTC and 2003 WTC/CTC
on children’s outcomes.
It makes a number of improvements over previous literature. First, it finds that
single mothers who are entitled to in-work benefit significantly improves children’s
cognitive outcome and non-cognitive outcome at early childhood stage. Second, it
identifies treatment and control groups by exploring eligibility of benefit rules. In
particular, since there is no perfect control group, this paper employs two control
groups—one is more similar to the treatment group on one dimension that they have
low income and the other is more similar in another dimension that they participate in
the labour market. The advantage of having multiple control groups is that comparisons
between different group pairs are likely to provide a bound estimator in the sense that it
bounds the income effects and working hour effects. Additionally I can be more confident
in that estimators are less biased by the effect of other contemporaneous changes or trend
differences among groups. Third, various specifications of production function are used.
Treatment effects are implicitly proxy for family monetary and time investment. Then a
cross-validation method selects the value-added specification with the best performance
as the main specification in this paper. Finally, this study explores the panel nature of
the data and identifies which parameters of the in-work benefit policies are more likely
to explain its estimated effects.
This paper stresses six main findings. First, the preferred value-added specification
indicates that mothers who are eligible to in-work benefits positively affect children’s
cognitive scores by 0.078 of a standard deviation and non-cognitive outcomes by 0.071
of a standard deviation. Second, this paper finds no income effect that is induced
by in-work benefit eligibility. It is in contrast with the finding of Miller and Zhang
(2009) and Dahl and Lochner (2012) that document significant policy induced income
effects. Third, increasing formal childcare usage induced by in-work benefit policy helps
explain the positive treatment effect on cognitive outcomes, and increasing maternal
30
time inputs contribute to an improvement in children’s non-cognitive outcomes. Fourth,
the improvement in non-cognitive skill is mainly driven by children of mothers who work
less than 30 hours per week. The positive treatment effect fades when mother works
at least 30 hours. It provides some implication for policy makers on designing the
policy parameter. Fifth, by allowing mother’s employment choice to be endogenous
with respect to unobserved child endowment and compositional changes in unobserved
characteristics, a child fixed effect model suggests no evidence of treatment effects.
Sixth, this paper does not distinguish between the intergenerational effects of 1999
WFTC and 2003 WTC/CTC, for the reason that the changes in policy parameter are
unlikely to affect working status of lone mothers and this study confirms the consistency
in the effects of being entitle to 2003 WTC/CTC with 1999 WFTC on children’s
outcomes under a difference-in-difference framework.
In-work benefit policies aim to encouraging labour market participation of lone
mothers and reducing child poverty. However, the intergenerational consequences of
those policies on child outcomes are often overlooked. This paper claims that there
is positive effect of in-work benefit eligibility on both children’s cognitive and non-
cognitive outcomes, and the positive impacts on non-cognitive outcome is mainly driven
by treatment mother who works less than 30 hours per week. However, a comprehensive
evaluation must also take into account other contemporary policy changes and other
responses. The author is also aware that the underlying single mother model may not
be sufficient in the case that they also receive other income support from boyfriend,
ex-husband and extended family members.
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Tables
Table 1.1: Working Family Tax Credit (WFTC) Rule
1999-2000 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03
Basic Credit
Adult (couple/lone parent) 52.30 53.15 59.00 62.50
30 hour premium 11.05 11.25 11.45 11.65
Child Element
Aged 0-11 19.85 25.60 26.00 26.45
Aged 11-16 20.90 25.60 26.00 26.45
Aged 16-18 25.95 26.35 26.75 27.20
Maximum eligible childcare expenditure 70.00 70.00 135.00 135.00
Maximum eligible childcare expenditure, 105.00 105.00 200.00 200.00
2 or more children
Childcare subsidy 70% 70% 70% 70%
Applicable Amounts
Couple/Lone Parent 90.00 91.45 92.90 94.50
Wihtdrawal rate 55% 55% 55% 55%
Source: Child Poverty Action Group, Welfare Benefits Handbook (various years).
Note: The tax credits are at weekly basis. Working Families’ Tax Credit(WFTC) was
introduced in October 1999 to replace Family Credit(FC). It was then integrated into the
Child Tax Credit and Working Tax Credit(WTC/CTC) in April 2003.
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Table 1.2: Working Tax Credit and Child Tax Credit (WTC/CTC) Rule
2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08
Working Tax Credit
Basic Element 29.33 30.19 31.15 32.02 33.27
Extra for couples and lone parents 28.85 29.71 30.67 31.54 32.69
30 hour element 11.92 12.31 12.69 13.08 13.56
Disabled worker element 39.23 40.38 41.63 42.79 44.42
Severe Disability element 16.63 17.12 17.69 18.17 18.85
Maximum eligible childcare expenditure, 135 135 175 175 175
1 child
Maximum eligible childcare expenditure, 200 200 300 300 300
2 or more children
Proportion of eligible childcare covered 70% 70% 70% 80% 80%
Child Tax Credit
Family element 10.48 10.48 10.48 10.48 10.48
Family element, 10.48 10.48 10.48 10.48 10.48
extra for child under 12 months
Child element 27.79 31.25 32.50 33.94 35.48
Disabled child additional element 41.44 42.60 43.94 45.19 46.92
Severely child additional element 16.63 17.12 17.69 18.17 18.85
Common Elements
Threshold 97.30 97.30 97.30 100.38 100.38
Threshold if not entitled to WTC 254.42 259.23 267.50 272.21 278.75
Withdrawal rate 37% 37% 37% 37% 37%
Source: HM Revenue and Customs, http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/rates/taxcredits.htm
Note: For ease of comparison with WFTC rule, the tax credits in this table are imputed at weekly
basis using annualised amounts.
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Table 1.3: Summary Statistics by Child Age and Group
age 3 age 5 age 7
low low middle low low middle low low middle
welfare work work welfare work work welfare work work
Outcome variable
cognitive score -0.031 0.130 0.246 -0.124 0.015 0.091 -0.289 -0.0838 0.075
(0.555) (0.526) (0.628) (0.585) (0.523) (0.589) (0.747) (0.612) (0.572)
non-cognitive score -0.318 -0.100 0.260 -0.321 -0.112 0.118 -0.382 -0.133 0.116
(0.790) (0.638) (0.528) (0.834) (0.633) (0.588) (0.889) (0.698) (0.543)
Childcare arrangement
none 0.176 0.088 0.000 0.705 0.016 0.013 0.693 0.009 0.000
formal 0.715 0.304 0.365 0.055 0.220 0.377 0.057 0.207 0.368
informal 0.096 0.159 0.027 0.217 0.396 0.312 0.224 0.439 0.347
family learning environment -0.047 0.131 0.095 -0.011 0.058 0.095 -0.039 0.050 0.069
(1.020) (0.939) (1.026) (1.042) (0.964) (0.766) (1.061) (0.916) (0.859)
Demographic charaterastics
child gender 0.488 0.518 0.486 0.490 0.512 0.455 0.491 0.502 0.516
birthweight 3.076 3.140 3.244 3.068 3.143 3.219 3.064 3.129 3.253
(0.575) (0.560) (0.520) (0.573) (0.571) (0.466) (0.567) (0.581) (0.465)
no. of siblings 1.176 0.670 0.703 1.401 0.865 0.792 1.668 0.986 0.884
(1.124) (0.895) (0.903) (1.180) (0.881) (0.937) (1.214) (0.916) (0.886)
parity 1.894 1.544 1.527 1.895 1.611 1.571 1.924 1.616 1.600
mother age 25.470 26.860 32.340 25.340 26.800 32.260 25.280 26.530 32.150
(6.374) (5.938) (5.562) (6.349) (6.072) (5.384) (6.293) (6.138) (5.702)
dummy for 0.023 0.073 0.541 0.018 0.073 0.519 0.018 0.058 0.474
having first degree or above
white 0.895 0.930 0.878 0.892 0.932 0.844 0.887 0.935 0.832
(0.307) (0.255) (0.329) (0.310) (0.253) (0.365) (0.316) (0.246) (0.376)
Region
North West 0.107 0.088 0.162 0.106 0.095 0.143 0.106 0.101 0.105
Yorkshire and the Humber 0.062 0.079 0.000 0.065 0.067 0.026 0.065 0.066 0.053
East Midlands 0.046 0.055 0.041 0.052 0.038 0.065 0.043 0.050 0.063
West Midlands 0.071 0.068 0.041 0.070 0.070 0.052 0.073 0.066 0.053
East of England 0.054 0.050 0.041 0.053 0.060 0.039 0.055 0.056 0.063
London 0.091 0.048 0.189 0.088 0.055 0.169 0.088 0.055 0.168
South East 0.084 0.099 0.081 0.083 0.096 0.091 0.081 0.091 0.168
South West 0.044 0.051 0.041 0.041 0.057 0.052 0.036 0.061 0.032
Wales 0.210 0.181 0.149 0.217 0.179 0.130 0.218 0.190 0.095
Scotland 0.106 0.148 0.135 0.101 0.151 0.130 0.103 0.142 0.116
Northern Ireland 0.082 0.099 0.081 0.084 0.092 0.078 0.086 0.088 0.074
Observations 1386 546 74 1242 687 77 1106 805 95
Note: This table provides the descriptive statistics for three groups across child development age 3, 5 and 7.
low-welfare is the first control group, which includes children of single mother who is not working or working less than 16 hours
per week; low-work is the treatment group, which is consists of children of single mother who is working no less than 16 hours per
week but with low income; middle-work is the second control group, which is comprised of children of mother who is working more
or equal to 16 hours per week with middle income.
Standard deviation from mean is reported in parenthesis.
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Table 1.4: Transition Matrix of Working Status across Time
Working status
Non-working Low-income in-work Middle-income in-work
control group 1 treatment group control group 2 No.
Panel a: 9 months to age 7
Non-working 81.68% 17.91% 0.41% 4159
Low-income in-work 19.96% 75.32% 4.72% 1653
Middle-income in-work 3.40% 23.30% 73.30% 206
No. 3734 2038 246
Panel b: 9 months to age 3
Non-working 82.56% 16.85% 0.59% 1531
Low-income in-work 28.57% 64.29% 7.14% 420
Middle-income in-work 3.64% 32.73% 63.64% 55
No. 1386 546 74
Panel c: age 3 to age 5
Non-working 81.96% 17,825 0.22% 1386
Low-income in-work 18.86% 77.29% 3.85% 546
Middle-income in-work 4.05% 24.32% 71.62% 74
No. 1242 687 77
Panel d: age 5 to age 7
Non-working 80.27% 19.32% 0.40% 1242
Low-income in-work 15.57% 80.49% 3.93% 687
Middle-income in-work 2.60% 15.58% 81.82% 77
No. 1106 805 95
Note: Panel a shows the transition matrix across the whole sample period. Panel b, panel c and
panel d of the transition matrix show the probability of transiting between working status from wave
t(t <= 3) to wave t+ 1. There are three working status at each wave, with the low-income in-work as
the treatment group status, low-income non-working and middle-income in-work as two control group
status.
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Table 1.5: The Determinates of Working Status’ Transition
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
status111 status22 status33 status12 status13 status23 status21 status31 status32
child gender -0.015 -0.009 -0.063 0.015 0.000 -0.002 0.012 -0.010 0.073
(0.012) (0.021) (0.066) (0.012) (0.002) (0.010) (0.019) (0.030) (0.065)
birth weight -0.018 0.028 -0.056 0.015 0.003 0.004 -0.033 0.002 0.053
(0.010) (0.019) (0.065) (0.010) (0.002) (0.009) (0.017) (0.030) (0.064)
no. of children 0.066*** -0.101*** -0.207*** -0.064*** -0.001 -0.010 0.111*** 0.063* 0.144**
(0.008) (0.018) (0.055) (0.008) (0.001) (0.009) (0.017) (0.025) (0.053)
birth order -0.021* 0.051* 0.318*** 0.021* 0.000 -0.008 -0.042* -0.061* -0.257***
(0.010) (0.021) (0.063) (0.010) (0.002) (0.010) (0.019) (0.029) (0.062)
mother age -0.023** 0.057*** 0.079 0.024** -0.001 -0.004 -0.053*** -0.015 -0.064
at child birth (0.008) (0.014) (0.051) (0.008) (0.001) (0.007) (0.013) (0.024) (0.050)
mother age square 0.000** -0.001*** -0.001 -0.000** 0.000 0.000 0.001*** 0.000 0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
dummy for having -0.141*** -0.035 0.282*** 0.110*** 0.031*** 0.107*** -0.072** -0.057 -0.225**
first degree or above (0.027) (0.029) (0.073) (0.027) (0.005) (0.014) (0.027) (0.033) (0.071)
white -0.036 0.089* 0.022 0.034 0.002 -0.040 -0.049 -0.034 0.011
(0.022) (0.044) (0.094) (0.022) (0.004) (0.022) (0.040) (0.043) (0.091)
Region Effectsa
London -0.005 -0.156* -0.057 -0.005 0.009 0.077* 0.079 0.060 -0.003
(0.037) (0.072) (0.184) (0.037) (0.006) (0.035) (0.066) (0.084) (0.180)
South East -0.033 -0.063 -0.391* 0.031 0.003 0.060 0.002 0.020 0.371
(0.035) (0.063) (0.194) (0.035) (0.006) (0.031) (0.058) (0.089) (0.189)
South West -0.034 0.082 -0.416* 0.033 0.001 -0.001 -0.080 0.110 0.306
(0.041) (0.070) (0.203) (0.040) (0.007) (0.035) (0.064) (0.093) (0.198)
Observations 4137 1651 206 4137 4137 1651 1651 206 206
R-squared 0.039 0.070 0.272 0.035 0.019 0.078 0.095 0.092 0.239
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at child level. *** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5%
level, * Significant at the 10% level.
1 There are three working status of mothers, non-working, low-income in-work and middle-income in-work. For the ease of presentation,
number 1 indicates non-working group, number 2 represents low-income in-work group and number 3 means middle-income in-work group.
Thus variable name "status11" indicates for mother’s working status stays as non-working, "status12" means mother’s working status transits
from non-working to low-income in-work, the same logic applies to other dependent variables.
a There are 12 regions controlled for, with the North East region as the reference group. This table only presents regions with some
significance of estimates.
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Table 1.6: The Effect of In-work Benefit Reforms on Children’s Cognitive
Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
baseline cumulative VA VA-IV CVA1
Panel a: Control Group: low-income non-work
Working statusa
low-income in-work 0.058** 0.044* 0.052* 0.079* 0.010
(0.019) (0.021) (0.020) (0.035) (0.024)
lagged low-income in-work 0.029 0.078**
(0.021) (0.026)
Lagged child outcome 0.317*** 0.739*** 0.316***
(0.021) (0.106) (0.021)
Demographic controls
child gender 0.106*** 0.105*** 0.060** 0.104** 0.059**
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.033) (0.019)
birth weight 0.071*** 0.070*** 0.056*** 0.120*** 0.054**
(0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.029) (0.017)
no. of siblings -0.057*** -0.057*** -0.010 0.004 -0.008
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.021) (0.014)
birth order -0.056** -0.055** -0.068*** -0.036 -0.066***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.016) (0.028) (0.016)
mother age at child birth 0.024 0.023 0.032* -0.009 0.029*
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.023) (0.013)
mother age square -0.000 -0.000 -0.000* 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
dummy for having first degree or above 0.154*** 0.151*** 0.126*** 0.024 0.119***
(0.038) (0.038) (0.033) (0.065) (0.033)
white 0.010 0.010 -0.064 -0.140* -0.064
(0.041) (0.041) (0.037) (0.063) (0.037)
Observations 5533 5533 3613 1731 3613
R-squared 0.067 0.067 0.146 0.035 0.148
Panel b: Control Group: middle-income in-work
Working statusb
low-income in-work 0.012 0.021 0.049 0.034 0.064
(0.050) (0.051) (0.046) (0.077) (0.065)
lagged low-income in-work -0.018 -0.024
(0.050) (0.066)
Lagged child outcome 0.262*** 0.690** 0.262***
(0.038) (0.226) (0.038)
Demographic controls
child gender 0.112*** 0.112*** 0.079* 0.097 0.080*
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.050) (0.031)
birth weight 0.059* 0.059* 0.029 0.074 0.029
(0.029) (0.029) (0.028) (0.046) (0.028)
no. of siblings -0.016 -0.016 0.013 0.045 0.013
(0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.037) (0.027)
birth order -0.079* -0.078* -0.090** -0.044 -0.090**
(0.033) (0.033) (0.032) (0.049) (0.032)
mother age at child birth 0.003 0.003 -0.007 -0.016 -0.007
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.035) (0.021)
mother age square 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
dummy for having first degree or above 0.088* 0.087* 0.087* 0.002 0.085*
(0.041) (0.041) (0.039) (0.073) (0.039)
white 0.001 0.001 -0.054 -0.034 -0.054
(0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.092) (0.067)
Observations 1489 1489 1127 610 1127
R-squared 0.059 0.059 0.125 . 0.125
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at child level. *** Significant at the 1%
level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level. All regressions control for region fixed
effects.
1 It represents the cumulative value added specification.
a The reference group is low-income on-welfare families, and low-income in-work is the treatment group.
b The reference group is middle-income in-work families, and low-income in-work is the treatment group.
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Table 1.7: The Effect of In-work Benefit Reforms on Children’s Non-cognitive
Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
baseline cumulative VA VA-IV CVA1
Panel a: Control Group: low-income non-work
Working statusa
low-income in-work 0.152*** 0.150*** 0.071** 0.044 0.092**
(0.025) (0.026) (0.022) (0.035) (0.028)
lagged low-income in-work 0.004 -0.039
(0.026) (0.029)
Lagged child outcome 0.544*** 0.901*** 0.544***
(0.020) (0.057) (0.020)
Demographic controls
child gender 0.182*** 0.182*** 0.114*** 0.089* 0.115***
(0.029) (0.029) (0.021) (0.035) (0.021)
birth weight 0.048* 0.048* 0.050** 0.018 0.051**
(0.024) (0.024) (0.018) (0.028) (0.018)
no. of siblings -0.006 -0.006 -0.021 0.021 -0.022
(0.021) (0.021) (0.016) (0.023) (0.016)
birth order -0.035 -0.035 0.015 0.016 0.014
(0.026) (0.026) (0.019) (0.027) (0.019)
mother age at child birth 0.055** 0.055** 0.015 -0.001 0.017
(0.019) (0.019) (0.016) (0.021) (0.016)
mother age square -0.001* -0.001* -0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
dummy for having first degree or above 0.243*** 0.242*** 0.114*** -0.002 0.117***
(0.041) (0.041) (0.031) (0.053) (0.031)
white -0.059 -0.059 -0.062 -0.060 -0.062
(0.049) (0.049) (0.041) (0.067) (0.042)
Observations 5580 5580 3655 1775 3655
R-squared 0.054 0.054 0.309 0.262 0.309
Panel b: Control Group: middle-income in-work
Working statusb
low-income in-work -0.183*** -0.224*** -0.078 -0.002 -0.137*
(0.052) (0.055) (0.044) (0.062) (0.055)
lagged low-income in-work 0.075 0.096
(0.056) (0.058)
Lagged child outcome 0.496*** 1.074*** 0.498***
(0.039) (0.113) (0.039)
Demographic controls
child gender 0.204*** 0.204*** 0.110*** -0.054 0.109***
(0.040) (0.040) (0.032) (0.051) (0.032)
birth weight 0.080* 0.080* 0.078** -0.028 0.078**
(0.036) (0.036) (0.027) (0.045) (0.027)
no. of siblings 0.025 0.028 -0.002 -0.008 0.000
(0.039) (0.039) (0.031) (0.044) (0.031)
birth order -0.036 -0.038 -0.010 0.005 -0.012
(0.046) (0.046) (0.036) (0.048) (0.036)
mother age at child birth 0.038 0.038 0.033 0.047 0.033
(0.028) (0.028) (0.025) (0.030) (0.025)
mother age square -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
dummy for having first degree or above 0.096 0.102 0.071 -0.023 0.079*
(0.052) (0.052) (0.040) (0.064) (0.040)
white -0.050 -0.051 -0.079 -0.180 -0.079
(0.082) (0.082) (0.070) (0.100) (0.070)
Observations 1510 1510 1150 633 1150
R-squared 0.088 0.088 0.296 0.191 0.298
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at child level. *** Significant at the 1%
level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level. All regressions control for region fixed
effects.
1 It represents the cumulative value added specification.
a The reference group is low-income on-welfare families, and low-income in-work is the treatment group.
b The reference group is middle-income in-work families, and low-income in-work is the treatment group.
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Table 1.8: Model Selection—A Cross-Validation Approach
(1) (2)
Cognitive outcome Non-cognitive outcome
Panel a: Control Group: low-income non-work
Contemporary 3.5790 4.5848
Cumulative 3.5790 4.5826
VA 3.5125 3.9849*
VA-IV 3.5393 4.0065
CVA 3.5084* 3.9854
Panel b: Control Group: middle-income in-work
Contemporary 3.3169 3.6891
Cumulative 3.3169 3.6877
VA 3.2569* 3.2740*
VA-IV 3.2741 3.3155
CVA 3.2590 3.2769
Notes: This paper compares different specifications by applying cross-validation method. It compares
the performance of different models and select the one with the best goodness fit for the available data on
the basis of an out-of-sample root-mean-squared error (RMSE) criterion. This table applies the K-fold
cross-validation.
* indicates the model specification with the smallest RMSE value.
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Table 1.9: Robustness Check: Alternative Definition of Groups—Fixing groups
at the first wave1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cognitive outcome Non-cognitive outcome
baseline value added2 baseline value added
Panel a: Control Group: low-income non-work
low-income in-work a 0.023 0.041* 0.105*** 0.036
(0.020) (0.019) (0.027) (0.020)
lagged cognitive score 0.314***
(0.019)
lagged non-cognitive score 0.533***
(0.018)
R-squared 0.065 0.142 0.051 0.298
Observations 6786 4439 6837 4487
Panel b: Control Group: middle-income in-work
low-income in-workb -0.082 -0.017 -0.050 -0.002
(0.050) (0.042) (0.056) (0.045)
lagged cognitive score 0.274***
(0.031)
lagged non-cognitive score 0.491***
(0.037)
R-squared 0.072 0.140 0.076 0.294
Observations 2003 1312 2024 1336
Demographic controls c YES YES YES YES
Regional FE YES YES YES YES
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at child level.
*** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the
10% level.
1 Define treatment and control groups based on the eligibility at the first wave of
observation and keep the group composition the same across waves.
2 The cross validation selects cumulative value-added specification for modelling
the cognitive outcome for the first control group, but there is no variation in the
working status in the case of fixing treatment group. Therefore, value-added model,
the specification with the second smallest RMSE, is used here for the first control
group.
a The reference group is low-income on-welfare families, and low-income in-work is
the treatment group.
b The reference group is middle-income in-work families, and low-income in-work is
the treatment group.
c Demographic controls include child gender, birthweight, number of siblings, birth
parity, mother’s age and age square, dummy for having first degree or above and
ethnicity.
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Table 1.10: Robustness Check: Alternative Definition of Groups—Education1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cognitive outcome Non-cognitive outcome
baseline value added baseline value added
Panel a: Control Group: low-income non-work
low-income in-worka 0.031 0.041* 0.110*** 0.038
(0.020) (0.019) (0.027) (0.020)
lagged cognitive score 0.320***
(0.019)
lagged non-cognitive score 0.537***
(0.018)
R-squared 0.057 0.136 0.042 0.296
Observations 6733 4405 6783 4451
Panel b: Control Group: middle-income in-work
low-income in-workb -0.092 -0.110* -0.119 -0.055
(0.065) (0.052) (0.084) (0.059)
lagged cognitive score 0.292***
(0.029)
lagged non-cognitive score 0.494***
(0.036)
R-squared 0.070 0.149 0.069 0.298
Observations 2181 1431 2205 1458
Demographic controls c YES YES YES YES
Regional FE YES YES YES YES
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at child level.
*** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the
10% level.
1 Define treatment and control groups based on the education level of lone mother
at the first wave of observation and keep the group composition the same across
waves.
a The reference group is comprised of mothers who work less than 16 hours per
week with the education level above O-level but below bachelor level. The treatment
group includes mothers who work at least 16 hours per week and have education
level above O-level but below bachelor level.
b The reference group is mothers who work no less than 16 hours per week and
have at least bachelor education degree.
c Demographic controls include child gender, birthweight, number of siblings, birth
parity, mother’s age and age square, dummy for having first degree or above and
ethnicity.
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Table 1.11: Robustness Check: Child Fixed Effects Estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cognitive outcome Non-cognitive outcome
baseline CVA1 baseline VA
Panel a: Control Group: low-income non-work
low-income in-worka -0.105*** 0.041 0.029 0.023
(0.025) (0.037) (0.026) (0.034)
lagged low-income in-work 0.018
(0.034)
lagged cognitive score 0.292***
(0.024)
lagged non-cognitive score 0.539***
(0.021)
R-squared 0.016 0.148 0.005 0.310
Observations 5533 2625 5580 3094
Cognitive outcome Non-cognitive outcome
baseline VA baseline VA
Panel b: Control Group: middle-income in-work
low-income in-workb 0.012 0.059 -0.154* -0.049
(0.062) (0.057) (0.071) (0.072)
lagged cognitive score 0.244***
(0.046)
lagged non-cognitive score -0.377***
(0.046)
R-squared 0.001 0.122 0.009 0.166
Observations 1489 768 1510 1150
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at child level.
*** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the
10% level. Additional controls includes number of siblings and region dummies.
1 It represents the RMSE-selected cumulative value added specification.
a The reference group is low-income on-welfare families, and low-income in-work
is the treatment group.
b The reference group is middle-income in-work families, and low-income in-work
is the treatment group.
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Table 1.12: Mechanism: Treatment Effect through Childcare Usage and Family
Environment–First Control Group
(1) (2) (3) (4)
cognitive non-cognitive
baseline CVA baseline VA
Working Statusa
low-income in-work 0.045 0.041 0.100** 0.023
(0.024) (0.037) (0.031) (0.034)
lagged low-income in-work 0.018
(0.034)
Childcare arrangementb
formal childcare 0.092*** -0.060 0.061* 0.047
(0.021) (0.040) (0.029) (0.042)
informal childcare 0.002 -0.033 0.013 0.024
(0.027) (0.033) (0.034) (0.035)
lagged formal childcare 0.132***
(0.028)
lagged informal childcare 0.054
(0.034)
family learning environment 0.028** 0.006 0.096*** 0.051***
(0.010) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013)
lagged family learning environment 0.009
(0.013)
Lagged child outcome
lagged cognitive score 0.292***
(0.024)
lagged non-cognitive score 0.539***
(0.021)
Demographic controls c YES YES YES YES
Regional FE YES YES YES YES
R-squared 0.075 0.148 0.060 0.310
Observations 4589 2625 4633 3094
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at child level. ***
Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level.
a The reference group is low-income on-welfare families, and low-income in-work is the
treatment group.
b The reference group is no non-maternal childcare.
c Demographic controls include child gender, birthweight, number of siblings, birth
parity, mother’s age and age square, dummy for having first degree or above and
ethnicity.
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Table 1.13: Mechanism: Treatment Effect through Childcare Usage and Family
Environment–Second Control Group
(1) (2) (3) (4)
cognitive non-cognitive
baseline VA baseline VA
Working Statusa
low-income in-work 0.057 0.059 -0.194** -0.083
(0.065) (0.057) (0.063) (0.050)
Childcare arrangement
formal childcare -0.189 -0.255 0.233 0.004
(0.123) (0.191) (0.168) (0.179)
informal childcare -0.263* -0.316 0.196 -0.028
(0.123) (0.190) (0.168) (0.176)
family learning environment 0.044* 0.034 0.103*** 0.057*
(0.021) (0.021) (0.029) (0.025)
Lagged child outcome
lagged cognitive score 0.244***
(0.046)
lagged non-cognitive score 0.528***
(0.047)
Demographic controls c YES YES YES YES
Regional FE YES YES YES YES
R-squared 0.067 0.122 0.090 0.328
Observations 895 768 910 786
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at child
level. *** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant
at the 10% level.
a The reference group is middle-income in-work families, and low-income in-
work is the treatment group.
b The reference group is no non-maternal childcare.
c Demographic controls include child gender, birthweight, number of siblings,
birth parity, mother’s age and age square, dummy for having first degree or
above and ethnicity.
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Table 1.14: Mechanism: Treatment Effect through Income Channel
cognitive non-cognitive
baseline CVA baseline VA
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel a: Control Group: low-income non-work
low-income in-worka 0.122 0.092 0.037 0.251
(0.100) (0.128) (0.126) (0.132)
low-work*income -0.006 -0.010 0.012 -0.020
(0.011) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
income -0.004 0.003 -0.006 0.008
(0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011)
R-squared 0.067 0.134 0.049 0.316
Observations 2591 1728 2600 1732
cognitive non-cognitive
baseline VA baseline VA
Panel b: Control Group: middle-income in-work
low-income in-workb 0.598 0.534 -0.111 0.187
(0.305) (0.361) (0.456) (0.518)
low-work*income -0.035 -0.033 -0.008 -0.029
(0.021) (0.025) (0.032) (0.036)
income 0.022 0.014 0.019 0.024
(0.018) (0.022) (0.030) (0.034)
R-squared 0.067 0.118 0.102 0.347
Observations 552 433 559 442
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered
at child level. *** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the
5% level, * Significant at the 10% level. All regressions control for
demographic characteristics and region fixed effects.
a The reference group is low-income on-welfare families, and low-
income in-work is the treatment group.
b The reference group is middle-income in-work families, and low-
income in-work is the treatment group.
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Table 1.15: Mechanism: Treatment Effect through Working Hour Channel
cognitive non-cognitive
baseline CVA baseline VA
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel a: Control Group: low-income non-work
low-income in-worka 0.058 0.022 0.157*** 0.127**
(0.033) (0.038) (0.046) (0.045)
low-work*wkhr -0.013* -0.007 -0.014 -0.006
(0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011)
working hour 0.013* 0.006 0.014 0.004
(0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011)
R-squared 0.068 0.148 0.055 0.309
Observations 5533 3613 5580 3655
cognitive non-cognitive
baseline VA baseline VA
Panel b: Control Group: middle-income in-work
low-income in-workb -0.301 -0.044 -0.135 0.160
(0.234) (0.255) (0.203) (0.220)
low-work*wkhr 0.009 0.002 -0.001 -0.007
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
working hour -0.009 -0.003 0.002 0.006
(0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006)
R-squared 0.060 0.125 0.088 0.297
Observations 1489 1127 1510 1150
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered
at child level. *** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the
5% level, * Significant at the 10% level. All regressions control for
demographic characteristics and region fixed effects.
a The reference group is low-income on-welfare families, and low-
income in-work is the treatment group.
b The reference group is middle-income in-work families, and low-
income in-work is the treatment group.
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Table 1.16: Robustness Check: the Effect of 30 hour Element of the In-work
Benefit Reforms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
cognitive non-cognitive
baseline CVA baseline VA
Panel a: Control Group: low-income non-work
low-income working< 30 hours 0.062** 0.019 0.162*** 0.088***
(0.021) (0.026) (0.027) (0.024)
low-income working>= 30 hours 0.048 -0.020 0.128*** 0.024
(0.030) (0.036) (0.037) (0.031)
lagged low-income working< 30 hours 0.079**
(0.027)
lagged low-income working>= 30 hours 0.091*
(0.042)
lagged cognitive score 0.316***
(0.021)
lagged non-cognitive score 0.544***
(0.020)
R-sqr 0.067 0.148 0.055 0.309
Observations 5533 3613 5580 3655
cognitive non-cognitive
baseline VA baseline VA
Panel b: Control Group: middle-income in-work
low-income working< 30 hours 0.019 0.064 -0.183*** -0.075
(0.051) (0.048) (0.055) (0.046)
low-income working>= 30 hours -0.003 0.020 -0.182** -0.085
(0.055) (0.052) (0.057) (0.049)
lagged cognitive score 0.262***
(0.038)
lagged non-cognitive score 0.496***
(0.039)
R-sqr 0.059 0.126 0.088 0.297
Observations 1489 1127 1510 1150
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at child level. ***
Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level. All
regressions control for demographic characteristics and region fixed effects.
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Table 1.17: Robustness Check: Consistency of WFTC and WTC/CTC reform
effects—Difference-in-difference Estimations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
cognitive non-cognitive
baseline1 time trend2 child FE3 baseline time trend child FE
treata 0.100 0.079 0.009 0.109* 0.093 0.034
(0.054) (0.058) (0.065) (0.055) (0.059) (0.069)
treat*post 0.014 -0.028 -0.066 0.070 0.038 0.066
(0.056) (0.068) (0.071) (0.059) (0.073) (0.077)
post b 0.136*** 0.150*** 0.151*** -0.244*** -0.234*** -0.254***
(0.033) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.040) (0.040)
time trend -0.112*** -0.120*** -0.109*** -0.022* -0.027 0.001
(0.010) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.015) (0.015)
treat*time trend 0.020 0.023 0.015 -0.009
(0.020) (0.021) (0.022) (0.021)
Child FE NO NO YES NO NO YES
Demographic YES YES YES YES YES YES
controls c
Regional FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 7534 7534 7534 7581 7581 7581
R-squared 0.039 0.039 0.022 0.044 0.044 0.033
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at child level. *** Significant
at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level.
1 This specification refers to equation 1.18.
2 This specification refers to equation 1.19.
3 This specification refers to equation 1.20.
a Treat refers to the low-income in-work group and the control group is the low-income on-welfare
group.
b Post refers to post April 2003 period i.e. post WTC reform.
c Demographic controls include child gender, birthweight, number of siblings, birth parity, mother’s
age and age square, dummy for having first degree or above and ethnicity.
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Figures
Figure 1.1: Timeline
Note: There are two in-work benefit reforms in the period 1999-2008: the WFTC reform and
WTC/CTC reform. The points of observation for children’s outcome occurred when they are 9
months, 3, 5 and 7 years old. Due to different interview date, the information documented
at wave 2(age 3) could refers to the outcome at before/after the implementation of 2003
WTC/CTC.
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(a) Income gap
(b) Working hour gap
Figure 1.2: Mother’s Working Status by Group
Note: Cells are the average income band or working hour at each survey age. Panel (a) shows
the net income gap among low-income on-welfare, low-income in-work and middle-income in-
work groups. Panel (b) shows the working hour gap among low-income on-welfare, low-income
in-work and middle-income in-work groups.
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(a) Cognitive outcome gap
(b) Non-cognitive outcome gap
Figure 1.3: Child Outcome Gap by Group
Note: Cells are the average child outcome at each survey age. Panel (a) shows the
cognitive outcome gap among low-income on-welfare, low-income in-work and middle-
income in-work groups. Panel (b) shows the non-cognitive outcome gap among low-
income on-welfare, low-income in-work and middle-income in-work groups.
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(a) Income gap
(b) Working hour gap
Figure 1.4: Robustness Check: Alternative Definition of Groups—Mother’s
Working Status by Group
Note: Cells are the average income band or working hour by group and survey age.
The composition of each group are fixed under the WFTC regime, i.e. the definition of
treatment and control group is defined based on the WFTC rule. Panel (a) shows the
net income gap among low-income on-welfare, low-income in-work and middle-income
in-work groups. Panel (b) shows the working hour gap among low-income on-welfare,
low-income in-work and middle-income in-work groups.
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(a) Cognitive outcome gap
(b) Non-cognitive outcome gap
Figure 1.5: Robustness Check: Alternative Definition of Groups—Child Outcome
Gap by Group
Note: Cells are the average child outcome at each survey age. The composition of each
group are fixed under the WFTC regime, i.e. the definition of treatment and control
group is defined based on the WFTC rule. Panel (a) shows the cognitive outcome gap
among low-income on-welfare, low-income in-work and middle-income in-work groups.
Panel (b) shows the non-cognitive outcome gap among low-income on-welfare, low-
income in-work and middle-income in-work groups.
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Chapter 2
Is the Quantity-quality Trade-off Real?
Quasi-experimental Evidence from China
Abstract
China has implemented several family planning policies during the last four
decades. For the purpose of understanding the implication and consequences of
controlling population size, this paper investigates the relationship between fertility
and children’s educational outcome(quantity-quality(Q-Q) trade-off). It departs from
previous literature in accounting for the non-linear distribution both within each birth
parities and across birth parities. Specifically, the non-normal distribution within each
birth parity is accounted for by applying Generalized Method of Moments(GMM). It
respects the limited dependent nature of both outcome and endogenous variables. In
contrast with conventional 2SLS estimates, GMM estimates give significantly negative
effects of fertility on education outcome of children, which is consistent with the
Becker-Lewis model that an increase in child quantity increases the shadow price of
quality. Moreover, the Q-Q trade-off non-linearly decreases with family size and shows
heterogeneous effects by birth order. The identification strategy exploits variation in
family size that is induced by twin births and first child’s gender. This paper is the first
to apply first child’s gender as an instrumental variable to explore the Q-Q trade-off
in the context of China where son preferences are prevailing. This instrument offers
the possibility to test the Q-Q trade-off at a lower fertility margin than the typical
instruments based on twins and same-sex composition.
Key Words: Fertility, education, quality-quantity trade-off, GMM, twin births, first
child’s gender
JEL Classification:: C26, J13, J18, J24, O15, P20
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2.1 Introduction
Under the general assumption that parents invest in all their children equally, Becker
and Nigel (1973) propose that an exogenous increase in the number of children increases
the marginal cost of investment in their quality. Motivated by the theoretical model
of the quantity-quality(Q-Q) trade-off (Becker and Nigel, 1973, 1976; Willis, 1973), the
relationship between family size and child outcome has been one of the most enduring in
economics. On the one hand, the declining quantity of children will free up resources for
human capital investment; on the other hand, larger family size may benefit from the
economies of scale and the social interaction of children, as Black et al. (2005) argued,
children with fewer siblings may not be better off than if they are in a larger family.
If the Q-Q trade-off exists, it suggests that parents who have less children allocate
more of their time and resources to each of the children assuming that parents invest in
children evenly and holding income constant. Furthermore, the trade-off implies that
those policies aiming at curbing population growth or subsidizing families with fewer
children may contribute to better health, educational and behavioural outcomes of each
child. In turn, it may reduce abortion rates, crime rates and poverty rates in the society
(Schultz, 2007). For example, if couples perceive this Q-Q trade-off story and prefer
better quality children, parents could be motivated to avoid unwanted births and reduce
social problems. Therefore, a significant trade-off provides evidence for government to
advance contraceptive knowledge and subsidize birth control.
However, population control policy is unsustainable for long term economic growth,
especially for ageing societies such as some western countries and China. China
implemented One-Child Policy(OCP) in 1978 to curb the rapid population growth, but it
realized recently that the OCP gave substantial pressure for the only child to give elderly
care for parents and for the society to bear the cost of ageing population structure. Thus
the OCP was relaxed to some extent in 2014(selective two-child policy), and two-child
policy has been implemented since early 2016. These shifts in family planning policy
induces complicated demographic transition, thus it would be important to understand
the relationship between fertility and human capital accumulation. If the Q-Q trade-off
exists, policies aiming at maintaining sustainable economic growth should be equipped
with policies that alleviate the adverse effect of fertility, such as more generous maternal
leave, public education and health support for the family. It is also important to test the
existence of a cutoff point for Q-Q trade-off. If non monotonicity and heterogeneity exist
in quantity effects, then a trade-off may be found in a certain range of family size and
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households with certain characteristics. Thus policies should be adjusted accordingly.
While the theoretical model implies a negative trade-off, empirical results of the
Q-Q trade-off need to be treated critically. It is well established that there is no Q-Q
trade-off in developed countries, but developing societies tend to have less conclusive
findings. Due to the higher quality of public education system and better government
support for childbearing and childcare, it is likely that the Q-Q trade-off is less evident
in more developed economies. This study focuses on children born in 1970s with a
majority of them living in rural China, they suffered from poor education system and
were born before1 the implementation of One Child Policy.
The compulsory schooling law in China was not implemented until 1986. It mandates
six-year primary school and three-year junior high school. The primary school enrolment
rate was quite low at the beginning of Chinese economic reform in 1978. Only 36.6
percent of the counties has widespread access to primary school education for schooling
age children in 1985, and the enrolment rate of primary school and junior high school
was 95.9 percent and 68.4 percent, respectively2. The implementation of compulsory
schooling was not uniform across the country. It largely depended on local government
budget which made the access to education more difficult in poor rural areas. In poor
areas, even if public school was provided, it was not totally free, parents still had to pay
the tuition and other fees3. Thus the school enrolment of children were subject to the
choices of parents and local government budget and facilities prior to 1986. The sample
under study in this paper is composed of children born in a period which is before the
implementation of compulsory schooling law.
This paper presents new evidence on the child quantity(sibling size)-quality(schooling)
trade-off in the context of China. The identification strategy exploits variation in fam-
ily size that is induced by the gender of first birth and twin births. Typically previous
literature tends to estimate the trade-off using linear probability approach and only con-
siders non-linearity across birth parities4. This paper departs from previous literature
in accounting for the non-linear distribution both within each birth parities and across
1The sample also includes children born in early 1980s, which may result in the estimates
being contaminated by the OCP. However, robustness check based on an earlier period
sample(1982 census) give similar result.
2source from the website of the National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China
http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/rdlt/fzjs/2009-02/13/content_1470214.htm
3It is not until 2000 that the coverage of nine-year compulsory schooling reached 85% and
the illiteracy rate reduced to less than 5%.
4Here birth parities means at least 1 birth sample(families with at least 1 birth), at least 2
births sample(families with at least 2 births) and at least 3 births sample(families with at least
3 births).
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birth parities. Specifically, the non-normal distribution within each birth parity is ac-
counted for by applying Generalized Method of Moments(GMM). It respects the binary
nature of the outcome variables and the count nature of the endogenous variable, thus
it gives a consistent and more efficient estimator of the Q-Q trade-off. The non-linear
distribution of fertility effects across birth parities is accounted for by estimating Q-Q
trade-off at each birth parity separately(Black et al., 2005; Angrist et al., 2010).
This paper is the first to apply the variation in fertility generated by first child’s
gender into testing the Q-Q trade-off in the context of China where son preferences are
prevailing. This is largely influenced by the Confucianism that it stresses the importance
of patrilineality within Chinese society (Das Gupta et al., 2003). Patrilineality enforces
sons to continue the family lineage and inheritance. It is also widely believed that girls
marry “out" of their natal families and parents cannot rely on girls for old-age support.
Therefore, families with son preferences will generally have larger family size if the first
birth is a girl than a boy. This instrument uncovers a channel to test the Q-Q trade-off of
a marginal second birth on the first born, while typically twins and parental preference
for a mixed gender composition estimate the effect of a marginal third or higher birth
order child on older siblings1. Moreover, using it as an instrumental variable provides
a sensitivity test on twinning as an instrument.
I find significantly adverse effects of one additional birth on the education outcome
of the firstborn child for families with at least one or two births, regardless of the
instruments. The Q-Q trade-off is estimated separately for firstborn and secondborn
children of families with three or more children, as it is reasonable to believe that children
of different birth order would present different response to an additional birth. Indeed,
Q-Q trade-off is bigger for the second-born children than for the first-born children.
Generally the Q-Q trade-off is more evident in a relatively smaller family. It maybe
due to the fact that conditional on a bigger family size, the resource is spread more
thinly and thus the marginal decrease in the welfare of older sibling declines with child
quantity. It provides some evidence on the non-linearity of trade-off as family size goes
up.
Although exploring potential mechanisms through which family size affects
children’s outcome is beyond the scope of this paper, I explored mother’s labour supply
adjustment and economies of scale channels. Basically, mother’s labour supply stayed
1In this paper marginal child refers to the child that is born due to the instrument, for
example, a marginal third birth refers to the additional child induced by twins at the second
birth.
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stable when family size increased from 2 to 3 but dropped significantly when fertility
raised from 3 to 4. It has been documented that maternal time is very important in
the early stage of the children’s development. If reduction in labour supply indicates
an increase in maternal supervision time with their children, then this labour supply
adjustment could possibly explain the finding that 2+ families showed a significant Q-
Q trade-off while 3+ families displayed no Q-Q trade-off. The evidence on economies
of scale in terms of sharing schooling costs was mixed, but in general it favoured the
channel that children from a bigger family enjoyed economies of scale1.
Several tests are performed to test the validity of instrumental variables since twin
births and girl at first birth may affect the schooling outcome independently from family
size. Twinning may affect the outcome of lower parity children through zero spacing
and lower birthweight. I test the existence of these mechanisms, and the results suggest
that estimators of Q-Q effects are probably positively biased. Thus the true adverse
effects of family size on the schooling performance of the children are bigger.
The validity of firstborn gender implies that it should be random so that it is
not correlated to any parental preference. Thus it requires assumptions to be made
on parental investment in education, i.e. parents have no gender-biased investment
preference and child’s ability is independent of gender. This paper tests this hypothesis
in the following ways.
First, if the sex ratio at the first birth is within the natural range2, then it can at least
rule out pre-natal sex preferences. One would worry about the technology advancement
in invalidating the gender-related instruments. Ultrasound diagnosis of fetal gender
became available since early 1980s, but sex-selective abortion techniques became widely
available only after 1986/7 (Lin et al., 2008). My sample period covers children born
between 1974 and 1984, among which the younger cohorts could be affected by theses
technologies but only to a weak extent. A simple way to check sex-selective abortion
on the firstborn is to compare mother’s age at first birth with boy versus girl. The
idea is that if abortion exists, it should delay son’s birth. However, I find no significant
difference between mother’s age at firstborn boy and at firstborn girl. Additionally,
the infant mortality rate was 70 deaths per 1000 births, among which boy death was
higher than girl death. Furthermore, to rule out the contamination of technology effect,
1Results on these mechanisms are not attached in this version of paper, but they can be
provided upon request.
2The World Health Organization(WHO) defines natural sex ratio at birth to be 105 males
for every 100 females. More information at http://www.searo.who.int/entity/health_
situation_trends/data/chi/sex-ratio/en/
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results are also provided using 1982 census which is consists of children born before
the availability of these technologies. Second, possibly the validity can be tested by
comparing the educational outcomes of children for different gender holding family
size constant. If families with more boys have better outcomes than those with more
girls, conditional on family size, then it indicates a post-natal sex-selective investment,
assuming child ability is independent of gender. This paper find no evidence of post-
natal gender biased investment behaviour from this perspective. Third, if gender at
first birth does not affect child outcome independently from family size, then one would
expect no reduced-form effects in a sample where the first child gender should matter
the least. Unfortunately, this validity test fails to rule out the direct impact of first
child’s gender, but the direction of bias indicates that the true Q-Q tradeoff is smaller.
Previous twins-based studies mainly examine the effects of family size on lower
birth order children, the effects on outcome of twins themselves are often overlooked.
Rosenzweig and Zhang (2009) suggest that the effect of twinning on twins and non-twins
provides upper and lower bound estimation of Q-Q trade-off, under the assumption that
parents allocate resources towards non-twins due to the birthweight deficit. Therefore,
this study also employs twin at first birth as instrument to bound the traditional twin
estimators. Applying their estimation strategy, I find support of parental reinforcement
behaviour, implying estimators of lower bound are positively biased. Thus, the true
Q-Q trade-off based on twin instrument is bigger than what is showed in this study.
There is evidence of heterogeneity in supporting that the trade-off is mainly driven
by children of rural households and of less educated mothers. Possible explanation could
be that children from relatively disadvantaged background experienced less developed
education system and government support, and were more likely to be financially
constrained due to the less developed capital market.
The paper unfolds as follows: section 2.2 presents the institutional background and
literature review on the analysis of quantity-quality trade-off. Section 2.3 provides the
estimation strategy. Section 2.4 describes the data source and descriptive statistics.
Section 2.5 provides empirical results and robustness checks. Finally, section 2.6 draws
conclusion.
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2.2 Institutional Background and Literature Re-
view
2.2.1 Policy background
After two decades of rapid population growth, the Chinese central government enacted
a series of birth planning campaign to curb population growth in 1971. At first, the
main objective was to encourage people to get married later, to expand birth spacing
between births and to have fewer children. Later, a stricter policy – the One Child
Policy – was announced in 1978 and tightly enforced across the country in 1980. Each
household was allowed to have only one child, a second child was permitted only under
extreme circumstances. However, it only applied to individuals of Han ethnicity, ethnic
minorities were exempt from this policy. It generates additional variation in family size
across ethnicities.
Considering the difficulties in enforcing the policy and the high labour demand in
rural areas, this restriction was relaxed in the manner that rural couples were allowed to
have a second birth after a specified interval if the first child was a girl in 1984. However,
in some rural areas, all couples were allowed to have two children. Violators of the family
planning policy will mainly be punished in the form of monetary penalties. The amount
of fines are generally big and varies with regions. Under certain circumstance, people
can even lose their jobs or permanently lose the chance to get promoted, for instance if
one of the couple works in the government or state-owned enterprise.
There has been a gradual relaxation of ChinaâĂŹs family planning policies in recent
years. The selective Two-Child policy was implemented in 2014. Couples in many parts
of the country have been allowed to have two children if one parent was an only child.
However, eligible couples did not illustrate strong wishes of giving additional birth.
Thus this policy was far from reaching the government goal. In early 2016, Two-Child
policy has been enacted to allow for maximum 2 children in all families.
2.2.2 Literature Review
A main implication of the quantity-quality trade-off model (Becker and Nigel, 1973,
1976) is that the marginal cost of quality increases with quantity, holding the income
constant. However, empirical research, to some extent, diverges from the theory
implication.
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Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980) are the first to confirm the hypothesis of Becker and
Nigel (1973, 1976) by using twins as an exogenous increase in fertility in India. However,
their estimation is imprecise due to the fact that the sample size is small(25 twins pairs),
and the selection bias problem resulting from using outcomes of all children. Moreover,
the internal validity of twinning as an instrumental variable relies on a large sample
data which helps to mop up the infrequency of multiple births.
More recent studies based on developed societies tends to find negligible effects
of family size on educational attainment of children. Using a data set on the entire
population of Norway, Black et al. (2005) argue that previous work on the impacts
of family size1 would be biased if not controlling for birth order effects. In fact, they
find negligible family size impacts on children’s education when controlling for birth
order. Instead of affecting the quality of each child, family size may only affect the
marginal child through the impact of birth order. In particular, higher birth order has
significant negative effects on child’s education, adult earnings, employment and teenage
childbearing. Theoretically, there are some models predicting birth order effects, say
the optimal stopping model(continue to have children until they have a poor quality
child). However, later research fails to find this pattern of birth order effects. One
candidate explanation is that the Q-Q trade-off is offset by the good education system
and generous welfare in well-off countries.
As pointed out by Imbens and Angrist (1994), the estimations generated by
any particular IV approach capture only the effects on individuals affected by that
instrument, which should be interpreted as the local average treatment effect (LATE).
Angrist et al. (2010) combine evidence from multiple sources of variation in family
size by separately and jointly using the incidence of twin births and same-sex sibling
pairs. This method captures the effect of fertility across different treatment groups and
therefore increases the range of variation. Their results show no evidence of Q-Q trade-
off in Israel. However, their study fails to capture the effects on the marginal child, and
the estimated effects on college attendance show large standard error. Additionally,
a limitation of using twins at second/third birth and preference for a mixed gender
composition of children is that they give only the marginal effects of a third/fourth
child, while the marginal effects of a first or second child is technically inaccessible.
Developing countries differ from developed countries in many aspects, such as
economy status, public education system, government support for childbearing and
1This paper uses fertility effect, family size effect, sibling size effect and quantity effects
interchangeably. They all refers to the effect of number of children.
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childcare, and social norms, which may render the trade-off more evident in the
developing countries.
Lee (2008) studies the trade-off by exploiting variation in family size under son
preferences in South Korea. He proposes an new instrumental variable – the first
child’s gender and directly tests the effect by using measurements of parental monetary
investment in children’s education, as he argues that the economics theory of Q-Q trade-
off is about parental choices. He finds that per-child investment is reduced by 25.4% for
children with one sibling, and by 42.4% for children with two siblings compare to the
only child. The trade-off goes up as the family size is bigger. However, using parental
monetary investment solely is not enough to capture the whole picture of Q-Q trade-
off. For example, parental supervision time has been shown in economic and sociology
literature that plays an important role for children’s human capital accumulation,
especially at the early stage.
Following the method of Black et al. (2005), Li et al. (2008) estimate the trade-off
in China using 1990 Chinese Population Census, they find no effect of family size on
first-born’s education by exploiting the exogenous variation in family size induced by
twins at second birth, and a significant trade-off on average educational outcome of
first two births by using twins at third birth. They show that controlling for birth
order do not alter the Q-Q trade-off effects, which contradicts the finding of Black et al.
(2005). However, they treat an ordered discrete dependent variable using ordinary least
square(OLS) estimation, which renders their results less convincing. Additionally, they
do not estimate fertility effect for the first and second born children separately, in the
at least three births family.
Rosenzweig and Zhang (2009) use a new data set, the Chinese Child Twins
Survey(CCTS), to quantify the Q-Q trade-off of children. They also find a significantly
negative relationship between family size and child quality. They exploit the effects
by using the incidence of twin births that for the first time taking into account the
effects of birth-weight deficit and close spacing of twins. Their study firstly proposes
that the impacts of twinning on older non-twin births and on twin births themselves
provide the lower and upper bounds of true impacts of the family size on average child
quality. Moreover, the lower bound is positively biased if parents exhibit reinforcement
behaviour. Thus true Q-Q trade-off should be bigger than what have been found in
previous literature, if not accounting for variations in endowment. However, their
strategy ignores the fact that birthweight itself is endogenous because it is affected
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by twinning. In addition, their approach is more likely to be a reduced form estimation
by using twins, instead of using twins as an instrument to solve the endogeneity problem.
Based on different datasets in China, Li et al. (2008) find no evidence of Q-Q trade-
off, but Rosenzweig and Zhang (2009) show negative effects of fertility rates on education
outcomes of children by exploiting variation in family size using twins. Instead of the
twins IV, China’s family planning policy provides a good opportunity for researchers
to investigate the quantity-quality trade-off. Using one child policy as an instrument
provides a different LATE, Qian (2009) finds positive family size effects and Liu (2014)
shows no significant effects on education outcome. The heterogeneity in the Q-Q trade-
off suggests that it is sensitive to the sample period and composition.
Qian (2009) makes a breakthrough by using the relaxation of China’s one child
policy in rural China to instrument fertility. The sample size is substantially boosted
by matching the 1989 CHNS data with the 1990 1% sample census at the county level.
In particular, she exploits the exogenous variation by a triple interaction of the child’s
gender, year of birth and region of birth. Results show that an extra child increases
school enrolment of first-born child by 16% for one-child family. She proposes several
mechanisms for explaining the positive correlation and finds support in economies of
scale in schooling cost and increasing mother labour supply for rising demand on cash
for children’s future education cost. However, the variation in the implementation of
the One Child Policy is likely to correlate with the demand of children, thus the fertility
effects derived from the policy are likely to be negatively biased.
In order to partly address the potential correlation problem, Liu (2014) uses two
community level variables to control for the potential correlation between parental
preference and local family planning polices. His study employs three instruments for
fertility: fines for unsanctioned births, the eligibility for having two children, and their
interactions. Results show weak fertility effects on children’s educational attainment. He
suggests that government interventions in education partly offset the effects of parental
investments in children’s schooling, resulting in a weak Q-Q trade-off.
Prior empirical studies that explore exogenous variations in family size due to twin
births and sex composition mostly impose a constant fertility effects on child outcome,
Mogstad and Wiswall (2016) re-examine this relationship by allowing an unrestricted
functional form. They propose a non-parametric estimation that allows identification of
marginal fertility effects, in comparison to the total fertility effects studied previously
(Black et al., 2005). They find that previous conclusion of no Q-Q trade-off is an
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artifact of the linear specification in fertility, which masks significant marginal fertility
effects. They conclude a Q-Q tradeoff in large families and Q-Q complementary in small
families.
This paper departs from previous empirical work in accounting for the non-normal
distribution of outcome and endogenous variables within each birth parity, rather than
only across parities. In addition, it explores an additional dimension of marginal fertility
effect.
2.3 Methodology
2.3.1 Instrumental Variables
Child quantity and quality are affected by parental preferences, household characteristics
and child’s innate ability. It is not possible to fully observe all the factors that affect child
quality, hence child quality is endogenously determined by quantity. In order to identify
a causal relationship, I use the gender of firstborn and twin births as instrumental
variables to capture potentially exogenous variations in family size.
There are three main samples in my estimation, at least one birth, at least two
births and at least three births sample. This analysis is limited to lower birth order
(N-1 births) child(ren) in at least N births sample as they are the only unconditional
treatment units in the household. In specific, at least one birth sample(1+) consists of
firstborns from families with one or more births, and the family size is instrumented
by the gender of first birth. At least two births sample(2+) consists of firstborns from
families with two or more births, and sibling size is instrumented by twins at second
birth. At least three births sample(3+) consists of firstborns and secondborns from
families with three or more births, fertility is instrumented by twinning at third birth.
These three samples are further divided by outcome variables, as it will be explained in
section 2.4, due to different exposed age groups.
This paper is the first one to apply the gender of first birth to test Q-Q trade-off in the
context of China where traditionally son preferences is influenced by the Confuciusim.
The argument for relevance of this instrument is that families with son preferences will
generally have larger family size if the first birth is a girl than a boy. Moreover, given
the biological time constraint for childbearing, families with a first born girl will shorten
the birth spacing if they try to have a boy sooner. By the same logic, a girl at first
birth is also a good predictor for a third birth. For example, if families have first two
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girl births and prefer to have a son, they will try to have an additional birth and should
do so more quickly. In general, a girl at first birth is likely to contribute to a higher
fertility rate and shorter birth spacing. Lee (2008) proposes two relevant tests of first
child’s sex as an instrumental variable for fertility.
The first test estimates a parity progression model under the hypothesis that parents
having daughters in lower birth orders should end up with larger family sizes if there
were son preferences. This model requires that households’ decisions about future
childbearing are fully observed, so that it will be tested only among those who have
completed fertility. The sample is confined to mothers aged above 40 as conventional
demographic paper assumes that this is the age range that women are no longer fertile.
I estimate a logit model where the main variable of interest is the sex composition of
siblings and the dependent variable is an indicator for whether the family has more than
N child/children birth. Mother’s age at first birth, current age, birth year, education,
ethnicity, geographic location of parents are controlled for. The first two columns of
table 2.1 show that a girl at first birth increases the probability of having a second
child by 5.5% and the likelihood to have a third child by 9.5%. The second column
also shows that having same-sex children at first two births increases the probability to
have a third child by 11.2% while the third column suggests that the increase in family
size is mainly due to two girl births (9.4%). Having two sequential boy births does not
affect the family size.
The other model for testing son preferences is a hazard model of fertility timing. The
hypothesis in this model is that families should advance the timing of having a second
child if the first birth is a girl than a boy given the time constraint of childbearing
biologically. Similarly, the birth spacing between the second and third child should
be shortened following two consecutive girl births. I estimate a Weibull hazard model
where the key variables of interests are sex compositions of siblings and the outcome
variable is the birth spacing between corresponding births. To avoid bias that caused
by changes of time-variant variables during the interval, only time-invariant variables
are included as controls. Right panel of table 2.1 reports relative hazard ratios. The
fourth column shows that the hazard rate of having a second child increased 56% by a
first girl birth. As before in the parity progression model, the positive effect of samesex
sibling in inducing an additional birth is mainly resulted from two consecutive girl
births(95%). Two consecutive son births decrease the hazard rate of having a third
child by 26%. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that an initial girl
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birth(births) advances the timing of the second(third) child while boy births delay the
additional childbearing.
The rational for twins instrument is that twin births at any parity is random and the
subjects of interest are older siblings. The internal validity of twins instrument relies
on its randomness conditional on some observed biological factors. One concern would
invalidate this instrument is the use of fertility drugs that boosts the chance of having
multiple births. However, the introduction of this drug started in late 1980s, which is
unlikely to affect my sample. In addition, several robustness checks are carried out in
this study with regard to the closer spacing, lower birthweight, economies of scale issues
of using twinning as an instrument.
Angrist et al. (2010) point out that combining evidence from multiple sources of
variation is important since different instruments are potentially subject to different
omitted variables biases. For example, the occurrence of twins varies with maternal
age, and twin births may affect outcome directly through birth spacing. Although first
child’s sex instrument is not suffering from those biases, it may directly affect outcome
through gender specific characteristics and postnatal investment preferences of parents.
Therefore, estimations based on different instruments provide specification check on
themselves.
Table 2.2 shows strong first stage effects. A girl at first birth increases fertility by
about 28% to 30% for 1+ households, and twin births increase the family size by about
37% to 51% for 1+ sample, by 56% for 2+ sample, and by 42% to 55% for 3+ sample,
depending on the exposed subsamples and birth orders. Figure 2.1 plots first stage
estimates of the effect of twins and first child’s sex on fertility. Twinning captures shifts
in family size over a narrow range that is close to the parity of twins birth, while the
first child’s sex instrument captures a relatively wider range of fertility variation. For
example, the effect of twins at second birth increases the fertility from 2 to 3 with no
further effects on higher birth parities. While those families who have son preferences
will tend to have children until obtaining a son, and significance of the effects fades out
when family size go beyond 5.
2.3.2 Rationale for Using Non-linear Model
Previous work mainly uses conventional 2SLS to estimate the fertility effects, while
typically the normal distribution assumptions for outcome and endogenous variables
are violated. The conventional 2SLS approach can be characterized as follows (Black
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et al., 2005; Angrist et al., 2010):
Ni = Ziα+Xiβ + ei (2.1)
Yi = γNi +Xiθ + vi (2.2)
whereNi is the number of children in the family(quantity), Zi stands for instruments,
it’s a dummy for the gender of the firstborn at 1+ sample, or twin births at parity N
for at least N births sample, Xi is a set of control variables, Yi is a measure of child’s
educational outcome(quality).
2.3.2.1 Graphic Evidence
Fertility, an endogenous variable in Q-Q trade-off literature, has traditionally been
estimated using Ordinary Least Squares(OLS) with normal error terms. Since fertility
is a discrete count variable, the normal distribution assumption is inappropriate. More
importantly, the assumption of constant variance is invalid. Figure 2.2 explores the
form of mean-variance association for households with at least one child. To make
the evidence graphically representative, the moments are computed conditional on the
education level of mother and mother’s age at giving first birth. Clearly, the variance
is not constant. Although the variance is not precisely equal to the mean, the plot
suggests a proportional relationship between them. Thus it can do more justice to the
data by using Poisson estimations than by relying on OLS (Rodriguez, 2007).
Recent literature has realized the non-linear fertility effects and anaylized the Q-Q
trade-off for different family size, separately. However, they only consider the non-
linearity across parities, but the non-normal distribution within parity is overlooked.
Specifically, this paper argues for a GMM approach to account for the count nature of the
endogeneous variable and binary nature of the outcome variables. This analysis shows
that the use of this approach makes a significant difference in estimating the fertility
effects. Following the visual assessment strategy proposed by Silva et al. (2014), figure
2.3 provides visual comparisons of the traditional approach and the proposed method
on model fitness1. For ease of demonstration, equation 2.1 and 2.2 can be rewritten as
the following,
Ni = Viσ + ei (2.3)
1Bear in mind that the true estimation process is not constructed in two stages, but showing
the estimation step by step helps to provide clear rationale for using non-linear approach.
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Yi = Wiφ+ vi (2.4)
where Vi includes all the covariates in the first stage of equation 2.1 and Wi includes all
the covariates in the second stage of 2.2.
Figure 2.3 focus on families with at least one birth, examining the effects of an
additional birth on the probability of completing primary school for the first-born
children. The instrument used is the gender of first birth. Panel (a) and (b) of figure 2.3
estimate the first stage and compare the fitness of OLS and Poisson regression. Plots
show the value of Ni and parametric fits of E[Ni|Vi] versus the estimated single index
Viσˆ. In addition, nonparametric fits are displayed to provide a robustness check of the
parametric fit, in the sense that parametric one proposes a model to fit the data while
nonparametric one let the data commands the regression. Here the nonparametric fit
uses a kernel regression of Ni on the fitted value obtained above. Panel (c) and (d) of
figure 2.3 estimate the second stage and compare the fitness of OLS and Logit model.
They show plots of Yi and of parametric fits of E[Yi|Wi] versus the estimated single
index Wiφˆ. Similarly nonparametric fits are added to plots.
All of the OLS estimators have the expected sign but the magnitude of marginal
effects are clearly erroneous. For example, figure 2.3(c) shows that the fitted value
of E[Yi|Wi] goes beyond zero and way below the upper bound of probability one.
As a result, the parametric and non-parametric fits largely diverge from each other,
which indicates a mismeasurement of partial effects for most of the observations. The
departure of OLS fit from kernel fit may explain the failure of proving a Q-Q trade-off
previously. In contrast, figure 2.3(d) displays an overlapping, to a large extent, of Logit
and kernel regression, which shows a large improvement on the model fitting. The slight
diverge of two regression fits at the upper tail is likely due to the fact that fewer children
are enrolled at junior high school than those who are not.
Similar analysis is applied in figure 2.4 where the outcome variable is the probability
of enrolling in Junior high school with twins at the second birth as an instrument
variable1. Non-linear fitting shows better performance at the distribution boundaries.
While the performance of non-linear fitting is not necessarily better than OLS within
the boundaries, the non-linear estimation at least provides another bound of the Q-Q
trade-off.
To sum up, the merit of using non-linear specification are manifold. First, it allows
1Here only two of the many regression are showed graphically, more plots are provided on
request.
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for non-normal distribution of the error term. Second, it relaxes the constant variance
assumption imposed on Ordinary Least Square estimation. Third, it captures the
discrete nature of the data, and allows inference to be analysed on the probability
of event occurrence. Although coefficients can be estimated consistently by OLS, the
inference based on the estimated covariance matrix is not valid.
Figure 2.3 and 2.4 have shown that non-linear fitting approximates data better than
ordinary least squares at the distribution boundaries. This is of particular importance
if the true value of outcome variable have higher probability locating closer to 0 or 1.
The econometric estimation will be presented as follows.
2.3.2.2 Econometrics Reasoning
Equation 2.5 uses a Poisson regression to estimate first stage, but directly plugging
in the first-stage fitted value to a Logit estimation—equation 2.6 would fall into the
forbidden regression problem (Angrist and Pischke, 2008).
E(Ni|Xi, Zi) = exp(Ziα+Xiβ) (2.5)
Yi = F (γNi +Xiθ) + εi (2.6)
Estimation in stages, by replacing N with its estimated conditional mean, does
not give consistent estimates of the parameters (Windmeijer and Santos Silva, 1997;
Wooldridge, 2010).
Yi = F (γexp(Ziα+Xiβ) +Xiθ + γηi) + εi (2.7)
where
ηi = Ni − exp(Ziα+Xiβ) (2.8)
Equation 2.9 shows that the moments of ηi depend on parameters and regressors.
E(η2i |Xi, Zi) = exp(Ziα+Xiβ) (2.9)
Angrist and Pischke (2008) propose a simple alternative to the forbidden second
step by using the nonlinear fitted values as instruments, instead of directly plugging
in nonlinear fitted values. It has been shown graphically that nonlinear estimators
give better approximations to the first stage conditional expectation function than the
linear model, thus an additional advantage of non-linear modelling is the improvement
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in efficiency.
Furthermore, as suggested by Windmeijer and Santos Silva (1997) and Wooldridge
(2010), a consistent estimator would be the Generalized Method of Moments(GMM)
estimator, and the nonlinear fitted values are used as instruments. Following
Windmeijer and Santos Silva (1997), a GMM approach with exp(Ziαˆ + Xiβˆ) as an
instrument has been applied to this analysis. Using the fitted values, obtained from
the Poisson regression, as instruments provide a best approximation to the optimal
instrument set. Figure 2.5 and 2.6 show the comparison of 2SLS and GMM estimator,
clearly the advantage of GMM estimation exhibits at the boundaries. Thus the GMM
estimation is appropriate for this study in the sense that outcome variables are more
located at the upper tail of the distribution.
Additionally, number of children in a household are likely to display under-dispersion
property, an ideal model to control for dispersion (Winkelmann and Zimmermann,
1994; Wang and Famoye, 1997) would be Generalized Poisson regression. However,
this attempt to improve the instrument will have only a marginal impact on the final
estimator, but will result in more of computational complication due to the additional
parameters to be estimated. Thus, this paper uses Poisson regression to obtain the
instrument.
2.4 Data
The dataset is the 1% sample of 1990 Chinese Population Census, it covers 11,835,947
individuals from 3,260,243 households. The 1990 census questionnaire contains detailed
demographic information, including the following: name, relationship, sex, age,
nationality, registration status, education, industry, occupation, unemployment status,
marital status, residence in 1985, number of children ever born, number of children
surviving, birth order in 1989 etc. The census provides no direct information on
parental-children linkage, the relationship is thus inferred using the census question
on what is each household member’s relationship to the head and using the IPUMS
matching rule1.
For the purpose of this analysis, information on both parents and children are
needed. However, the drawback of using census data is that it has no record on
individual who left the family. Thereby this analysis requires households to have
1Information on the IPUMS algorithm is available at http://www.ipums.umn.edu
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parents and children co-residence in the household1, which drops 33% of the households.
This reduction in sample size is largely due to elderly/very young families with no
children presenting or families with no parents presenting. This analysis also requires
observations of all alive children in the family since the test of Q-Q trade-off is built
on resource competition or sharing. Thus it excludes families with reported number of
children alive unequal to the constructed family size. There are 29% (690,924) of the
households with reported number of children alive bigger than constructed family size.
It suggests that those families having non-coresident children. Additionally 1% of the
households have reported number of children smaller than the constructed family size,
which could be attributed to measurement error or misreporting.
This study further restricts the sample by excluding mothers giving birth before
age 16(0.2% of the sample); excluding families that migrated in the last 5 years2;
excluding families with multiple birth (except twins birth) since they have closer spacing
and endowment deficit compared to the singleton child(125 households are dropped).
Finally, the sample size is 1,656,679 households.
This analysis focuses on three domains of outcome3: the probability of primary
school enrolment, primary school graduation and junior high school enrolment.
School enrolment is a binary variable that equals to one if a child was enrolled in
school(attending) or dropped out or graduated, and zero if a child had never enrolled
school. Graduation is defined as one if a child had graduated from school, zero if still
attending or dropped out, conditional on enrolled in primary school. I use relatively
early educational outcomes as measurements of child quality because the economic
theory of the Q-Q trade-off analyses parental choices. It is more convincing to use
outcomes that take place closer in time to parental choice-making on quantity and
quality to test the theory (Lee, 2008). Therefore, college enrolment and labour market
outcomes are not my outcomes of interest; they are more likely to be affected by various
factors that are not correlated with parental choices.
1Divorce was considered both immoral and bourgeois during 1950s to 1970s, and it required
approval from the state, which made it basically impossible. In 1980s, a new marriage law made
divorce relatively easier but the divorce rate remained very low, at less than 0.1%.
2This is the only information on migration history that the 1990 census provided. China
had very rigid hukou registration system that made migration very difficult. Before 1990s, the
household mobility in China was almost zero. Indeed, 98% of the households reported to live in
the same county and 99% reported to live in the same province during the last 5 years.
3This study focuses on public school which was the only type of primary and secondary
school that existed in China during the sample period. The number of private school expanded
in 2003 due to a change in the education law that admitted the legitimacy of non-government
education.
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The sample is restricted to children aged between 6 and 16 to ensure that all children
have satisfied the minimum entry age for primary school and that there is no adult
children living in the house since they are not traceable in the survey. The sample
is further restricted to children age smaller than or equal to 131 for estimation of the
effect on enrolment of primary school, and restricted to children age older than 13 for
estimation of completing primary school and junior high school enrolment. Overall, this
paper focuses on nine subsamples, which are categorized by family size and outcome
variable.
A set of family demographic characteristics are controlled for. In the 1+ sample, the
age of the firstborn, mother’s age at first birth, education and ethnic group of parents,
an rural indicator and provincial indicators are included as controls. It is important
to control for maternal age at first birth due to its correlation with twin births and
investment behaviour. I also control for cohort effects by including the birth year of
the firstborn child and father. It will help address the problem that younger children
are more likely to be in school and have few siblings (Qian, 2009). Parental cohort
effects are also included in the sense that parents of first-born children are likely to
be different from parents of other parity born children. In addition, it controls for the
year specific effects. For example, one would expect certain differences between parent
who experienced the cultural revolution2 and those who did not. In the 2+ sample,
the gender of firstborn child and birth spacing between first two births are additionally
controlled for. In the 3+ sample, I also control for the sex composition of the first and
second borns, birth spacing between the second and third born children.
As shown in table 2.3, the primary school enrolment rate is 86% for firstborn in 1+
sample, 86% for firstborn in 2+ sample, 84% for firstborn and 84% for secondborn in
3+ sample. Primary graduation rate is relatively lower, 75% for 1+ sample, 74% for
2+ sample, 74% for firstborns and 68% for secondborns in 3+ sample. Following the
similar pattern, the rate of junior school enrolment drops quite a lot in all subsamples.
While older siblings have similar enrolment rate of primary school, the rate of primary
school graduation and secondary school enrolment decreases with household size. It
indicates a negative correlation between family size and child schooling outcome, but
not necessarily a causal one. It may simply due to the fact that children of smaller
1The years of primary school education varied between 5 and 6 years. Most of the children
were expected to complete primary school by the age of 13, conditional on enrolled in primary
school and no drop-out.
2The Cultural Revolution lasted from 1966 to 1976, and it caused a large scale eduction
system disruption.
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families are from relatively younger cohorts and benefit from better education system.
The gender of the first birth is biologically normal(0.51) in the 1+ sample, and it
decreases in 2+ sample and declines further in the 3+ sample. In addition, sex ratio
increases with birth order1. The sex ratio at different sample and birth order provides
evidence for son preferences. The twinnng rate at each birth is within the natural
range2.
Table 2.4 shows that children are relatively older and mothers are younger at first
child birth in households with higher fertility, while mother’s and father’s age at census
are quite similar across subsamples. Parents have higher education level are associated
with fewer children. There are smaller proportion of parents of Han ethnicity and from
urban areas in higher fertility families.
2.5 Empirical Results
This section tests the Q-Q trade-off for the firstborn child in the 1+ sample, 2+
sample and 3+ sample, respectively; for the secondborn child in the 3+ sample. Four
specifications are used for the test in each sample, the author will start the estimation
with ordinary least square (OLS) estimator, then move to two stage least square (2SLS)
estimator. Since 2SLS estimator deals with the endogenous issue using two stages of
linear estimation, this paper considers two additional non-linear estimators–nonlinear
first-stage(NLIV) and generalized method of moments(GMM). Due to the forbidden
regression problem mentioned earlier, NLIV uses Poisson regression to estimate the
first stage effects on fertility and then uses it as an instrument for fertility in a linear
regression of outcome variable. GMM estimator employs non-linear estimations at both
firth and second stage, i.e. obtaining Poisson estimator for fertility and then use it as
instrument for fertility in a binary regression for the schooling outcome variable.
2.5.1 At Least One Birth Sample
Panel a of table 2.5 shows the effect of a marginal child at second birth on the education
outcomes of the firstborn. All the specifications provide evidence on significant Q-Q
1Yi et al. (1993) show that the sex ratio of the first child is biologically balanced, but it goes
up at higher birth orders especially for households with no previous boy birth. Almond et al.
(2013) confirm that the sex ratio of the first child is at natural rate 1.05, but the sex ratio of
the second child quite differs, with first girl families have persistently higher rate than families
with a first boy.
2Huang et al. (2016) show that twins rate is around 0.4% for households with children born
between 1974-1980, and slightly higher 0.45% in the period 1980-1984.
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trade-off, irrelevant of the outcome variables. OLS estimation suffers from endogeneity
problem that parents with different preference for family size may also have different
preference for quality of children, and unobserved child’s ability may affect parents’
investment decision and child’s performance. The exogenous variation of sibling size is
induced by gender of the first child in the 1+ sample.
In all the cases, 2SLS estimator gives larger Q-Q trade-off than OLS, which implies
that the OLS estimator is downward biased. NLIV estimator gives even larger effects
than the 2SLS estimator, this is mainly due to the difference in the distribution
assumption imposed on fertility. 2SLS assumes that fertility is normal distributed, and
NLIV uses Poisson distribution to model fertility. Comparing to the NLIV estimator,
GMM estimator gives a slightly greater effect of family size on the probability of enrolling
in primary school, and a smaller effect on the probability of graduating from primary
school and enrolling in junior school. For example, GMM estimates shows that an
additional birth induced by a firstborn girl decreases the probability of primary school
enrolment by 19 percent 1, which is 1% higher than the NLIV estimator 2. The different
magnitude of Q-Q trade-off between NLIV and GMM is resulting from the non-linear
distribution assumption imposed on the outcome variable. For example, high density
of children’s outcome are located at the upper tail of the distribution of the nonlinear
model, thus it gives better approximation to the data generating process than the linear
probability model.
Note that the magnitude of Q-Q trade-off is considerably higher in the case of junior
school enrolment. OLS estimator states that the probability of enrolling in junior school
for the firstborn is reduced by 11.1%, and 2SLS suggests a reduction in the probability
by half. NLIV gives slightly higher estimate of 61.5%, while GMM estimator shows a
54.3% reduction in the likelihood of enrolling in the junior school if there is a marginal
second birth.
By exploring the exogenous variation in family size that is induced by first child’s
gender, this paper is able to fill the gap of examining the effect of family size increasing
from 1 to 2 on firstborn. It provides the technical foundation for family planning
policies, particularly it may imply that China’s One Child Policy is actually beneficial for
child’s human capital by restricting the family size, thus reducing resource competition.
Furthermore, if policy maker aims at encouraging child birth, then corresponding policy
1Note that column (4) of panel a gives estimates of -0.162, which corresponds to a
19%(0.162/0.857) reduction in the probability of primary school enrolment for the firstborn
in 1+ sample.
2Column (3) of panel a gives NLIV estimates of -0.15, which corresponds to a 18% reduction.
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(for example, education and health) reform is needed to cooperating with the significant
Q-Q trade-off.
2.5.2 At Least Two Births Sample
Panel b of table 2.5 gives the estimation results in the households with at least 2 births.
All the OLS estimations show significantly negative effects of family size on the outcome
of firstborn children, which are likely to be spurious inverse relationships. An additional
child at second birth decrease the probability of enrolment by 3%, the probability of
primary graduation by 7% and the likelihood of enrolling in junior school by 12.5%.
However, OLS estimation neglects unobserved endowment and parental heterogeneity
in preferences for quality of children and quantity of children.
By using twins at second birth as an instrumental variable, the conventional 2SLS
estimations show smaller effects in magnitude but no evidence of significant Q-Q trade-
off, which is in line with previous literature that using the same methodology. The
twins instrument generates an average treatment effect on the nontreated, thus the
estimator can be interpreted as the impact of an additional child at second birth on
the educational attainment of firstborn child in two singleton births family(non-twins
family). Note that 2+ sample shows a different direction of OLS bias than the 1+
sample. Comparing to 2SLS, OLS underestimates the true trade-off on the first born in
at least 1 birth family while overestimates the effects in 2+ sample. A marginal child
at second birth insignificantly increases the probability of primary school enrolment by
0.6%, the probability of primary graduation by 6.1% and of junior enrolment by 4.4%,
for the firstborn.
Move to the NLIV estimates, the Q-Q trade-off turns significant, the effects are
-2%, -20% and -35%, respectively. GMM estimation supports a significant Q-Q trade-
off by accounting for the non-normal distribution of both outcome and endogenous
variables. The schooling outcome of firstborn child is reduced by 8.3%, 12.2% and 15.5%,
respectively for the probability of primary enrolment, primary graduation and junior
enrolment. This finding contrasts the majority of previous literature which finds no Q-Q
trade-off, but somehow in line with the results of Rosenzweig and Zhang (2009). They
use a logit model and show that twinning reduces the likelihood of college attendance
by 27%.
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2.5.3 At Least Three Births Sample
Estimation results from the at least three births sample give a different picture than
the at least two births sample. Panel c of table 2.5 shows effects of a marginal fourth
child on firstborn and secondborn children, separately. As it in the case for 2+ sample,
OLS estimators show significant negative effects of an extra child on the outcome of
elderly siblings, with the effect is slightly greater in magnitude on the secondborn than
the firstborn.
This paper examines the effects on the firstborn and secondborn separately, because
children of different birth orders experience different degrees of sibling interaction and
family resource allocation. Generally the 2SLS estimates show no significant trade-
off, with one exception that the probability of enrolling in junior school is significantly
reduced by 22.4 percent for the secondborn child. NLIV estimate shows greater effects in
magnitude than 2SLS. It gives insignificant Q-Q trade-off on primary school enrolment,
and significant trade-off on the other two measurements of schooling outcome. GMM
estimator shows that the only significant adverse effect on the firstborn children is the
3.3 percent reduction on the likelihood of primary school graduation, while there is
no significant trade-off on enrolment of primary school and junior high school. The
secondborn sibling suffers more of an additional fourth child than the firstborn sibling.
An additional child decreases the probability of primary school enrolment by 5.5%,
primary school graduation by 8.4%, and junior high school enrolment by 10.1% for the
secondborn children. This is consistent with Black et al. (2005) in that they find a
monotonic decline in educational attainment as the birth order goes up.
It is worth noting that in the summary statistics, firstborn children in 3+ sample
have similar rate of primary school enrolment with 1+ and 2+ sample, but lower rate
of primary school graduation and junior high school enrolment. It may imply that
3+ families are more financially constrained if resource competition is more intense in
families with more children. Families make different decisions on whether to send kids
to junior high school or not, it could be the case that more aﬄuent families have higher
propensity sending kids to junior high school. Therefore the trade-off is less obvious for
those families who are less likely to financially affected by the additional fourth child.
Comparing the trade-off effects in 1+, 2+ and 3+ sample, I find that the trade-off is
more evident in a relatively smaller family. It maybe due to the fact that conditional on
a bigger family size, the resource is spread more thinly and thus the marginal decrease
in the welfare of older sibling declines with child quantity. In other words, for those
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families who prefer to have a larger family size, an extra child affect the division of family
resources less as family size goes up. The smaller magnitude of the estimators obtained
for a larger family size provides some evidence on the non-linearity of the trade-off as
quantity goes up. In addition, there is evidence of birth order effect. Generally, Q-Q
trade-off is greater for the secondborn than for the firstborn in at least 3 births family.
Note that the majority of the sample is consists of rural households, thus the estimation
is more reflexive for less developed part of China.
2.5.4 Robustness Check
2.5.4.1 Instruments Validity
There are concerns about the validity of the instruments if the gender of firstborn and
twins affect the schooling outcome independently from family size.
Twinning may affect the outcome of lower births children through zero spacing,
lower birthweight and economies of scale. The spacing channel on the outcome of the
firstbirth can be tested through 3+ sample without twins but with two tightly spaced
following births (Black et al., 2005). Panel (a) of table 2.6 shows that spacing has nearly
zero effect on the outcome of older sibling. If this can be extrapolated to the case of
twins, then twins will not affect outcome of older sibling independently through family
size.
Alternatively, the validity of twins instrument can be tested as proposed by Angrist
et al. (2010), they estimate reduced forms in the no-first-stage sample. The idea is that
a valid instrument should not affect outcome independently of family size, therefore by
shutting down the channel of family size, twin births should have no effect on outcome.
The no-first-stage sample consists of families who are likely to have a bigger family
anyway, regardless of the twins birth. Indicators for preferring a larger quantity of
children could be a tighter spacing of subsequent births and an younger age of mother
at first child birth. Panel (b) of table 2.6 shows results based on no-first-stage samples,
there is no evidence to reject the validity of twin births as instruments.
Rosenzweig and Zhang (2009) propose that birthweight deficit of twins may induce
parents to allocate resources toward lower birth order non-twins children, if this
reinforcement story is true, then the estimators obtained through twins at second and
third births will be biased positively. My data provides no information on birthweight,
although birthweight itself is endogenous. This paper tests the Q-Q trade-off following
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the bounding strategy proposed by Rosenzweig and Zhang(2009),
Yij = α1Tj + α2Fij + α3(Tj ∗ Fij) +Xiθ + eij (2.10)
where Tj is an indicator for a household j with twin at second(third) birth, Fij
is a dummy for singleton first-born(singleton first two births) and their interaction are
included in the regression. The variable of interest is the interaction term, with a positive
coefficient α3 implying parental reinforcement behaviour. I observe reinforcement effects
toward singleton birth child in the at least two births sample, while the effects are not
evident in the at least three births sample (table 2.7).
Following the idea of Rosenzweig and Zhang (2009), the effects of twinning on
non-twins older sibling provide the lower bound, and the effects of twinning on twins
themselves provide the upper bound. As it indicated by table 2.7, the Q-Q trade-off
obtained through twins at second birth gives the lower bound, it would be informative to
also know the upper bound by using twins at first birth. Twins at first birth generates
bigger effects of fertility on schooling outcome (table 2.8). These estimates are big
in magnitude but comparable to the previous finding of Rosenzweig and Zhang (2009)
where they find a 20 percent decrease in expected college enrolment and literature grade.
Since twining reduces birthweight which is positively correlated with the reinforcement
behaviour, the estimations without conditional on birthweight are negatively biased.
There is caveat using twin at first birth as an instrumental variable. Twins themselves
are not directly comparable to non-twins due to birthweight deficit, the reader should
bear in mind that the true Q-Q trade-off effect is possibly overestimated in the case of
using twins at first birth as instrumental variable.
Note that estimation based on twins at first birth is not directly comparable to
twins at higher birth order and gender of the first birth for three reasons. First, twins
at first birth identifies the effect of an additional birth on the average outcome of twins
compare to the outcome of singleton birth, while twins at higher birth orders gives
the effects of an additional birth on singleton births. Second, twins at first birth is
more likely to be an exogenous shock in the sense that parents have no prior on their
children, therefore they are less likely to have reinforcement or compensate behaviour.
On the contrary, twins at higher birth order may induce parents who value the quality
of children to allocate the resource away from twins, which partly offsets the true Q-
Q trade-off. Third, different instruments generate different complier population and
capture different local average treatment effects(LATE) (Angrist et al., 2010). Twins
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at first birth affect family size at the incidence of twinning, while girl at first birth
affects fertility at a relatively bigger range for families have son preferences and the
range will be wider if this preference is stronger. Overall, twins at first birth provide
the upper bound of Q-Q trade-off as suggested by Rosenzweig and Zhang (2009), which
is consistent with the finding that estimators generated by twins at first birth are bigger
in magnitude compares to the case of twins at higher birth order and gender at first
birth. As Angrist et al. (2010) point out, different instrument is suffering from different
omitted variable bias, therefore comparing the estimation results from two different
instrumental strategies would provide a specification check itself.
An additional issue of using twins as instrument is the possibility that twins may
affect outcome through economies of scale, depending on the tighter spacing and the
gender composition of twins birth. If twins of the same gender benefit from sharing
clothes and rooms, then one would expect smaller trade-off to be found in the same
gender twins. It twins of the mixed gender benefit from the interaction of different-
gender sibling, then a smaller trade-off would be found in the mixed gender twins. The
best scenario for twins to be a valid instrument is to have estimation results irrelevant
of gender composition of twins. I compare results based on two subsamples of 1+
sample. The same-sex subsample is consists of singleton boy(girl) at first birth and
same-sex twins at first birth; the mixed-sex subsample is comprised of singleton at
first birth and mixed-sex twins at first birth. If economies of scale do exist, then the
formal subsample will be expected to exhibit significantly less Q-Q trade-off. Table
2.9 shows no evidence that twins affect outcome variable directly through economies of
scale. There are no significant differences between two subsamples among all outcome
variables. For example, the first two columns show the slope of regression line -0.194
and -0.210, clearly their confidence interval are largely overlapped. Therefore, it seems
that the internal validity of twins instrument is not threatened in this context.
There is also concern about using the gender of firstborn as instrument for fertility,
it may affect outcomes through parental preference in terms of resource allocation. A
direct test is to compare the average outcomes of children by number of boys in the
family and family size (Lee, 2008). Panel a of table 2.10 shows that households with
more boys have higher probability enrolling in primary school conditional on family
size, however, the probability of completing primary school and enrolling in secondary
school decreases with more boys in the household. This can be regarded as evidence that
there is no systemic gender bias in parental investment. Note that this comparison is
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intuitive, while it does not account for any endogeneity. If parents prefer to invest more
in boy rather than girl, then the trade-off is likely to be positively biased for boys and
negatively biased for girls. Additionally, panel b of table 2.10 performs a reduced form
test in the no-first-stage sample. Indicators for preferring a larger quantity of children
could be tighter spacing of subsequent births, younger mother at first child birth and
one of the parent belongs to ethnic minorities1. Unfortunately, the author fails to rule
out the direct impact of first child’s gender on education outcomes, but the direction
of the bias can be inferred. Since there is a negative correlation between girl birth and
outcome variables, the true Q-Q trade-off is overestimated.
2.5.4.2 Heterogeneous Effects
There is some evidence in the literature that the quantity-quality effect differs by
families’ socioeconomic background. In order to check whether it also applies to this
study, I identify potential heterogeneous effects by stratifying the sample by mother’s
education level. I also test the sensitivity of results to other stratifications of the
sample, including rural-urban gap and gender gap. For the ease of presentation, this
subsection only reports results based on GMM estimates. In addition, following the logic
of bounding strategy (Rosenzweig and Zhang (2009)), GMM estimation based on twins
at first birth is also shown in this subsection, despite its problem mentioned above2.
To identify the heterogeneity in terms of mother’s education level, children have
been grouped into two sub-samples, depending on whether mothers have completed
primary school. The Q-Q trade-off is more evident in families with lower educated
mother in 1+ and 2+ samples (table 2.11). In fact, the big negative effects found in
table 2.5 are mainly driven by households with low educated mothers. There is relative
smaller or no significant negative effects of family size on primary school graduation
and junior high school enrolment for children of high educated mothers. However,
estimation results turn opposite in the case of at least three births family. The Q-
Q trade-off is not subject to mothers’ education level when the outcome is measured
by primary school enrolment, but children in high-educated families turn out to suffer
1Ethnic minorities are waved from the One Child Policy. I would expect girl at first birth
has less impact on the family size in the non-han sample than the Han-sample.
2There is caveat using twin at first birth as an instrumental variable. On one hand, twins
themselves are not directly comparable to non-twins due to birthweight deficit, therefore, twins
at first birth provides the upper bound of Q-Q trade-off. On the other hand, twins at first birth
is more likely to be an exogenous shock to the family. Parents have no prior on their children,
therefore they are less likely to have reinforcement or compensate behaviour. On the contrary,
twins at higher birth order may induce parents who value the quality of children to allocate the
resource away from twins, which partly offsets the true Q-Q trade-off.
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more of the adverse fertility effects than children in low-educated families in the case
of primary graduation and junior high school enrolment. Possible explanation could be
drawn from mother’s labour force participation. I find that mother’s employment status
keeps stable when family size increase from 2 to 3, but decreases significantly when it
increases from 3 to 4. If education level could proxy the wealth of the family, then
children of less educated mothers suffer from more severe resource competition, that
explains why the Q-Q trade-off is more evident for children of less educated mothers in
the 1+ and 2+ sample. However, since mothers reduce labour supply in 3+ sample, then
education level is a poor indicator for wealth effect in this case. Conditional on enrolled
in primary school, children of high educated mothers have much higher probability of
graduation rate and enrolment rate of junior school1. However, the adverse effect of a
marginal fourth child is bigger conditional on a high-educated family than conditional
on a low-educated family.
Rural households are more likely to be financially constrained and the education
system in rural areas are relatively poorer. Therefore, it is reasonable to consider that
the fertility effects would vary by rural and urban areas. Table 2.12 presents considerable
adverse effects on children’s outcome in rural areas. The significant Q-Q trade-off found
in the main regression largely attributes to children of rural households, especially rural
households account for a large fraction of my sample. The rural-urban gap shows a
different pattern for first born and second born children in families with at least three
births. There is no significant difference found for the first born children, but a rural-
urban gap is observed in the probability of graduating from primary school for the
second born children. A marginal fourth child significantly decreases the probability of
completing primary school for the second born by 5.1 percentage points in rural areas,
while there is no trade-off found for the urban areas.
If families have strong son preferences, then an additional girl birth will affect the
performance of older siblings to a less extent than an extra boy birth. I constructed
two sub-samples for 2+ sample—one sub-sample excludes households with twin girls at
second birth to ensure that one of the twins must be a boy, and the other sub-sample
excludes households with twin boys at second birth to ensure that one of the twins must
be a girl. The same restriction applies to 3+ sample and the subjects of interest are
the average outcomes of first two births. Table 2.13 shows no significant gender gap by
1Conditional on enrolled in primary school, the probability of graduation is 0.69 for low-
educated families and 0.84 for high-educated families; the likelihood of enrolling in junior school
is 0.48 for low-educated families and 0.76 for high educated families.
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the marginal child, and the magnitude of the effect of an extra boy birth is very similar
to an extra girl birth. It could be explained by the possibility that families decide to
have larger families have less son preference for gender composition of children. In other
words, there is no post-natal gender preference conditional on child birth, parents treat
the new born child indifferently of gender. Almond et al. (2013) argue that sex mix is
most preferred, conditional on having two children in the family.
I further test Q-Q trade-off by gender composition of older siblings. Table 2.14 shows
that firstborn girls suffer more from an additional child birth comparing to firstborn
boys in primary school education. While there is no significant differences observed for
secondary school enrolment in 2+ sample, results for 3+ sample show that the rate of
junior high school enrolment is reduced by 10 percentage points for boys but no impacts
on girls. The adverse effect on the primary school education of girls may imply that
families with son preferences suppress the education opportunity for girls at an early
stage. However, given no significant differences on primary school graduation rate, the
enrolment of junior high school may be related with the higher education cost incurred,
if boys require higher costs than girls and families are financially constrained, then an
additional fourth child affects more negatively on boys.
2.5.4.3 One Child Policy
The overlap of my sample period and the One Child Policy(OCP) raises concern for the
credibility of the estimation. McElroy and Yang (2000) finds that the removal of the
One Child Policy would increase family size by one third of a child, and Qian (2009)
shows that relaxation of the policy in 1982 for rural families with first born girls lead
to an increase in fertility by one fourth of a child. Rosenzweig and Zhang (2009) show
that the policy would lead to a less than 4 percent increase in educational attainment, a
less than 9 percent increase in the expected college enrolment. Liu (2014) suggests the
men’s income would be increased by 1.71% and women’s income by 1.55% at most by
One-Child Policy. Overall, these analysis show that the consequences of the One Child
Policy on fertility is modest and on human capital accumulation is negligible.
Although sex-selective abortion is not widely available until late 1980s, it is
reasonable to suspect validity of instrumental variables as the ultrasound services to
some extent allows parents to decide the gender composition of the children. If this bias
exist, I would expect the contamination of estimation is less severe in a pre One Child
Policy period. My sample period covers the implementation of the One Child Policy
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since 1979, a sensitivity test is carried out using 1982 census. If parents are allowed
to choose the quantity of children, the willingness to trade quality for quantity would
indicate a bigger Q-Q trade-off. However, table 2.15 shows that the Q-Q trade-off is
smaller in the absence of One Child Policy. There could be two candidate explanations.
First, the children in 1982 sample were born between 1966 and 1976, which coincided
with the cultural revolution period. This revolution mainly disrupted senior high school
and higher education, and primary school and junior high school education system were
disorganised. Meng and Gregory (2007) describe that primary school students were not
taught in standard curricula and they spent most of their school time doing manual work
in factories and the countryside. Although surprisingly the primary school graduation
rates(around 90%) were higher than the 1990 sample, it is likely that that there was
a change in the graduation criterion, which made the trade-off less evident. Second, it
could be that those who violated the OCP for an extra birth suffered from bad economics
and socioeconomic situation so that it adversely affected the outcome of children.
2.6 Conclusion
This paper studies the effect of fertility on children’s human capital accumulation in
the context of China. The main contribution comes from applying a novel GMM
approach for testing the existence of Q-Q trade-off. This method is more favourable than
conventional two stage least squares because it takes into account the limited dependent
variable nature of the data. Thus, this paper not only considers the non-linear fertility
effect across parities by examining different birth sample, but also accounts for non-
linear distribution within parities. While the conventional approach shows no effect of
fertility on education performance of children, GMM estimators give significant Q-Q
trade-offs. This finding is consistent with the Becker-Lewis model that an increase in
child quantity increases the shadow price of quality. Moreover, the trade-off nonlinearly
decreases with family size and shows heterogeneous effects by birth order.
This paper is the first to apply first child’s gender as an instrumental variable for
testing Q-Q trade-off in the context of China where the son preferences are prevailing.
This instrument offers the possibility to test the Q-Q trade-off of a marginal second
birth on the first born while typically twins and parental preference for a mixed gender
composition estimate the effect of a marginal third or higher birth order child on older
siblings.
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Although arguably endogeneous, this analysis also employs twins at first birth as
an instrumental variable for fertility to provide an upper bound estimation for the Q-Q
trade-off. Rosenzweig and Zhang (2009) suggest that the upper bound estimator is
negatively biased and the lower bound estimator is positively biased, if not accounting
for the birthweight deficit of twins and parental reinforcement behaviour. There is
no birthweight information available in the census, but I find evidence of parental
reinforcement behaviour in the 2+ sample, by comparing the effect of twinning on twins
and non-twins. Therefore, estimator in the 2+ sample is regarded as a positively biased
lower bound. In other words, the true Q-Q trade-off are bigger in magnitude for the 2+
sample. The upper bound is provided by using twins at first birth. Additionally, the
effect of fertility on the outcome of older siblings are provided for first and second birth
separately in the 3+ sample, as I believe that the trade-off would differ by birth order
due to differences in sibling interaction and parental resource allocation. Indeed, results
show heterogeneous birth order effects, which are obscured by previous literature.
Several validity tests are conducted to ensure that the estimates are not driven by
direct effects of instrumental variables on outcomes, if any, at least the direction of
bias is obtained. Twinning may affect the outcome of lower births children through
zero spacing(economies of scale) and lower birthweight. I test the existence of these
mechanisms and results suggest that some estimators are probably positively biased.
Thus the true adverse effects of family size on the schooling performance of children are
bigger in magnitude, with the exception of the effect on twin themselves. Son preferences
may affect outcome independently through gender-based parental investment, for
instance, families with son preferences will tend to allocate resource toward boys and
the Q-Q trade-off will be positively biased for boys and negatively biased for girls.
There is evidence that gender of firstborn directly affects outcomes, thus Q-Q trade-off
is negatively biased. In other words, the true effects of an additional birth induced by
a girl birth on quality is weaker than what the estimators imply.
In addition, I explore heterogeneous effects across family socioeconomics back-
ground, rural urban areas, gender of older siblings and extra child. The Q-Q trade-off
are mainly driven by children of households from rural areas and low-educated parents
in the sample of at least one or two births, while the trade-off is more obvious in high-
educated parents in a larger family size. Results based on gender confirms the finding
of Almond et al. (2013) that parents prefer sex mix than 2 boys, followed by 2 girls.
This study provides technique support for policies aiming at reducing contraceptive
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costs, controlling population growth and subsidizing families with fewer children. The
estimates show that those policies may in fact contribute to better educational outcomes
of children. However, population control is unsustainable for long term economic
growth especially in ageing societies. If policy maker aims at alleviating population
ageing problem by encouraging child birth, then corresponding policy reform is needed
to cooperate with the adverse fertility effect. For example, maternal leave, childcare
provision, public education and health system should be adjusted accordingly.
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Tables
Table 2.1: Relevant Test: First Child’s Gender
Parity Progression Weibull Hazard Model
of Childbirth Spacing
No.children>1 No.children>2 No.children>2 spacing12 spacing23 spacing23
girl1 0.055*** 0.095*** 0.005 1.564*** 1.539*** 0.946***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.014) (0.013)
girl2 0.129*** 1.625***
(0.003) (0.015)
samesex12 0.112*** 1.197***
(0.003) (0.011)
boy12 -0.001 0.736***
(0.003) (0.011)
girl12 0.094*** 1.948***
(0.003) (0.022)
N 60437 60437 58883 566133 222428 222428
Note: All the number contained in the variable name indicates birth order, for instance, spacing12 means
spacing between first and second births. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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Table 2.2: First Stage Effects on Fertility
Panel a: 1+ sample
Sub-sample Primary enrolment Primary graduation
Instrument twin1 girl1 twin1 girl1
No. Children 0.513*** 0.275*** 0.372*** 0.298***
(0.009) (0.002) (0.025) (0.004)
Wald test 3280.220 23884.040 221.960 5140.730
N 610484 606422 148969 148303
Panel b: 2+ sample
Sub-sample Primary enrolment Primary graduation
Instrument twin2 twin2
No. Children 0.561*** 0.562***
(0.008) (0.027)
Wald test 4899.800 425.430
N 429120 137560
Panel c: 3+ sample
Sub-sample Primary enrolment Primary graduation
Instrument twin3 twin3
First born
No. Children 0.426*** 0.523***
(0.011) (0.027)
Wald test 1441.900 389.080
N 153693 69735
Second born
No. Children 0.482*** 0.547***
(0.013) (0.032)
Wald test 1411.370 295.600
N 163451 58141
Note: Panel a shows the first-stage effects of twins and girl at first birth on fertility
for the 1+ sample. Panel b shows the first-stage effects of twins at second birth on
fertility for the 2+ sample. Panel c shows the first-stage effects of twins at third birth
on fertility for the 3+ sample.
All the number contained in the variable name indicates birth order, for instance,
girl1 indicates girl at first birth and twin2 means twins at second birth.
Regressions for panel a include controls for child’s age, gender, mother’s age at first
child birth, father’s age and year of birth, panel b also controls for mother’s age at
census, birth spacing between first and second birth, panel c additionally controls
for sex composition of the first two birth, birth spacing between the second and
third birth. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered
at household level for the 3+ sample.
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Table 2.3: Descriptive Statistics by Sample 1/2
1+ sample 2+ sample 3+ sample
First born Second born
mean std dev mean std dev mean std dev mean std dev
Endogeneous variable
No. children 2.152 0.935 2.531 0.764 3.336 0.629 3.416 0.703
Education outcomes
Primary Enrolment 0.857 0.351 0.865 0.342 0.841 0.366 0.841 0.366
(6 <= age <= 13)
N 610484 429120 153693 163451
Primary Completed 0.752 0.432 0.743 0.437 0.681 0.466 0.653 0.476
(13 < age <= 16)
Junior Enrolment 0.602 0.490 0.586 0.493 0.485 0.500 0.456 0.498
(13 < age <= 16)
N 148969 137560 69735 58141
Family Composition
twin1 0.006 0.079
twin2 0.004 0.063
twin3 0.003 0.053 0.003 0.052
boy1 0.512 0.499 0.482 0.500 0.409 0.492 0.422 0.494
boy2 0.526 0.499 0.420 0.494 0.433 0.496
boy3 0.541 0.498 0.531 0.499
boy12 0.241 0.428 0.198 0.399 0.206 0.404
girl12 0.234 0.423 0.369 0.482 0.351 0.477
boy123 0.087 0.282 0.092 0.289
girl123 0.141 0.348 0.141 0.348
N 759453 566680 223428 221592
Note: 1+ sample includes households with at least 1 child birth(note here 1+ sample is the
sample I use for estimation with twinning at first birth as instrument. When first child’ sex is
used as instrumental variable, the 1+ sample excludes families with twins at first birth, and all
the summary statistics remains largely unchanged); 2+ sample is consists of families with at
least 2 child births, 3+ sample is comprised of households with at least 3 births.
For the ease of table presentation, it reports the summary statistics for aggregated sample
of primary school enrolment and junior school enrolment. However, in the regression analysis,
sample differs by children exposed to the outcome. Specifically, in the case of primary enrolment,
the sample only contains children age between 6 and 13; in other cases, sample is comprised of
children age above 13 but not older than 16.
All the number contained in the variable name indicates birth order, for instance, twin1 means
twins at first birth, spacing12 means spacing between first and second births.
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Table 2.4: Descriptive Statistics by Sample 2/2
1+ sample 2+ sample 3+ sample
First born Second born
mean std dev mean std dev mean std dev mean std dev
Control Variables
child’s age 10.194 3.110 10.661 3.168 11.240 3.229 11.022 3.037
child’s birth year 1979.260 3.143 1978.784 3.198 1978.198 3.261 1978.444 3.076
mother’s age 23.814 3.025 23.334 2.844 22.920 2.835 22.697 2.792
at first child birth
mother’s age at census 34.008 4.143 33.995 4.147 34.160 4.090 36.180 3.734
father’s age at census 36.153 4.663 36.196 4.647 36.399 4.645 38.489 4.462
Mother Education level
illiterate 0.359 0.480 0.426 0.494 0.510 0.500 0.544 0.498
primary school completed 0.311 0.463 0.346 0.476 0.333 0.471 0.335 0.472
junior high school completed 0.221 0.415 0.173 0.378 0.127 0.333 0.100 0.301
senior high completed 0.099 0.298 0.054 0.226 0.030 0.171 0.020 0.141
college completed 0.009 0.095 0.002 0.048 0.000 0.016 0.000 0.021
Father Education level
illiterate 0.158 0.364 0.183 0.386 0.216 0.412 0.236 0.425
primary school completed 0.320 0.466 0.359 0.480 0.368 0.482 0.403 0.491
junior high school completed 0.344 0.475 0.322 0.467 0.302 0.459 0.271 0.444
senior high school completed 0.153 0.360 0.127 0.333 0.112 0.315 0.086 0.280
college completed 0.025 0.157 0.009 0.095 0.002 0.046 0.004 0.060
mother ethnicity(Han) 0.931 0.254 0.917 0.276 0.884 0.320 0.889 0.314
father ethnicity(Han) 0.930 0.254 0.917 0.275 0.887 0.317 0.891 0.312
mother’s birth year 1955.477 4.139 1955.491 4.142 1955.332 4.082 1953.309 3.725
father’s birth year 1953.323 4.660 1953.281 4.643 1953.084 4.640 1950.991 4.457
spacing12 37.625 22.703 37.808 22.580 30.525 15.104 29.708 13.583
spacing23 35.338 20.610 38.324 22.938
rural 0.775 0.418 0.894 0.308 0.955 0.208 0.938 0.242
N 759453 566680 223428 221592
Note: Same note as it stated in table 2.3.
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Table 2.5: The Effect of Family Size on Education Outcome
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS 2SLSa NLIVb GMMc OLS 2SLS NLIV GMM
Panel a: 1+ sample Panel b: 2+ sample
IV: girl at first birth IV: twin at the second birth
Primary Enrolment
No. kids -0.019***-0.078***-0.150***-0.162*** -0.023***0.005 -0.015***-0.072***
-0.022d -0.091 -0.175 -0.189 -0.027 0.006 -0.017 -0.083
(0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004)
N 606422 606422 606422 606422 429120 429120 429120 429120
Primary Graduation
No. kids -0.041***-0.089***-0.163***-0.115*** -0.049***0.045 -0.151***-0.091***
-0.055 -0.118 -0.217 -0.153 -0.066 0.061 -0.203 -0.122
(0.001) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.001) (0.030) (0.009) (0.011)
N 148303 148303 148303 148303 137560 137560 137560 137560
Junior Enrolment
No. kids -0.067***-0.300***-0.370***-0.327*** -0.073***0.026 -0.203***-0.091***
-0.111 -0.498 -0.615 -0.543 -0.125 0.044 -0.346 -0.155
(0.001) (0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.002) (0.034) (0.009) (0.014)
N 148303 148303 148303 148125 137560 137560 137560 137394
Panel c: 3+ sample
First Born Second Born
IV: twin at third birth IV: twin at third birth
Primary Enrolment
No. kids -0.025***-0.001 0.013 -0.011 -0.033***-0.008 -0.001 -0.046***
-0.030 -0.001 0.015 -0.059 -0.039 -0.010 -0.001 -0.055
(0.001) (0.017) (0.010) (0.013) (0.001) (0.018) (0.009) (0.007)
N 153693 153693 153693 153693 163451 163451 163451 163424
Primary Graduation
No. kids -0.048***0.044 -0.057***-0.033* -0.053***-0.022 -0.074***-0.055**
-0.070 0.065 -0.084 -0.048 -0.081 -0.034 -0.113 -0.084
(0.002) (0.035) (0.016) (0.017) (0.003) (0.041) (0.015) (0.022)
N 69735 69735 69735 69710 58141 58141 58141 58141
Junior Enrolment
No. kids -0.066***0.036 -0.045***-0.009 -0.068***-0.102**-0.053***-0.046**
-0.136 0.074 -0.093 -0.019 -0.149 -0.224 -0.116 -0.101
(0.002) (0.040) (0.007) (0.019) (0.002) (0.044) (0.014) (0.021)
N 69735 69735 153693 69556 58141 58141 58141 58054
Note: Panel a shows the effects of fertility on schooling outcome of firstborns in the 1+
sample. Panel b shows the effects of fertility on schooling outcome of firstborns in the
2+ sample, panel c shows the effect on schooling outcome of firstborns and secondborns,
respectively, in the 3+ sample.
a 2SLS gives the two stage least square estimates. b NLIV gives the estimates based on
non-linear first-stage. cGMM gives the result taking into account non-linear distribution in
both first and second stage.
d Numbers in bold gives the corresponding transformation of the magnitude of Q-Q trade-off,
i.e. -0.022 means that an extra kid decreases the probability of primary enrolment by 2.2%,
which corresponds to 1.9 percentage points decrease in the outcome variable compared to its
mean value(0.019/0.857). The same calculation applies to all the estimates.
All the regressions include control variables described in the note of table 2.2. Robust
standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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Table 2.6: Testing the Internal Validity of Instruments — Birth Spacing
Panel a: spacing channel—Black et al.(2005)
Primary enrolment Primary graduation Junior enrolment
spacing23 -0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N 207734 207752 207218
Panel b: no-first-stage—Angrist et al. (2010)
Primary enrolment Primary graduation Junior enrolment
Tight birth spacing sample
twins at second birth 0.017 0.066 0.019
(0.014) (0.054) (0.054)
N 142381 40431 40394
twins at third birth -0.018 -0.149 -0.177
(0.027) (0.091) (0.119)
N 27846 6278 6278
Young mother sample
twins at second birth -0.028 0.010 -0.037
(0.019) (0.044) (0.051)
N 104272 46338 46281
twins at third birth 0.064 -0.015 -0.144*
(0.066) (0.069) (0.082)
N 26234 13530 13532
Note: In panel a, sample is restricted to non-twin families with two tightly spaced second
and third births.
Panel b performs reduced form estimations in no-first-stage samples as proposed by Angrist
et al. (2010). Those samples are families with tightly spaced births, or households with
young mothers. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered by
household ID for 3+ sample.
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Table 2.7: Testing the Internal Validity of Instruments — Bounding Strategy
Panel a: 2+ sample
Primary enrolment Primary graduation Junior enrolment
twins at second birth -0.023*** -0.010 -0.047**
(0.006) (0.017) (0.020)
first-birth (non-twin) 0.004*** 0.045*** 0.064***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
twins at second birth 0.024*** 0.037 0.063**
* first-birth (non-twin) (0.009) (0.029) (0.032)
N 802109 258258 258258
Panel b: 3+ sample
Primary enrolment Primary graduation Junior enrolment
twins at third birth -0.025 -0.073 -0.053
(0.019) (0.093) (0.120)
first two births (non-twin) 0.029*** 0.067*** 0.059***
(0.003) (0.009) (0.011)
twins at third birth -0.004 0.053 -0.011
* first two births (non-twin) (0.028) (0.093) (0.120)
N 155408 48768 48705
Note: Panel a applies the bounding strategy (Rosenzweig and Zhang, 2009) to 2+ sample, while
panel b performs similar methodology on 3+ sample. Robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses and are clustered by household ID for 3+ sample.
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Table 2.8: The lower bound of using twin births as instrument
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS 2SLSa NLIVb GMMc
IV: twin at the first birth
No. childnum -0.017*** -0.018* -0.226*** -0.203***
-0.020d -0.021 -0.264 -0.237
(0.001) (0.009) (0.005) (0.007)
N 610484 610484 610484 610484
No. childnum -0.039*** -0.185*** -0.380*** -0.262***
-0.052 -0.246 0.505 -0.348
(0.001) (0.044) (0.017) (0.007)
N 148969 148969 148969 148969
No. childnum -0.059*** -0.212*** -0.563*** -0.343***
-0.098 -0.352 0.935 -0.570
(0.001) (0.045) (0.022) (0.031)
N 148969 148969 148969 148791
Note: Panel a shows the effects of fertility on schooling outcome
of firstborns in the 1+ sample. Panel b shows the effects of fertility
on schooling outcome of firstborns in the 2+ sample, panel c shows
the effect on schooling outcome of firstborns and secondborns,
respectively, in the 3+ sample.
a 2SLS gives the two stage least square estimates. b NLIV gives
the estimates based on non-linear first-stage. cGMM gives the
result taking into account non-linear distribution in both first and
second stage.
d Numbers in bold gives the corresponding transformation of the
magnitude of Q-Q trade-off, i.e. -0.020 means that an extra
kid decreases the probability of primary enrolment by 2%, which
corresponds to 1.7 percentage points decrease in the outcome
variable compared to its mean value(0.017/0.857). The same
calculation applies to all the estimates.
All the regressions include control variables described in the note
of table 2.2. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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Table 2.9: Testing the Internal Validity of Instruments — Economies of Scale
Economies of scale
Primary Enrolement Primary Graduation Junior Enrolment
same-sex mixed-sex same-sex mixed-sex same-sex mixed-sex
twin twin twin twin twin twin
No. children -0.194*** -0.210*** -0.271*** -0.210*** -0.402*** -0.393***
(0.003) (0.012) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
N 609332 607574 148765 148507 148587 148329
Note: Two sub-samples are used to identify the economies of scale channel. The same-sex
twin sample consists of singleton boy(girl) and boy-boy(girl-girl) twinning at first birth.
The mixed-sex twin sample is comprised of singleton boy(girl) and boy-girl twinning at
first birth. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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Table 2.10: Testing the Internal Validity of Instruments — Son Preferences
Panel a: education outcome by number of boys and family size
No. boys
Primary enrolment
No. births 0 1 2 3
1 0.822 0.847 . .
2 0.878 0.885 0.887 .
3 0.838 0.853 0.858 0.865
primary graduation
1 0.879 0.858 . .
2 0.841 0.807 0.791 .
3 0.767 0.732 0.719 0.715
Junior enrolment
1 0.814 0.792 . .
2 0.728 0.683 0.679 .
3 0.587 0.539 0.538 0.548
Panel b: no-first-stage
Primary enrol Primary grad Junior enrol
Tight spacing
girl at first birth -0.027*** -0.018*** -0.085***
(0.001) (0.004) (0.004)
N 142381 40431 40394
Young mother
girl at first birth -0.041*** -0.047*** -0.118***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
N 121039 47722 47662
Ethnic minorities
girl at first birth -0.059*** -0.055*** -0.082***
(0.003) (0.008) (0.008)
N 41656 10966 10809
Note: In panel a, average education outcomes of children are listed
by number of boys and family size.
In panel b, sample is restricted to families with tightly spaced
births, or households with young mothers, or families with Non-Han
ethnicity(exempted from the One Child Policy). Robust standard
errors are reported in parentheses.
95
Table 2.11: Robustness Check: Heterogeneity—Q-Q Trade-off by Mother’s
Education
Primary Enrolement Primary graduation Junior Enrolment
low-edu high-edu low-edu high-edu low-edu high-edu
Panel a: 1+ sample
IV: girl at first birth
No. children -0.124*** -0.060*** -0.111*** 0.032*** -0.343*** -0.018
(0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.012) (0.009) (0.013)
N 321624 107496 115425 22135 115259 22135
IV: twins at first birth
No. children -0.065*** -0.052*** -0.087 -0.012 -0.096*** -0.037
(0.005) (0.008) (0.067) (0.012) (0.034) (0.031)
N 323856 109326 115867 22359 115701 22359
Panel b: 2+ sample
IV: twins at second birth
No. children -0.042*** -0.044*** -0.065*** -0.003 -0.069*** -0.019
(0.006) (0.008) (0.014) (0.013) (0.016) (0.016)
N 321624 107496 115425 22135 115259 22135
Panel c: 3+ sample
IV: twins at third birth
No. children -0.040 0.000 -0.002 -0.089* 0.003 -0.116**
(0.027) (0.025) (0.067) (0.048) (0.026) (0.059)
N 175914 32424 175914 3454 175378 3454
Note: High educated mother is defined as completed primary school. Robust
standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered by household ID
for 3+ sample.
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Table 2.12: Robustness Check: Heterogeneity—Q-Q Trade-off in terms of Rural-
Urban Gap
Primary Enrolement Primary graduation Junior Enrolment
rural urban rural urban rural urban
Panel a: 1+ sample
IV: girl at first birth
No. children -0.131*** -0.096*** -0.136*** 0.027* -0.402*** 0.018
(0.002) (0.009) (0.009) (0.015) (0.006) (0.015)
N 466549 139873 118935 29368 118935 29368
IV: twins at first birth
No. children -0.210*** -0.084*** -0.301*** -0.065*** -0.339*** -0.092***
(0.004) (0.009) (0.003) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011)
N 469207 141277 119345 29624 119345 29624
Panel b: 2+ sample
IV: twins at second birth
No. children -0.082*** -0.018* -0.110*** -0.021*** -0.098*** -0.048***
(0.005) (0.011) (0.014) (0.008) (0.017) (0.014)
N 392259 36861 114267 23293 114267 23293
Panel c: 3+ sample
IV: twins at third birth – average outcome of first two births
No. children -0.054*** -0.061*** -0.015 -0.073 -0.053 -0.029
(0.012) (0.021) (0.030) (0.066) (0.037) (0.069)
N 200862 7476 30166 3584 30166 3584
IV: twins at third birth
1st birth
No. children -0.081*** -0.064** -0.008 -0.032 0.020 0.002
(0.011) (0.032) (0.021) (0.031) (0.022) (0.040)
N 148754 4939 64529 5206 64529 5206
2nd birth
No. children -0.079*** -0.048*** -0.051** -0.015 -0.039 -0.017
(0.010) (0.017) (0.022) (0.028) (0.025) (0.033)
N 155822 7629 51932 6209 51932 6209
Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered by
household ID for 3+ sample.
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Table 2.13: Robustness Check: Heterogeneity—Q-Q Trade-off by Gender of the
Extra Sibling
Primary Enrolement Primary graduation Junior Enrolment
boy girl boy girl boy girl
Panel a: 2+ sample
IV: twins at second birth
No. children -0.077*** -0.073*** -0.096*** -0.093*** -0.098*** -0.095***
(0.006) (0.004) (0.013) (0.010) (0.014) (0.014)
N 428547 428559 137443 137432 137277 137266
Panel b: 3+ sample
IV: twins at third birth
No. children -0.052*** -0.053*** -0.010 -0.004 -0.049 -0.038
(0.009) (0.009) (0.026) (0.025) (0.032) (0.031)
N 208168 208146 33720 33706 33678 33664
Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered by
household ID for 3+ sample.
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Table 2.14: Robustness Check: Heterogeneity—Q-Q Trade-off by Gender of Older
Sibling
Primary Enrolement Primary graduation Junior Enrolment
male female male female male female
Panel a: 2+ sample
IV: twins at second birth
No. children -0.023*** -0.060*** -0.023 -0.040*** -0.008 -0.010
(0.006) (0.005) (0.024) (0.015) (0.014) (0.018)
N 204453 224667 68618 68942 68536 68858
Panel b: 3+ sample
IV: twins at third birth
No. children -0.008 -0.035** -0.093 0.010 -0.100** -0.009
(0.018) (0.017) (0.406) (0.044) (0.051) (0.047)
N 40416 80346 7076 10606 7058 10616
Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered
by household ID for 3+ sample.
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Table 2.15: Robustness Check: Heterogeneity—the Effect of Family Size on
Education Outcome (1982 Census)
Primary graduation
First stage OLS 2SLSa NLIVb GMMc
Panel a: 2+ sample
IV: twins at second birth
twin2 0.533***
(0.032)
No. childnum -0.023*** 0.007 -0.213*** -0.041***
-0.025d 0.008 -0.236 -0.045
(0.001) (0.022) (0.013) (0.010)
Wald test 280.160
N 104487 104487 104487 104487
Panel b: 3+ sample
IV: twins at third birth
1st born
twin3 0.576***
(0.025)
No. childnum -0.032*** 0.015 -0.091*** -0.019**
-0.036 0.017 -0.102 -0.021
(0.001) (0.017) (0.010) (0.008)
Wald test 531.440
N 90233 90233 90233 90021
2nd born
twin3 0.605***
(0.035)
No. childnum -0.033*** -0.005 -0.130*** -0.023*
-0.037 -0.006 -0.146 -0.026
(0.001) (0.022) (0.013) (0.013)
Wald test 299.29
N 76734 76734 76734 76734
Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
a 2SLS gives the two stage least square estimates. b NLIV gives
the estimates based on non-linear first-stage. cGMM gives the result
taking into account non-linear distribution in both first and second
stage.
d Numbers in bold gives the corresponding transformation of the
magnitude of Q-Q trade-off, i.e. -0.025 means that an extra
kid decreases the probability of primary enrolment by 2.5%, which
corresponds to 2.3 percentage points decrease in the outcome variable
compared to its mean value(0.023/0.904). The same calculation
applies to all the estimates.
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Figures
(a) Girl at first birth (b) Twins at first birth
(c) Twins at second birth (d) Twins at third birth
Figure 2.1: First Stage Effects on Fertility
Note: It plots the first stage effects of different instrumental variables on fertility, with
number of children on x-axis and the first stage effects on y-axis. For example, the first
dot in panel (a) tells that a girl at first birth increases the probability of fertility rises
from 1 to 2 by 0.29. The dashed lines are estimated confidence intervals, note that at
higher fertility range, the confidence interval is not shown due to the lose of significant
power.
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Figure 2.2: The Mean-variance Relationship for Families with Children
Note: It plots the variance against the mean conditional on the education level
of mother and age of giving first birth.
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(a) first stage given by OLS (b) first stage given by Poisson
(c) second stage given by OLS (d) second stage given by Logit
Figure 2.3: Model Fitting in Two Stages 1/2
Note: Sample: at least 1 birth household; Endogenous variable: fertility; Outcome variable: the probability of completing primary school; Instrumental
variable: gender of the first birth. The dots plot dependent variable Y i or Ni versus estimated linear indexes. The red line shows parametric fit of
dependent variable E(Y i|Xi) or E(Ni|Xi) versus estimated linear indexes. The green thicker line represents a kernel regression of Y i or Ni on the fitted
index for each model.
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(a) first stage given by OLS (b) first stage given by Poisson
(c) second stage given by OLS (d) second stage given by Logit
Figure 2.4: Model Fitting in Two Stages 2/2
Note: Sample: at least 2 birth households; Endogenous variable: fertility; Outcome variable: the probability of entering junior high school; Instrumental
variable: twins at the second birth. The dots plot dependent variable Y i or Ni versus estimated linear indexes. The red line shows parametric fit of
dependent variable E(Y i|Xi) or E(Ni|Xi) versus estimated linear indexes. The green thicker line represents a kernel regression of Y i or Ni on the fitted
index for each model.
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(a) 2SLS estimation
(b) GMM estimation
Figure 2.5: Model Fitting in One Step 1/2—2SLS VS. GMM
Note: Sample: at least 1 birth household; Endogenous variable: fertility; Outcome variable:
the probability of completing primary school; Instrumental variable: gender of the first
birth. The dots plot dependent variable Y i versus estimated linear indexes. The red line
shows parametric fit of dependent variable E(Y i|Xi) versus estimated linear indexes. The
green thicker line represents a kernel regression of Y i on the fitted index for each model.
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(a) 2SLS estimation
(b) GMM estimation
Figure 2.6: Model Fitting in One Step 2/2—2SLS VS. GMM
Note: Sample: at least 2 birth households; Endogenous variable: fertility; Outcome variable: the
probability of entering junior high school; Instrumental variable: twins at the second birth. The
dots plot dependent variable Y i versus estimated linear indexes. The red line shows parametric fit
of dependent variable E(Y i|Xi) versus estimated linear indexes. The green thicker line represents a
kernel regression of Y i on the fitted index for each model.
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Chapter 3
No Retirement Consumption Puzzle—the Effect of
Labour Supply on Disaggregated Expenditures in the
Later Life Cycle
Abstract
This paper examines the life cycle profile of disaggregated nondurable expenditures
for Chinese urban households. The result shows that aggregated expenditure conceals
substantial heterogeneity in the life-cycle pattern of expenditure subcomponents. Based
on the observed disaggregated life cycle pattern, I test how much of the adjustment of
consumption across time and categories can be attributed to the labour supply status. A
regression discontinuity approach shows that elderly households are able to maintain a
stable consumption onset of retirement by adjusting expenditure across sub-aggregated
categories and household behaviour. In particular, due to changes in family composition,
family transfer, precautionary saving motives and adjustments in intra-household food
production time, elderly households are not only able to smooth food expenditure but
also food consumption upon retirement. Furthermore, by using subjective retirement
expectations as an instrument for actual retirement, I find that the adjustments in
sub-aggregated expenditure categories are resulting from unexpected retirement. This
study confirms the prediction of Life Cycle Model and has important implications for
using disaggregated data to test the existence of retirement consumption puzzle and for
testing consumption theories.
Key Words: retirement consumption puzzle; sub-aggregated expenditures; regression
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discontinuity; subjective retirement expectations; China
JEL Classification:: D12, D91, J26, O12, P36
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3.1 Introduction
The Chinese economy experienced rapid growth since the 1978 economic reform, which
achieved an average of 8.6 percent in GDP annual growth over the period 1978-2007.
The significant growth is mainly driven by the expansion of international trade. China
has overtaken the US, becoming the world’s biggest goods exporter in 2009, but this
export-led pattern has proved to be unsustainable. The growth of the economy has
decelerated recently, as signalled by the stock market crash in July 2015. Despite
remarkable economic growth, household consumption, decreasing from 50% in 1980
to 36% in 2014, accounted for a gradually smaller proportion of the GDP. It raises
the importance of analysing and understanding the consumption behaviour of Chinese
households.
In addition, Chinese population has been ageing rapidly over the past three decades,
mainly resulting from the family planning policy and longer life expectancy. The amount
of elderly population was around 200 million by 2014, which accounted for 15.5 percent
of the whole population, and it has been projected to surpass one third of the whole
population by 2050. Given the fact that the working population is shrinking over time,
the topic on delaying mandatory retirement age is widely debated. It is certainly a
public policy that not only concerns economic growth, but more importantly the welfare
of elderly people. Modigliani and Brumberg (1954) propose that households should
maintain stable marginal utility over the life cycle, thus a failure to smooth consumption
upon retirement would raise considerable concerns for the well-being of elderly people
and adjustments of public policies. Hence, studying consumption behaviour of elderly
individuals and their consumption response to retirement is of great policy relevance.
Studies of retirement consumption mainly focused on the western world where
significant drops in consumption upon retirement are repeatedly documented. China
provides a comparable context for investigating this issue due to different retirement
policies and social norms. China has been implementing the mandatory retirement
policy since 1950s. It firstly targeted at workers in public sectors and then gradually
extends to private sectors since 1997. Although the mandated retirement age has
been fixed for about 60 years, the replacement rate—the percentage of a worker’s pre-
retirement wage—varies across area, time and work-unit types. A major pension reform
took place in 1997, which leads to the replacement rate of public sector workers decreased
from 80% to 60% and the coverage extended to all types of enterprise1. However, the
1This includes state-owned enterprises, collective enterprises, foreign-funded enterprises,
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implementation of the new pension system is far from achieving the policy goal. Li
(2012) shows that the coverage rate increased from 24% in 1993 to 67% in 2011 for
urban residents. China Household Income Project (CHIP) 2007 shows that 53.40 %
of people residing in urban areas, age between 50 and 70, have no pension in 2007.
Public sector workers typically receive higher replacement rate than workers in private
sectors, this paper finds that it was 65% for the former and 50% for the latter across
the whole sample period. The unique context of Chinese retirement and pension system
provides a quasi-experimental framework for identifying a causal relationship between
labour supply status and consumption. Moreover, elderly support prevails in Chinese
culture, and the high saving rates of Chinese elderly households have been intensively
reported(Modigliani and Cao, 2004; Wei and Zhang, 2011; Chamon and Prasad, 2010;
Yang, 2012), which provides a unique opportunity to understand potential mechanisms
through which households smooth their consumption.
This paper begins by exploring the life cyle profile of nondurable expenditure. In
particular, it reports the evolution of household consumption at disaggregated categories
over the life cycle. The importance of analysing subcomponents of consumption goods
is raised by Aguiar and Hurst (2013) who claim that the life cycle pattern of total
nondurable consumption is mainly driven by inputs that are complementary to work
status and that are amenable to home production. This study confirms that total
nondurable expenditure masks heterogeneity in the life cycle profile of disaggregated
expenditures. Specifically, the total nondurable expenditure presents a typical hump-
shaped pattern, which is consistent with the life cycle hypothesis with uncertainty. Food
expenditure presents a hump-shaped profile in general but remains relatively stable at
later stage of the life cycle. Core nondurable expenditure1 shows a typical hump-shaped
life cycle profile, while work-related expenditure2 displays a significant drop since age
45. It seems that the pattern of total nondurable expenditure is mainly driven by the
drop in work-related spending in the later stage of life cycle. These pieces of evidence
emphasize the role of subaggregated expenditures in explaining the life cycle profile of
total nondurable goods. Furthermore, this paper explicitly tests how retirement affects
the consumption behaviour of households.
This study adds to prior literature in several aspects. First, it provides the
joint ventures enterprises, private enterprises, joint-stock enterprises and so on.
1Core nondurable expenditure includes rent or rent equivalent, utility, property management
and daily use good spending. More detail will be provided in section 3.4.
2Work_related expenditure includes spending on clothes, transportation and communica-
tion. More detail will be provided in section 3.4.
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first empirical evidence of the disaggregated Chinese household life cycle consumption
profile. It shows that studies based on total nondurable expenditure ignore the
heterogeneity in sub-aggregated expenditures. Second, it explicitly tests the life cycle
model and presents new evidence that there is no retirement consumption puzzle in
China. A regression discontinuity approach fails to find any impact of retirement on
total nondurable expenditure, while retirement affects the allocation of expenditures
on disaggregated categories. In particular, there is no drop in food consumption
taking into account food production. Third, this study firstly applies subjective
retirement expectation as an instrumental variable for the actual retirement in the
context of China. I use an additional dataset (CHARLS) which allows me to separate
anticipated changes in consumption from total changes in consumption upon retirement.
Estimation result supports the life cycle model that adjustments in subcomponent
consumption are resulting from unexpected retirement. Fourth, this paper differs from
previous literature by exploring possible mechanisms through which the retirement
affects disaggregated expenditures. Due to changes in family composition, increases
in family transfers received from non-coresident children and stable household food
production time, households are not only able to smooth food expenditure but also
food consumption upon retirement. Work related expenditure drops upon retirement
due to the complementary effects of labour supply, and it only significantly falls for
high-educated households. Total nondurable expenditures stay stable leaving out sub-
expenditures that are inputs into market work and amenable to home production,
possibly also due to the high saving rates of elderly households. Fifth, this paper
provides an implicit test of the consumption theory that the life cycle profile of
consumption goods that are complementary to working status should be different from
those goods that are substitution or amenable to home production. Estimation results
confirm the complementary mechanism, and the home production theory finds support
in adjustments of intra-household food shopping time. Sixth, the main analysis is
based on a repeated cross sectional data that has the advantage over panel data in
its longer span of coverage. Existing research in Chinese retirement consumption use
panel structure with short time span which are insufficient to fully capture the welfare
changes of elderly households.
The paper proceeds as follows: the next section presents institutional background
and literature review on the analysis of household life cycle consumption behaviour.
Section 3.3 states the empirical framework that the current paper focuses on. Section
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3.4 describes the data source and descriptive statistics. Section 3.5 provides empirical
results, robustness checks and possible smooth mechanisms of retirement consumption.
Finally, Section 3.6 draws conclusion.
3.2 Background Information and Literature Re-
view
3.2.1 Institutional Background
The mandatory retirement law has been officially implemented in public sectors1 since
May 1978, and then gradually applied to private sector. The retirement law requires
male workers to retire at age 60, female white-collar workers to retire at age 55 and
female blue-collar workers to retire at age 50, with few exceptions applying to certain
occupations and physical situations. These age thresholds have not changed since the
initial establishment in 1950s, while there are heated debates regarding postponing
the retirement age given the fact that China is among those countries with earliest
retirement age and experiences rapid changes in demographic structure. The ageing
population puts heavy pressure on pension reforms that it has been projected that one
pensioner will be sponsored by two tax payers in 2035.
The compliance of the mandatory retirement age law is not perfect, there are cases
that people retire earlier than the mandatory age2, and cases that people get re-hired
by the previous employer after official retirement or get a new job.
Although the mandated retirement age has been fixed for about 60 years, the
replacement rate varies across area, time and work-unit types. ChinaâĂŹs Urban
EmployeeâĂŹs Pension System has gone through several reforms in changing the way
providing funds and replacement rates. China established the urban pension system in
the early 1950s, targeting at state-owned enterprise and collective enterprise workers,
the latter made up a very small fraction of the total (Li, 2012). Under the planned
economy system from 1950s to 1980s, this system covered all urban public sectors and
1Here public sector is a broad term, for the purpose of distinguishing from private sector.
Public sector in this paper refers to governments and public sectors, state-owned enterprises,
and collectively-owned enterprises
2The institutional reform took place in 1990s, aiming at reducing operation cost and
reconstructing State-owned enterprises. Individual who is about to retire in 5 years and has
worked more than 30 years can apply for an early retirement. Early retirees are able to receive
certain amount of money from their employers monthly before getting pension upon normal
retirement age.
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the replacement rate was around 80%. With the reform and opening-up policy in
1980s, this system could not adapt to economic development and the government began
to implement some local pilot social pension insurance programmes during the period
1991–1997. A major pension reform took place in 1997, which required the retirement
fund to be provided by combining individual accounts and social pooling, rather than
being entirely provided by employers before 1997. Under this context, the replacement
rate decreased by 25% and the coverage rate increased from 24% in 1993 to 67% in 2011
for urban residents(Li, 2012).
This reform interferes with my sample period 1995-2007, but it should not affect the
size of compliers and consumption behaviour right upon the retirement age given the
nature of the Regression discontinuity design. Additionally, results are robust to drop
1995 wave.
3.2.2 Literature Review
Aguiar and Hurst (2013) firstly document that the life cycle profile of total nondurable
consumption masks surprising heterogeneity across expenditure subcomponents. The
well-known hump-shaped nondurable expenditure profile is mostly driven by sub-
expenditures that are inputs into market work or are amenable to home production.
Consumption categories that are complements to labour supply would decline as the
labour supply declines at the later life cycle, while those categories that are substitutes
to labour supply would not decline significantly with the change in labour supply since
they are cost opportunity of the working status.
Their paper gives insight to a new understanding of the so-called retirement
consumption puzzle—that household consumption drops significantly at retirement—
which contradicts the life cycle hypothesis by Modigliani and Brumberg (1954). A
key implication of the life cycle model is that individuals are able to smooth their
consumption over the life cycle against expected income shocks. While retirement is
probably the most predictable change in income, Banks et al. (1998) firstly document
the retirement consumption puzzle in the UK, they claim that unexpected adverse
information around retirement would affect the consumption behaviour. Smith (2006)
and Barrett and Brzozowski (2012) show that it is the involuntary retirement that
causes a drop in the consumption while the voluntary retirement actually shows no
change. Bernheim et al. (2001) find a pronounced discontinuity in consumption at
retirement by using Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) in US, in particular, they
113
claim that work-related expenses or leisure substitutes do not contribute to explain the
reduction in consumption based on Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX). However,
based on the longitudinal component of CEX, Aguila et al. (2011) find no evidence
of discontinuity of retirement consumption measured by total nondurable expenditure,
while food expenditure declines by 6 percent at retirement.
Hurst(2008) surveys the retirement consumption puzzle literature and concludes
that the standard life cycle consumption model augmented with home production
and health shocks accounts for household retirement consumption, to a large extent.
The fact that work-related expenditure declines at retirement has been consistently
documented but what really puzzling is that the well documented significant drop in
food expenditure at retirement. Given food is necessity in daily life thus have relatively
lower income elasticity, a promising explanation for the expenditure drop is the relative
lower opportunity cost of home production after retirement.
Empirical challenges to identify a causal effect of retirement on consumption come
from several aspects. The first concern is that retirement is an endogenous choice,
but often times previous studies have no good ways to deal with the endogenous issue,
therefore, it is most likely for them to present a correlation instead of a causal effect.
There are few exceptions that exploit variation in retirement due to retirement benefit
eligibility (Battistin and Weber, 2009) or subjective retirement expectations (Haider
and Stephens, 2007).
Battistin andWeber (2009) identify the causal effect of retirement on consumption in
Italy by using the exogenous variation in pension eligibility. They find that a 9.8 percent
of the nondurable consumption drop is due to eligibility induced retirement, and the
drop is explained by reduction in work-related expenses or leisure substitutes. However,
most of the retirement consumption drop is attributed to a significant reduction in the
number of adult children living with their parents.
The paper most closely related to this study in the context of China is provided
by Li et al. (2015). They exploit a causal relationship between retirement and
consumption within a regression discontinuity framework. The identification comes
from China’s mandatory retirement policy and they report a 21 percent drop in
nondurable consumption at retirement, but the drop is mainly driven by food at home
and work-related expenditures. Their work is in support of the finding of Hurst (2008)
that the retirement consumption puzzle does not exist when the life-cycle model is
augmented with home production. Dong and Yang (2016) find a significant decline in
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food expenditure that is mostly explained by drop in average food prices rather than
quantities, but find no changes in work-related expenses. This paper differs from these
two studies in that new evidence on food expenditure is provided, more importantly
several mechanisms through which elderly households are able to smooth consumption
are proposed and tested. Furthermore, subjective retirement expectation is employed
as an instrument for better understanding the consumption smooth channel.
The second challenge is that most of the literature have no detailed information
on consumption or they provide evidence based only on food expenditure or total
nondurable expenditure. While food is a relatively easy accessed measurement of
expenditure in most of the database and assumed to have low income elasticity, it
cannot represent a composite measurement of expenditure especially in the presence of
heterogeneity in the subcomponent consumption.
3.3 Empirical Methodology
To provide the life cycle profile of mean expenditures, this analysis adopts the
specification by Aguiar and Hurst(2013),
lnCkit = α
k
0 + α
k
1Ageit + α
k
2Cohortit + α
k
3Familyit + 
k
it (3.1)
where Ckit represents nondurable expenditure of household i in year t on category k,
Ageit contains a set of age dummies that cover household head age ranging from 26 to
75, αk1 shows the effect of age at each life stage relative to age 25 on expenditure category
k. Cohortit is a vector of cohort dummies, ranging from 1927 to 1974. Familyit is a
set of family composition dummies, including dummies indicating number of household
members, dummies representing number of children in age categories 0-2, 3-5, 6-13,
14-17 and 18-21 and a dummy for marital status. The measure of expenditure is at
household level instead of the individual level, hence I use the cross-sectional differences
in family structure to identify family composition effects. One common alternative
approach is to deflate expenditure by a measure of common equivalence scales, as this
study looks at sub-aggregated expenditure categories, the major limitation in applying
a common equivalence scale is that it cannot account for the different returns to scale
across expenditure categories(Aguiar and Hurst, 2013).
Since this analysis is based on repeated cross section surveys, the age effects would
actually capture a mixture of life cycle and cohort effects. Hall(1968) states that age
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effects are not identified due to the collinearity among age, cohort and year effects. The
standard practice is to normalize year dummies so that the year effects are capturing
cyclical fluctuations or business cycle effects that average to zero over the long run
(Deaton, 1997). Thus the year effects would be orthogonal to a time trend. This study
deals with few waves that it is insufficient to isolate time trends from transitory shocks.
Moreover, if the true time effects contains a linear trend, the orthogonal assumption will
create bias by forcing that trend into estimated age and cohort effects (Browning et al.,
2014). An alternative to put restriction on the time effects is to model time effects with
observable variables. To account for the relative change in the price of goods over time,
expenditures are deflated based on consumption category, region of residence and year.
To test how the consumption behaviour of elderly people changes with working
status, specifically to assess the impact of retirement on sub-aggregated expenditures,
this paper exploits the retirement consumption under a regression discontinuity (RD)
framework. The RD design was firstly introduced by Thistlethwaite and Campbell
(1960) and become gradually popular in relatively recent studies(Angrist and Lavy
(1999), Hahn et al. (2001), Imbens and Lemieux (2008), Lee and Lemieux (2010)).
There are few studies employing the RD design to test the existence of a retirement
consumption puzzle(Battistin and Weber (2009), Stancanelli and Van Soest (2012), Li
et al. (2015), Dong and Yang (2016)). Essentially, I would like to estimate the treatment
effect at a range as close as possible to the threshold of assignment variable while not
losing too much precision around the cutoff.
The fact that retirement is mandatory at a certain threshold in China provides
a unique quasi-experiment to capture the causal effect of retirement on consumption.
Under the assumption that the cutoff is not related to any family characteristics or
predetermined variable, any significant change in consumption at the age cutoff can be
attributed to the retirement.
Ideally this paper is interested in estimating the following specification:
lnCkit = γ
k
0 + f(ageit) + ρRetireit + ν
k
it (3.2)
where f(ageit) represents a nonlinear relationship between outcome and the forcing
variable ageit for allowing a reasonable smooth at both sides of the cutoff. In practice,
there are two ways to approximate f(ageit), one is to use a pth order polynomial
specification i.e.
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lnCkit = γ
k
0 + γ
k
1 ˜ageit + γ
k
2 ˜ageit
2 + ...+ γkp ˜ageit
p + ρRetireit + ν
k
it (3.3)
where ˜ageit = ageit − 60, centering the running variable at cutoff age 60 to ensure that
the treatment effect at ageit = 60 is the coefficient on Retireit in a regression with
interaction terms(equation 3.5 – 3.8). The choice of polynomial order is based on the
Akaike information criterion (AIC) as suggested by Van der Klaauw (2002) and Lee and
Lemieux (2010). In the regression context, the AIC is given by
AIC = Nln(σ2) + 2k (3.4)
where σ is the root mean squared error, and k represents the number of parameters in
the regression.
Retireit is a dummy for retirement status of the household head in household i at
time t. This specification implicitly assumes that the only factor affecting the outcome
at a range very close to age 60 is the retirement status which is independent of the
error term. Figure 3.2(a) shows that there is a jump of around 40 percent of individual
transiting into retirement from employment. However, there are non-compliers who got
early retirement or postponed retirement. Hence the endogeneity of retirement would
bias the result estimated from equation 3.3. Following Li et al.(2015), I use an age
indicator Dit that equals to one if age above 60 and 0 if below 60 to instrument the
retirement status. Dit is a strong predictor for retirement and is very unlikely to suffer
from any manipulation and selection bias.
The first stage specification can be estimated from
Retireit =δ0 + δl1 ˜ageit + δl2 ˜ageit
2 + ...+ δlp ˜ageit
p + λDit+
δr1 ˜ageitDit + δr2 ˜ageit
2Dit + ...+ δrp ˜ageit
pDit + eit
(3.5)
where both Dit and the interaction terms are used as instruments for Retireit.
The second stage model with interaction terms can be specified as follows:
lnCkit =γ
k
0 + γ
k
l1 ˜ageit + γ
k
l2 ˜ageit
2 + ...+ γklp ˜ageit
p + ρRetireit+
γkr1 ˜ageitRetireit + γ
k
r2 ˜ageit
2Retireit + ...+ γ
k
rp ˜ageit
pRetireit + ν
k
it
(3.6)
A natural alternative to approximate f(ageit) is to use a nonparametric kernel
method for showing a local linear fit. By applying kernel weights and conditioning
on the age, the idea is to eliminate residual differences between individual who are close
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to get retired and are just retired. The first-stage and reduced-form local linear kernel
regressions are specified as follows,
min
α,δ
ΣitK(
˜ageit
h
)(Retireit − αDit − δ0 − δ1 ˜ageit − δ2 ˜ageitDit)2 (3.7)
min
β,γ
ΣitK(
˜ageit
h
)(lnCkit − βDit − γ0 − γ1 ˜ageit − γ2 ˜ageitDit)
2
(3.8)
where K( ˜ageith ) is a triangular kernel that puts more weight on observations that
closer to the cutoff point, h is a positive bandwidth sequence. Here the running variable
comes with discrete nature so that it simplifies the problem of bandwidth choice, as the
graphic fit will be shown using the mean of the outcome variable for each value of the
discrete running variable.
Estimated effects should be interpreted as a local average treatment effect since
fuzzy RD by construction is a 2SLS estimation with treatment-covariate interactions.
The estimated causal effect captures the average treatment effect for those compliers
who only retire at the point when they reach the mandatory retirement age.
3.4 Data
The empirical analysis is based on data from the urban Chinese Household Income
Project (CHIP), which was conducted by the Institute of Economics at the Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences with assistance from the National Bureau of Statistics(NBS).
The survey adopts a national probability sample of households approach, selecting
provinces from four distinct regions varies in economic development and geography for
constructing a nationally representative sample. The four regions of China are defined
as coastal, central, western and large municipalities with provincial status.
I use four waves out of the available five from this project, which covers year 1995,
1999, 2002 and 2007.
The initial 1988 survey differs from the rest in terms of purchasing pattern. In
order to meet people’s need of necessities against a terrible shortage of supply since
1950s, the government implemented a central controlled food supply policy that urban
people were issued with food ration which was the only way to purchase food. This
policy was abolished nationwide in 1992. One may suspect that the cease of this policy
would induce a change in people’s expenditure pattern, thus the 1988 wave is excluded.
118
All surveys document individual and household characteristics, sources of income and
categories of expenditure. All expenditure and income data are deflated on urban and
category basis, and are in 2007 constant Chinese Yuan1.
The expenditure data are recorded on a diary basis across the survey years in the
CHIP dataset. There are three main disaggregated expenditures to be exploited in
this study. The first category is food expenditure, the second category is work-related
expenditure which includes clothing, transportation and communication. The third
category is the core nondurable expenditure which includes rent or rent equivalent,
utilities, property management and daily use goods spending. This study only focuses
on nondurable expenditure since it is difficult to obtain annual service flow measures
from durables. For the same reason, education and health expenditure are excluded.
There is no information for distinguishing food at home from food away in the
sample, except for 2002 urban survey. Hence, food expenditure consists of both food
at home and food away from home. It is also difficult to distinguish work-related
transportation from travel-based transportation spending in the sample. Given the
fact that for most of the working age people, travelling transportation should account
for a relatively smaller fraction of total transportation cost in China during the sample
period, this study assumes that most of the transportation cost occurred during working
age is driven by work-related transportation cost. The drop in transportation cost at
later stage of life potentially confirms this statement. In addition, the robustness check
section uses a demand system analysis to test the relationship between work-related
spending and work status by directly controlling for labour supply. Utilities costs include
electricity and fuel expenditures. Entertainment expenditure is included in a broader
category—education, culture and entertainment services. For most of the survey waves,
it is difficult to isolate the entertainment expenditure from the rest. Thus entertainment
expenditure is not included in our analysis. Rents are computed as annual actual rent
paid of renters and self-reported estimation of rental equivalent of the house owners.
The sample is restricted to households who report non-missing expenditures on
five key subcomponents of the consumption: food, transportation and communication,
clothing, utilities and rent or equivalent. This condition is not overly restrictive, leading
to a reduction in sample size by 2 percent. The sample only includes households with
household heads age over 25 and below 75 to ensure that household head has completed
education. The pooled sample left with 21952 observations. This sample is used to
1Results are robust to deflating based on CPI index by province and category.
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describe the life cycle consumption pattern of households aged from 25 to 75. It will be
restricted further for the testing of retirement consumption puzzle.
Table 3.1 shows the share and mean change of three main nondurable goods over
the life cycle. Specifically, it shows the pattern for individual ages around 25, 45 and 65.
The share of food spending over total nondurable expenditure increases across these age
groups, while work-related expenditure share decreases and the core nondurable share
remains fairly constant. Column (4) and (5) show the log change in mean expenditure
between age 25 and 45, 45 and 65, respectively. The log change is given by the change
in corresponding age dummy coefficient as shown in figure 3.1.
In this analysis, retirement is defined based on current labour force status, i.e.
individual is retired if self-reported labour supply status is retired. For testing the
existence of retirement consumption puzzle, the RD sample restricts households to those
with male household head and age between 50 to 70 (60 is excluded1). This restriction
further shrinks the sample size, the RD sample contains 5160 observations. This analysis
focus only on households with male household heads due to the fact that the mandatory
retirement law is more complicated for women, depending on the occupation and type
of work unit. In addition, there are few cases that female are the household heads. In
fact, the average age difference between husband and wife is around three years old,
71.5(95.4) percent of the households in our sample have less than 5(10) years age-gap
between husband and wife, which suggests that most of the spouse are already retired, if
spouse was employed, upon husband’s retirement. Thus, this analysis does not take into
account wife’s retirement decision and attributes the change of household consumption
at husband age 60 mainly to the retirement of husband.
Table 3.2 shows the summary statistics for both outcome variables and some
predetermined variables of the RD sample. The mean age of household head is around
58, 4% of which are ethnic minorities, with 41% obtained high school or above education.
On average, there are 3.05 individuals in the household among which includes 0.79
child. Around 98 percent of the male are married or cohabiting, with 63 percent of
the spouse are also retired. The majority(88%) of household head was/is employed in
the public sector, with 11% were/are employed in government, 16% were/are employed
in institutions, 54% were/are employed in state-owned enterprises or collective-owned
enterprises, 19% were/are employed in private sectors2. Table 3.2 also reports the mean
1Individuals age 60 are likely to be in a situation of a mixture of pre-retirement and post-
retirement status, therefore the expenditure data of age 60 people are excluded.
2This paper defines two broad categories of workunit: public and private sectors.
Public sector includes government organizations, institutions, state-owned and collective-owned
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expenditures in Chinese currency1.
3.5 Results
This section starts with showing empirical life cycle patterns of the evolution of mean
expenditures. Based on the graphic evidence, I test the association between labour
supply status and consumption goods. To be specific, the RD approach is employed to
test how much of the drop in total nondurables and changes in the three sub-aggregated
expenditures in later stage of the life can be attributed to transitioning into retirement.
3.5.1 Empirical Patterns
Figure 3.1 shows the life cycle consumption pattern of total nondurable goods and
subcomponent expenditures. The total nondurable expenditure seems to display a
hump-shaped pattern but with two peaks, it rises over the early stage of life cycle,
peaking at around age 40 at roughly 28 log points higher than the baseline 25-year-
old spending, the second peak comes at age 55 with 26 log points higher than the
baseline age effects2. The consumption pattern documented in figure 3.1(a) conceals
substantial heterogeneity among subcomponent consumption goods as depicted in figure
3.1(b). It shows that different expenditure categories present quite heterogeneous life
cycle patterns for both mean and variance of spending. In general, both food and
core nondurable spendings show a hump-shaped profile. Food expenditure rises by 30
log points at around age 40 and then stays relatively stable until age 54, followed by
some fluctuations within the range between 20 and 40 log points. Core nondurable
expenditure presents an increasing pattern before age 35 and stays relatively stable
between age 35 and age 50, then it slightly declines. Work-related consumption displays
a dramatically different life cycle profile from the previous two consumption goods. It
drops substantially after around age 45 which is below the baseline age effect at age 25,
followed by a decline of about 60 log points until age 753.
In summary, there is substantial heterogeneity across life cycle profiles of expenditure
categories, which is consistent with the finding of Aguiar and Hurst(2013). However,
enterprises. Private sector includes private firms, sino-foreign joint ventures, foreign companies,
state share-holding companies, and other ownership.
1Here the expenditures are measured in Yuan for the ease of understanding the composition
of spending, but main results are reported based on log value of expenditure.
2Note that Aguiar and Hurst (2013) show a peak at age 45.
3Aguiar and Hurst (2013) show a roughly 60 log points fall after middle age.
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in particular, I do not observe a fall in mean food expenditure at retirement as
mostly documented in the literature. It is natural to incorporate the home production
theory since the opportunity cost of time is relatively lower after retirement. If
this also applies to this study, then the actual food consumption might increase
after retirement. As the observed pattern has shown that work-related spending
drives down the total nondurable expenditure at later stage of the life, a potential
explanation for the heterogeneous pattern can be derived from the relationship between
different expenditure categories and employment status. Those categories which are
complementary to work should fall while those substitutes should increase.
3.5.2 Main Results
Given the potential importance of work-related expenditures in accounting for the
evolution of the life cycle profile, this paper is interested in assessing the relationship
between labour supply and adjustment of expenditures across life cycle and expenditure
categories. Specifically, in order to understand how much of the decline in spending of
the elderly households(age between 50 and 70) can be attributed to transition into
retirement, a RD design is employed to test the existence of retirement consumption
puzzle in China. The share of work-related spending accounts for around 20 percent
of the total expenditure at age 50-70, clearly not a negligible amount. It is natural
to question how much of the total nondurable drop at around retirement age can be
attributed to a change in work status. Here, the real consumption puzzle would present
if the total nondurable consumption drops at retirement even after taking out the work-
related spending.
Figure 3.2(a) shows a significant jump of the retiree fraction at the mandatory
retirement age 60, with the share of retirees increasing from around 40 percent at age 59
to around 81 percent at age 61. Table 3.3 confirms a significant first stage effect that age
above 60 increases the likelihood of retirement by about 35.0% to 46.5%, depending on
different specifications used. As stated in equation 3.5, this study incorporates flexible
age controls, allowing for interactions between age dummies and Dit and asymmetric
polynomial orders on either side of the age 60 cutoff. A valid RD design would imply
that the inclusion of other covariates does not affect the consistency but the efficiency of
point estimates. Table 3.3 shows that province and year dummies attributes to explain
the variation in the outcome variable retirement, and the standard errors of augmented
regressions are smaller while the significance and magnitude of the estimators stay quite
122
similar.
Tests of validity of the RD design are presented in table 3.4, additionally in figure
3.2(b) and figure 3.3. In order for the RD design to be valid, one would expect
individuals to have imprecise control over the assignment variable. Since it is not
possible to test this assumption directly, an alternative approach is to test the continuity
of the density of assignment variable at age 60 (McCrary, 2008). If individuals near the
compulsory retirement age were able to select on either side of it, and if they did so in
a monotonic way, then one would expect to observe a discontinuity of the density of
running variable at age 601. Figure 3.2(b) provides evidence that retirement status is
as good as randomly assigned near the cutoff 60.
Ideally, a discontinuity in the outcome of interest should only come from the
treatment effects while there should be no correlation between predetermined variables
and the treatment. The covariables that are taking into consideration are household size,
number of children and number of children in finer age groups 0-2, 3-5, 6-13, 14-17, 18-
21, education level, ethnic minority, whether the household head is married or cohabited,
the retirement status of his spouse. Figure 3.3 tests the validity of the assumption that
the cutoff is not correlated with any predetermined background variables2. Table 3.4
also shows that there is no correlation between the treatment and household background
characteristics, which provides additional support on the fundamental assumption that
retirement status is as good as randomly assigned to either side of the cutoff controlling
for a smooth polynomial in age. Here the polynomial order is chosen by the AIC
criterion. Since the AIC is a generalized cross validation procedure that minimizes a
loss function, it puts more weight on model fitting rather than a significance testing
of the null hypothesis that the estimator is zero. It explains why the AIC procedure
selects specification with polynomial orders that lack of significance or nearly zero in
magnitude.
The main result of the regression discontinuity design is given by figure 3.4 and
table 3.5. Figure 3.4 shows a discontinuity in work-related expenditure, while there is
no clear evidence of a drop in total nondurable expenditure, food and core nondurable
1Most likely age is considered as impossible to be manipulated. Out of caution, this paper
still conducts this density test to exclude the possibility for people to deliberately change age.
Additionally, the age is documented only in years not in months in some of the survey waves.
This density tests helps to check the problem of age rounding in the case of self-reported age.
2There is an observed discontinuity in the proportion of minority households. It is hard to
connect this pattern with any events or policy changes related to minority retirement. Given
that the minority households account for only 4 percent of the whole sample, the drop is possibly
driven by very few observations with characteristics that are uncorrelated with retirement
decision.
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expenditure. Table 3.5 confirms the graphic finding that there is no significant impact
of retirement on total nondurable expenditure; food and core nondurable expenditures
stay stable, while work-related spending shows a significant decline of 42.4%. It implies
that households are able to adjust expenditures across categories even though there is no
significant change in total nondurable spending. Hence, households smooth consumption
through reallocating sub-expenditures.
Note that the treatment-determining covariate is a discrete variable, since it is
impossible to get observations within arbitrarily small neighbourhoods of the cutoff, the
identification relies on choosing a particular functional form for relating the covariate to
outcomes. The specification error occurs whenever there is a deviation of the expected
value of outcome from the predicted outcome of a given functional form. This study
assumes that the specification error is random and identical (Lee and Card, 2008), to
be specific, I assume that the sources of specification error is independent of treatment
status. This orthogonal assumption of the specification error may seem restrictive,
but to an extent it relaxes the assumption of no specification error that conventional
inference relies on. The randomness assumption induces a within-group correlation (at
age level) in the error, therefore consistent estimators are provided by clustering at age
and province level.
3.5.3 Robustness Check
Several robustness checks have been applied to this analysis, mainly focusing on
testing the robustness of the regression discontinuity method and the sensitivity of
the expenditure measurements.
3.5.3.1 Bandwidth Choice
The discrete nature of the running variable simplifies the problem of bandwidth choice,
each observation in the graphic presentation displays an average over each age. The
main analysis focus on observations with ten-year bands on each side of the mandatory
retirement age, for achieving a bias-efficiency balance.
Table 3.6 experiments with different selection criteria on the bandwidth, ranging
from five-year bands to fifteen-year bands. Results are robust using the eight-year up to
fifteen-year bands that a significant decline in work-related expenditure is observed upon
retirement, while seven-year bands and smaller bands show similar drops in magnitude
as observed in table 3.5 but insignificant. Figure 3.1(b) shows that work-related
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expenditure starts to drop at around age 45, wider bandwidth captures a bigger work-
related spending drop and composition effects due to mortality. Although conventionally
small bandwidth reduce the bias, in our case smaller bands suffer from the effect of
outliers in the age profile. Thus it provides less credibility on the estimated effects upon
retirement.
3.5.3.2 Alternative Specifications
Figure 3.2, figure 3.3 and figure 3.4 are based on local linear fit estimations, which
provide a robustness check on the AIC-selected polynomial specifications as shown in
table 3.3, table 3.4 and table 3.5. Both the local linear and AIC polynomial specifications
reach the same conclusion.
The main analysis draws conclusion based on specification chosen by the AIC
criterion, which incorporates third order polynomial in some cases. However, higher
order specification achieves more flexible control and reduces bias at the cost of greater
asymptotic variance. Gelman and Imbens (2014) argue that regression discontinuity
analysis should not control for higher order (third, fourth, or higher) polynomials of
the running variable. The estimators that rely on such methods have poor properties
and are often misleading, therefore instead they suggest to use quadratic polynomials
or other smooth functions.
Figure 3.5, figure 3.6 and figure 3.7 show graphic results that are based on quadratic
polynomial regression, and table 3.7 shows the main regression of quadratic specification.
Results confirm the robustness of previous findings, but one exception is that work-
related expenditure shows no discontinuity under this specification. Although the
coefficient gives similar magnitude as the AIC selected model, the standard error of
work related expenditure doubles compares to the AIC selected model.
3.5.3.3 Placebo Test
Essentially, the placebo test in this context is to estimate whether there are
discontinuities at points where there should be no jumps. This analysis implements this
idea by splitting the sample into two subsamples on each side of the cutoff value and then
take the median of the running variable as a “fake” cutoff in each subsample (Imbens
and Lemieux, 2008). If the RD design is valid, one would expect no discontinuity exists
in either subsample. Picking the “fake” cutoff at the median on either side increases the
power of the test to detect jumps. Moreover, this idea avoids including the true cutoff
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point in subsamples, therefore excludes the possibility that the known discontinuity
contaminates the estimation.
Placebo estimates are implemented with age 54 and age 64 as the “fake” cutoff
points on either side of the true cutoff. Table 3.8 is in favour of the null hypothesis of
no effect of retirement on either side of the cut-off. Notice that the standard error in
both subsamples are relatively bigger due to smaller sample size.
3.5.3.4 Heterogeneity
Households with different pre-retirement wealth are likely to respond in different ways
to retirement even if the shock is expected. The socially disadvantaged households
maybe less prepared for the reduction in income, such as a shortage of saving or less
organised financial behaviour or bounded by credit constraint. Due to a lack of wealth
measurement across all waves, education is used as a proxy for wealth. Table 3.9
shows that there are no significant differences in the consumption response to retirement
between low and high educated groups. One exception is in the aspect of work-related
expenditure, high educated households show a significant 37.5 percent of a decline
while low educated households show similar magnitude of effect, not significant though.
Further tests suggest that the significant drop among high educated group is resulting
from a significant decrease in clothing of 49.2 percent1. Potential explanations could be
that high educated households are more likely to be employed in certain occupations or
work-units that stress more importance on outfits, in contrast, low educated households
incline to pay less attention on the outfits.
Chinese pension system is renowned for its double standard treatments, workers
in government, institutions and state-owned enterprise enjoy higher replacement rates
than those work for private enterprises. There are different measurements of replacement
rate, ideally it represents the rate of pension and pre-retirement wage for the retirees.
Unfortunately the data does not provide information on both pre-retirement wage
and pension for the same individual. Alternatively, this paper obtains the average
replacement rate by dividing the average pension of retired individuals by average wage
of the working force across cities. The replacement is around 50% among private sectors
and 65% among public sectors. One would expect that workers in former sector are
less affected by retirement than the latter. An attempt to exploit the consumption
retirement puzzle through different work units is presented in table 3.10. However, due
1This estimation is not presented in this paper but is available upon request
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to the few observations of private sector, the estimates are not precise. Additionally, this
paper considers the heterogeneity of retirement effects across time. Table 3.11 shows no
significant drop in total nondurable expenditure across years and that the biggest drop
in work related expenditure occurred in 1995. Similarly, the estimates are unfortunately
imprecise.
3.5.3.5 Measurement of Expenditure
Given the fact that clothing, transportation and communication are categorized as work-
related expenditure, it is natural to question whether it picks up some expenditures that
are not related to work. For example, transportation expenditure includes not only
commuting to work but also travelling and visiting family members and friends. Since
the author has no sources of data to tease out that part of expenditure, a potential
approach is to directly measure the effect of work status in the life cycle equations. A
demand system analysis (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980; Aguiar and Hurst, 2013) has
been employed to assess how much of the evolution of subaggregated expenditures can
be attributed to the labour supply status.
A main concern with this regression is that the labour supply is closely related
to permanent income which makes the specification suffer from omitted variable bias.
For example, if labour supply is measured by employment status dummy, then those
individuals who are working are likely to earn more than those who are unemployed.
By conditional on total expenditure which is a proxy for permanent income, it is
able to separate the effect of labour supply from income effect. There are some
other issues with this specification: first, total spending appears as both a right
hand side variable and a left hand side dependent variable, which makes it subject
to measurement error. Specifically, any measurement error found in one subcomponent
of expenditure will contaminate the total expenditure Xit. The standard practice is to
instrument total nondurable expenditure with income and education. Second, labour
supply is potentially endogenous if it is correlated with some shocks that affecting the
expenditure share. For example, if there is a shock on transportation industry that
makes transportation more expensive and therefore tends to be a larger share of total
spending(assume most part of the transportation cost is unavoidable), in the meanwhile
this shock affects the employment status of people working in transportation industry,
then failing to instrument labour supply would lead to a bias. Moreover, the instruments
used for controlling measurement error would be vulnerable to endogeneity issues as
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labour supply suffers.
Csharekit = θ
k
0 + θ
k
1Ageit + θ
k
2Cohortit + θ
k
3Familyit + θ4lnXit + θ5Lit + u
k
it (3.9)
where Xit represents the total nondurable expenditure including food, work-related and
core nondurables; Csharekit measures the share of expenditure category k out of total
nondurable spending Xit; Lit is our measurement of household labour supply. Note that
the changes in relative price of each expenditure category across time are controlled
for by the deflating process. Table 3.12 confirms that work-related expenditures are
positively correlated with employment status, i.e. household where husband works
spends an additional 1.2 percentage points on work-related spending.
Additional robustness checks are used to test if estimation results are altered by
excluding spending on food eat away from home. Previous literature documents a drop
in food at home expenditure, column (3) and (4) of table 3.13 show no discontinuity on
spending both for food at home and food eat away from home, and column (1) gives no
drop in total nondurable spending even if excluding food eat away from home1.
3.5.4 Mechanism
3.5.4.1 Family Structure
The literature overwhelmingly shows a drop in food expenditure upon retirement, this
paper presents a surprising increase yet not significant in food expenditure. Moreover,
food expenditure includes food eat away from home since eating at home and away
from home cannot be distinguished in this paper. Table 3.13 has shown that there is no
discountinuity in food expenditure even if only look at food expenditure at home. One
candidate explanation is a change in the family structure.
In the Chinese tradition, grandchildren are often took care of by their grandparents
especially when grandparents are retired. They have more time and energy to care
about and cook for their grandchildren while their children are busy with work. Figure
3.8(a) shows no evidence of a significant change in the number of grandchildren upon
retirement, but the increasing trend of grandchildren and decreasing trend of children
in the household may indicate that incorporating of grandchildren in the households
contribute to a relatively stable food consumption.
1Information on food eat away from home is only available in year 2002.
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3.5.4.2 Elderly Support
In contrast with most western countries that elderly care is offered by states and
covered by social security, Chinese culture honours elderly support provided by children
especially when children start to work and parents get retired (Banerjee et al., 2010;
Giles et al., 2010; Lei et al., 2015). Parents regard their children as a form of saving
especially when the credit constraint is tight. It is social norm that retired households
expect monetary transfer or in-kind benefits from their children, therefore it may help
alleviate a fall in income and smooth consumption.
China Household Income Project (CHIP) 2007 shows that 53.40% of people residing
in urban areas, age between 50 and 70, have no pension. China Health and Retirement
Longitudinal Study (CHARLS) 2011 shows that 45.17% of household, with household
head age between 50 and 70, are receiving monetary transfer from their non-coresident
children, and 68.27% of people report that children is the primary instrument for old-
age support and 21.66% will rely on pension. Figure 3.8(b) shows a significant increase
of family transfer from children onset of retirement.
3.5.4.3 Intra-household Time Allocation
A complementary indicator for testing retirement consumption puzzle is the time use.
Aguiar and Hurst (2005) highlight the difference between consumption and expenditure,
as stated by Becker (1965), consumption is the output of market expenditure and time.
Assuming individual’s opportunity cost of time declines upon retirement, individuals
will substitute market expenditure with time used for food production. For the purpose
of understanding the real change in food consumption, this study provides suggestive
evidence on food shopping time based on the time use data from the China Health and
Nutrition Survey (CHNS).
The CHNS is an ongoing open cohort, which covers a span of 22 years in 15 provinces
and municipal cities that varies in economic development and geography. The survey is
consists of about 7200 households with over 30000 individuals drawing from a multistage,
random cluster process. The survey provides information on food shopping and food
preparation frequency and time use. For example, it asks two types of questions related
to food shopping, one type is whether the individual did food shopping in the past week,
the other type is the amount of time spent per day on food shopping. The sample is
restricted to urban households with male household heads, age between 50 and 70.
To provide a comparison of the CHNS and CHIP data, figure 3.9 presents a jump
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of the fraction of retirees at age cutoff 60 of 30 percent. This is slightly lower than the
CHIP sample, probably due to different sample coverage. Furthermore, balance tests1
detect no discontinuities in covariates.
Results are provided for the time use of household head and all household members,
respectively. Table 3.14 shows no clear change in food production time upon retirement
both at household head level and household level. Table 3.9 suggests the existence
of heterogeneity in retirement effects by household wealth, proxied by education level.
Further estimations are performed to test the heterogeneous pattern in food production
pattern. Figure 3.10 presents a jump in individual food shopping time for the low
educated but no jump for the high educated household heads. However, there is no
clear change in food shopping time at household level for both groups of households.
Same applies to food preparing time as it can be observed from figure 3.11. Thus
retirees adjust their individual time use to maintain a stable household food shopping
time. This provides evidence that households not only able to smooth food expenditure
but also food consumption.
3.5.4.4 High household saving rate
Accompany with China’s high economic growth rate, the national saving rate is
persistently high and accounts for 34% to 53% of the GDP in the past three decades,
higher than other Asian countries with similar GDP per capita. In addition, household
saving experiences the highest growth among the three sectors(government saving,
corporate saving and household saving) since the economy reform in 1978.
Chamon and Prasad (2010) shows a 7 percentage points rise in Chinese urban
household savings rate from 1995 to 2005, accounting for one-quarter of disposable
income. While the saving rates rise across all demographic groups, the age profile
of saving gradually turns into a U-shaped pattern with the younger and the older
households saving relatively more. The households in my sample are those age from
50-70, who are in their 20s and 30s as China transiting into a market economy where
they bore the most of the increase in uncertainty during the transition but also benefited
from the rapid income growth. The mean saving rate is 37 percent in my sample, if the
high saving rates prepare households to future adverse shocks, one would expect that
households with higher saving rates to bear less of the retirement shock. Surprisingly,
table 3.15 shows no significant differences in the total expenditure, food and core
1Table of balance test based on CHNS data are provided on request.
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nondurable expenditure between high and low saving groups. Given the saving rates of
elderly households are high in general, even the relatively lower saving rate group are
able to smooth out the shock.
3.5.4.5 Unexpected Retirement
The life cycle hypothesis implies that consumption should not fall with expected retire-
ment, therefore a drop in consumption at an unexpected retirement would not contradict
the LCH. However, most of the literature provides evidence on retirement consumption
puzzle without distinguishing between expected and unexpected retirement, it is very
likely that the conclusion drawn from those analyses are biased upwards. Haider and
Stephens (2007) show that consumption drop estimated from expected retirement are
roughly a third less than those from other instrument variables such as age.
This study adopts an instrument variable method as a complementary approach to
confirm the non-existence of the retirement consumption puzzle in China. In specific, I
use subjective retirement expectations as an instrument for actual retirement (Haider
and Stephens, 2007). Subjective expectation has been proved to be a strong predictor
of the subsequent outcomes (Dominitz, 1998; Stephens Jr, 2004). Implicitly I assume
that household expectation error is not correlated with any past information possessed
by the household. The nature of this instrument provides potential mechanism of
retirement consumption smoothing of elderly households. Hence, this section tests
whether consumption falls at expected retirement.
In order to exploit the information on retirement expectation, I use the China Health
and Retirement Longitudinal Study (CHARLS). This dataset collects a nationally
representative sample of Chinese ages 45 and older, covering a wide range of information
on demographic background, health status, household income, wealth and consumption.
It resembles the American Health and Retirement Study(HRS) and the English
Longitudinal Study of Ageing(ELSA) in terms of sampling and questionnaire. Most
importantly, it provides information on expected retirement age “At what age do you
plan to stop working? Stopping work in this context shall refer to having stopped all
income-related activities and unpaid family business".
Table 3.16 shows a strong first stage effect that an expectation to retire next year
increase the actual retirement at next year by 10 percent. The 2SLS estimator shows
no evidence of a fall in any subcomponent of consumption at an expected retirement.
While it is consistent with the RD finding with respect to total nondurable spending,
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it contradicts the results on sub-aggregated categories. This could be due to the fact
that the RD setting captures the effects on unexpected retirement in addition to the
expected effects estimated from the CHARLS data. If the change in expenditure is
caused by unexpected event, then the evidence does not refute the life cycle hypotheses.
Another possibility is that the repeated cross-sectional data fails to control for some
unobserved family traits that would bias the results.
3.6 Conclusion
This study firstly documents that there are substantial heterogeneities across subcom-
ponents of nondurable goods in the life cycle pattern of mean and variance of expen-
ditures in the context of China. Specifically, food expenditure presents a hump-shaped
profile but the decline after around age 60 is minor, in other words, food expenditure
at later stage of life cycle remains relatively stable. Core nondurable expenditure shows
a typical hump-shaped life cycle profile, while work-related expenditure displays a sig-
nificant drop at age 45 and older. This provides insight into the fact that the fall of
total nondurable expenditure at age 55 is most likely to be driven by the change in the
work-related spending.
Based on the empirical pattern observed above, I tested how much of the adjustments
of consumption across time and categories can be attributed to the labour supply status.
In particular, a regression discontinuity approach confirms the non-existence of the
retirement consumption puzzle. There is a significant positive effect of labour supply
on work-related expenditures, but no evidence of a retirement consumption puzzle. In
particular, this analysis provide new evidence that elderly households are able to smooth
food consumption upon retirement by testing food production theory using time use
data from CHNS.
This paper differs from previous literature by exploring several potential explana-
tions for the differences in the profiles across expenditure categories. Due to potential
change in family composition and stable household food production time, food consump-
tion smooths upon retirement; work related expenditure drops upon retirement due to
the complementary effects of labour supply; total nondurable expenditures stay stable
leaving out sub-expenditures that are inputs into market work and amenable to home
production. There is no evidence of heterogeneity between households with different
education, work units and saving rates. One exception comes from that households of
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higher education or high saving rates show larger discontinuity in work related expendi-
ture, but it is not inconsistent with the life cycle theory. Additionally, high saving rates
of Chinese elderly households provide a possible consumption smoothing mechanism.
Furthermore, by using subjective retirement expectation as an instrumental variable
for actual retirement, I find no evidence of a fall in any subcomponent of consumption
upon an expected retirement. It implies that the adjustments in sub-aggregated
expenditure categories are resulting from unexpected retirement. This, again, is
consistent with the LCH. It is worth testing further to what extent that the unexpected
retirement is due to health conditions.
This paper also provides an implicit test of the consumption theory that the life
cycle profile of consumption goods that are substitution to working status should be
different from those goods that are complementary or amenable to home production.
Results confirm the complementary mechanism, and the home production theory finds
support in adjustments of intra-household food shopping time.
As with any study, there are some limitations of this paper. First, this study use
repeated cross section data that may fail to control for some unobserved household
characteristics that would bias the results. Moreover, while the data covers a relatively
long time span ranging from 1995 to 2007, there is only four waves of cross section data,
the analysis is likely to suffer from some transitory shocks that is difficult to separate
from time trends.
Nonetheless, the estimates and their magnitude are important for understanding
the life cycle profile of Chinese households’ consumption behaviour. Estimation results
demonstrate that disaggregated expenditures exhibit substantial heterogeneity with
respect to both mean and variance. In particular, work status is closely associated with
total nondurable expenditure life cycle profile. The finding has important implications
for using disaggregated data to test the existence of retirement consumption puzzle, for
testing consumption theories and for providing evidence on the widely debated topic
of postponing the mandatory retirement age given the economic deceleration and rapid
ageing problems in China.
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Tables
Table 3.1: Summary of Mean Change in Expenditure Over the Life Cycle by Consumption Category
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Disaggregated Share of Share of Share of Log change in Log change in
consumption expenditures expenditures expenditures expenditure expenditure
category at age 25-27 at age 43-45 at age 64-66 between age 25-45 between age45-65
Food 0.56 0.60 0.64 0.28 0.00
Work 0.26 0.23 0.17 0.05 -0.60
Core 0.18 0.17 0.19 0.25 -0.12
Total 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.21 -0.14
Note: This table summarizes the life cycle mean expenditure profiles for total nondurable good and three
main consumption categories: food, work-related and the core nondurables, as shown in figure 3.1(a) and
figure 3.1(a). Column 1-3 report the share of expenditures at ages 25-27, 43-45 and 64-66, respectively. I
use three year age average to smooth out some of the age-to-age variability. Column 4 and 5 report the log
change in mean expenditure between ages 25 and 45, 45 and 65, which is the difference in coefficient on the
age dummies from the regression of log expenditure on age dummies and demographic controls (equation 3.1).
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics for the RD Sample
Observations Mean s.d.
Demographic Charateristics
age 5160 58.07 5.99
retire 5160 0.43 0.50
high school or above 5144 0.41 0.49
number of household members 5160 3.05 1.02
number of children 5160 0.79 0.73
couple 5160 0.98 0.16
minority 5160 0.04 0.18
spouse retired 5160 0.63 0.48
housing area 4032 52.97 27.80
Institution Background
share of Public sectors 5160 0.88
share of Government workers 324 0.11
share of Instituition workers 476 0.16
share of State-owned Enterprise workers 1607 0.54
share of Private Sector Worker 576 0.19
Expenditures
food 5160 8575.99 7471.67
work-related 5160 3108.58 4792.30
core nondurable 5160 3000.91 5,560,401
total nondurable 5160 14685.48 12930.41
Note: This table summarizes demographic characteristics and main expenditure
categories for the RD sample, which restricts the sample to households that age between
50 and 70 with age 60 excluded.
The expenditures reported here are measured in Chinese currency Yuan(1 Yuan=0.12
Pound) for the purpose of understanding the scale of spending, while log value of
expenditures is used in the regression-based analysis.
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Table 3.3: First Stage: The Effect of Mandatory Retirement Age on Retirement
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Retire Retire Retire Retire Retire Retire
D(age>60) 0.464*** 0.465*** 0.350*** 0.354*** 0.357*** 0.360***
(0.027) (0.024) (0.042) (0.037) (0.070) (0.062)
age*D -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.051** -0.052*** 0.016 0.007
(0.004) (0.004) (0.016) (0.015) (0.052) (0.048)
age2*D -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005 -0.005
(0.001) (0.001) (0.010) (0.010)
age3*D 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
age 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.076*** 0.075*** 0.041 0.045
(0.003) (0.003) (0.011) (0.010) (0.039) (0.035)
age2 0.003*** 0.003*** -0.004 -0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.008) (0.007)
age3 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Province No YES No YES No YES
dummies
Year No YES No YES No YES
dummies
Polynomial 1st order 1st order 2nd order 2nd order 3rd order 3rd order
order
F statistics
for joint 199,860 251,390 124,100 148,900 31,240 39,860
significance
R-sqr 0.534 0.539 0.536 0.540 0.536 0.541
N 5160 5160 5160 5160 5160 5160
Note: Standard errors are clustered at province-age level. ∗ ∗ ∗ significant at 1 %; ∗∗
significant at 5 %; ∗ significant at 10 %.
Variable D is an indicator for whether age of household head is above 60; variable age
is the difference between real age and age 60; variable age2 and age3 are the square and
cubic of age, respectively.
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Table 3.4: Balance Test: the Effect of Retirement on Predetermined Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
edu_high hh_no child_no couple minority retire_sp hukou
Retire -0.123 -0.211 -0.108 0.018 -0.024 0.047 0.007
(0.095) (0.157) (0.184) (0.029) (0.020) (0.055) (0.007)
age*Retire 0.002
(0.002)
age2*(1-Retire) -0.004*** 0.000*
(0.000) (0.000)
age3*(1-Retire) -0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
age 0.008 -0.013 -0.042** -0.003 0.001 0.013* 0.000
(0.009) (0.010) (0.016) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.000)
age2 -0.001 0.001 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Province YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
dummies
Year YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
dummies
Polynomial L3R2 L3R1 L3R2 L3R2 L1R1 L2R1 L2R1
order
R-sqr 0.027 0.039 0.143 0.006 0.049 0.273 0.011
N 5144 5160 5160 5160 5160 5160 5155
Note: Standard errors are clustered at province-age level. ∗∗∗ significant at 1 %; ∗∗ significant
at 5 %; ∗ significant at 10 %.
All the regressions control for year dummies and province dummies. The polynomial orders
are chosen by AIC. The AIC criteria chooses among symmetric and asymmetric polynomial
order(up to the fifth order) for the balance test, for example, L3R2 in column (1) means that
third order on the left and second order on the right is chosen by the AIC criteria.
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Table 3.5: Second Stage: The Effect of Retirement on Expenditure Categories
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Food Work Core
Retire -0.068 0.074 -0.414** -0.102
(0.062) (0.054) (0.137) (0.103)
age*Retire -0.021*** -0.016***
(0.005) (0.005)
age2*(1-Retire) -0.003***
(0.001)
age3*(1-Retire) 0.000***
(0.000)
age 0.009* 0.006 -0.025** -0.004
(0.005) (0.004) (0.009) (0.007)
Province dummies YES YES YES YES
Year dummies YES YES YES YES
Polynomial order L1R1 L1R1 L2R1 L3R1
R-sqr 0.416 0.424 0.298 0.248
N 5160 5160 5160 5160
Note: Standard errors are clustered at province-age level. ∗ ∗ ∗
significant at 1 %; ∗∗ significant at 5 %; ∗ significant at 10 %.
All the regressions control for year dummies and province dummies.
The AIC criteria chooses among symmetric and asymmetric polyno-
mial order(up to the fifth order), for example, L3R2 in column (1)
means that third order on the left and second order on the right is
chosen by the AIC criteria.
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Table 3.6: Robustness Check: the Effect of Retirement based on Different Age
Band
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Food Work Core
45-75 -0.136 0.023 -0.479*** -0.202
(0.076) (0.073) (0.105) (0.114)
N 7863 7863 7863 7863
46-74 -0.102 0.029 -0.477*** -0.172
(0.082) (0.081) (0.107) (0.125)
N 7308 7308 7308 7308
47-73 -0.089 0.050 -0.473*** -0.148
(0.090) (0.087) (0.116) (0.294)
N 6828 6828 6828 6828
48-72 -0.045 0.094 -0.451*** -0.151
(0.096) (0.091) (0.121) (0.173)
N 6273 6273 6273 6273
49-71 -0.025 0.065 -0.377** -0.195
(0.100) (0.089) (0.130) (0.154)
N 5691 5691 5691 5691
51-69 0.095 0.069 -0.337 -0.089
(0.109) (0.061) (0.217) (0.106)
N 4586 4586 4586 4586
52-68 -0.041 0.085 -0.356* -0.121
(0.073) (0.067) (0.159) (0.113)
N 4105 4105 4105 4105
53-67 0.000 0.137 -0.210 -0.101
(0.084) (0.074) (0.246) (0.134)
N 3557 3557 3557 3557
54-66 -0.006 0.098 -0.332 -0.130
(0.196) (0.169) (0.187) (0.203)
N 2990 2990 2990 2990
55-65 0.113 0.197 -0.314 -0.043
(0.200) (0.167) (0.218) (0.255)
N 2526 2526 2526 2526
Note: Standard errors are clustered at province-age level.
∗ ∗ ∗ significant at 1 %; ∗∗ significant at 5 %; ∗ significant
at 10 %. All the regressions control for year dummies and
province dummies. The polynomial orders are chosen by
AIC.
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Table 3.7: Robustness Check: the Effect of Retirement on Expenditure
Categories—Quadratic Specification
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Food Work Core
Retire 0.107 0.200 -0.374 -0.001
(0.133) (0.118) (0.272) (0.206)
age*Retire 0.010 0.007 0.064 0.002
(0.025) (0.024) (0.053) (0.039)
age2*Retire 0.005* 0.003 0.006 0.005
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004)
age -0.032 -0.024 -0.068 -0.020
(0.019) (0.020) (0.038) (0.030)
age2 -0.003* -0.002 -0.007* -0.003
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Province dummies YES YES YES YES
Year dummies YES YES YES YES
R-sqr 0.386 0.396 0.290 0.235
N 5160 5160 5160 5160
Note: Standard errors are clustered at province-age level. ∗∗∗
significant at 1 %; ∗∗ significant at 5 %; ∗ significant at 10
%. All the regressions control for year dummies and province
dummies.
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Table 3.8: Robustness Check: Placebo Test
Left-side subsample Right-side subsample
“fake” cutoff—54 “fake” cutoff—64
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Total Food Work Core Total Food Work Core
Retire -0.060 0.509 -0.208 -0.737 -0.061 0.149 -0.526 -0.516
(0.741)(0.743)(1.6550(1.013) (0.280)(0.256)(0.603)(0.526)
age*Retire 0.087
(0.559)
age2*Retire -0.041
(0.067)
age3*(1-Retire) -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.005 0.011
(0.001)(0.001) (0.003) (0.004)(0.004)(0.010)(0.008)
age 0.022 -0.001 0.013 0.035 -0.017 -0.012 -0.035 -0.023
(0.036)(0.035)(0.026)(0.069) (0.009)(0.009)(0.021)(0.015)
age2 -0.003 -0.003
(0.002)(0.002)
R-sqr 0.408 0.310 0.257 0.165 0.411 0.431 0.248 0.192
N 3272 3272 3272 3272 2146 2146 2146 2146
Note: Standard errors are clustered at province-age level. ∗ ∗ ∗ significant at
1 %; ∗∗ significant at 5 %; ∗ significant at 10 %.
All the regressions control for year dummies and province dummies.
The polynomial orders are chosen by AIC. The AIC criteria chooses among
symmetric and asymmetric polynomial order(up to the fifth order), for
example, age2*Retire means that second order polynomial specification is
chosen by the AIC criteria for the right-side approximation, age2*(1-Retire)
means that second order polynomial specification is chosen for the left-side
approximation.
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Table 3.9: Robustness Check: the Effect of Retirement on Different Education
Group
Non-high school group High_school group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Total Food Work Core Total Food Work Core
Retire -0.010 -0.030 -0.349 -0.014 -0.038 0.106 -0.375* -0.156
(0.086) (0.160) (0.218) (0.147) (0.133)(0.122)(0.147)(0.130)
age*Retire -0.012
(0.016)
age2*Retire -0.001
(0.002)
age2*(1-Retire)-0.002*** -0.002*
(0.000) (0.001)
age3*(1-Retire) 0.000***0.000*** 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)(0.000) (0.000)
age -0.013* 0.012 -0.034* -0.011 -0.001 -0.002 -0.015 0.004
(0.005) (0.009) (0.014) (0.009) (0.012)(0.012)(0.011)(0.010)
age2 -0.000 -0.000
(0.001)(0.001)
R-sqr 0.413 0.412 0.292 0.263 0.421 0.454 0.306 0.231
N 3016 3016 3016 3016 2128 2128 2128 2128
Note: Standard errors are clustered at province-age level. ∗ ∗ ∗ significant at 1
%; ∗∗ significant at 5 %; ∗ significant at 10 %.
All the regressions control for year dummies and province dummies.
The polynomial orders are chosen by AIC. The AIC criteria chooses among
symmetric and asymmetric polynomial order(up to the fifth order), for example,
age2*Retire means that second order polynomial specification is chosen by the
AIC criteria for the right-side approximation, age2*(1-Retire) means that second
order polynomial specification is chosen for the left-side approximation.
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Table 3.10: Robustness Check: the Effect of Retirement on Different Work unita
Public sector Private sector
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Total Food Work Core Total Food Work Core
Retire -0.026 0.121 -0.459** -0.045 -3,833 -2,584 -5,476 -2,216
(0.123)(0.121) (0.167) (0.194) (15,988)(12,444)(74,525)(5,223)
age*Retire 3,574 0.373
(5,812) (2,018)
age2 *Retire 0.128 0.072
(1,490) (0.076)
age3 *Retire -0.038 -0.009
(0.119) (0.018)
age2 *(1-Retire) -0.004***
(0.001)
age3 *(1-Retire) 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000)(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001)
age -0.009 -0.010 -0.029* -0.010 0.049 0.043 -0.280 -0.031
(0.010)(0.011) (0.011) (0.017) (0.259) (0.202) (0.566) (0.156)
age2 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.030 0.003
(0.001)(0.001) (0.001) (0.060) (0.029)
age3 0.001
(0.001)
R-sqr 0.381 0.353 0.297 0.273 . 0.265 . .
N 3962 3962 3962 3962 505 505 505 505
Note: Standard errors are clustered at province-age level. ∗ ∗ ∗ significant at 1 %;
∗∗ significant at 5 %; ∗ significant at 10 %.
All the regressions control for year dummies and province dummies.
The polynomial orders are chosen by AIC. The AIC criteria chooses among
symmetric and asymmetric polynomial order(up to the fifth order), for example,
age2*Retire means that second order polynomial specification is chosen by the AIC
criteria for the right-side approximation, age2*(1-Retire) means that second order
polynomial specification is chosen for the left-side approximation.
a This paper defines two broad categories of workunit: public and private sectors.
Public sector is a broad term, for the purpose of distinguishing from private sector.
Public sector includes government organizations, institutions, state-owned and
collective-owned enterprises. Private sector includes private firms, sino-foreign joint
ventures, foreign companies, state share-holding companies, and other ownership.
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Table 3.11: Robustness Check: the Effect of Retirement across time
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Food Work Core
Year==1995 -0.029 -0.022 -0.603* -0.127
(0.160) (0.141) (0.316) (0.266)
N 1557 1557 1557 1557
Year==1999 0.041 0.069 -0.285 -0.125
(0.244) (0.118) (0.426) (0.421)
N 887 887 887 887
Year==2002 -0.067 -0.015 -0.160 0.079
(0.180) (0.155) (0.245) (0.158)
N 1588 1588 1588 1588
Year==2007 -0.109 0.066 -0.214 -0.319
(0.157) (0.267) (0.274) (0.433)
N 1128 1128 1128 1128
Note: Standard errors are clustered at province-age level. ∗ ∗ ∗
significant at 1 %; ∗∗ significant at 5 %; ∗ significant at 10 %. All
the regressions control for year dummies and province dummies.
The polynomial orders are chosen by AIC.
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Table 3.12: Robustness Check: the Relationship Between Work status and Spending by Consumption Category
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Share of Share of Share of Share of Share of Share of
food food work-related work-related core-non core-non
employ -0.018** -0.015* 0.019*** 0.012** -0.001 0.002
(0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
Model specification OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
R-sqr 0.228 0.221 0.240 0.177 0.090 0.080
N 5418 5377 5418 5377 5418 5377
Note: Standard errors are clustered at province-age level. ∗ ∗ ∗ significant at 1 %; ∗∗ significant at
5 %; ∗ significant at 10 %. This table provides estimation from demand system analysis, where total
expenditure is instrumented with income and education.
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Table 3.13: Robustness Check: the Effect of Retirement on Alternative
Measurement of Food Expenditures
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Food Food away Food home
retire -0.067 -0.015 0.018 -0.027
(0.180) (0.155) (0.553) (0.138)
age3*(1-Retire) -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
age 0.004 0.011 -0.026 0.015
(0.016) (0.014) (0.051) (0.012)
age2 -0.002 -0.002* -0.001 -0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001)
R-sqr 0.199 0.274 0.161 0.254
N 1588 1588 1484 1588
Note: Standard errors are clustered at province-age level. ∗ ∗ ∗
significant at 1 %; ∗∗ significant at 5 %; ∗ significant at 10 %.
Information on food eat away from home is only available in year
2002.
All the regressions control for year dummies and province
dummies.
The polynomial orders are chosen by AIC. The AIC criteria
chooses among symmetric and asymmetric polynomial order(up to
the fifth order), for example, age2*Retire means that second order
polynomial specification is chosen by the AIC criteria for the right-
side approximation, age2*(1-Retire) means that second order
polynomial specification is chosen for the left-side approximation.
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Table 3.14: Mechanism: the Effect of Retirement on Food Production time
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Household head Household head Household Household
time spend on time spend on time spend on time spend on
buying food preparing food buying food preparing food
Retire 13.097 -1.968 -24.542 1.375
(12.853) (14.055) (19.870) (11.370)
age*Retire -0.182 -0.089
(2.267) (0.684)
age2*Retire 0.150
(0.256)
age3*(1-Retire) -0.010 0.010
(0.007) (0.007)
age 0.529 0.205 1.119 0.189
(0.645) (0.491) (0.947) (0.621)
Province YES YES YES YES
dummies
Year dummies YES YES YES YES
N 1657 1566 3425 3425
R-sq 0.240 0.573 0.129 0.622
Note: Standard errors are clustered at province-age level. ∗ ∗ ∗ significant at 1 %; ∗∗
significant at 5 %; ∗ significant at 10 %. All the regressions control for year dummies and
province dummies.
The time use data are based on the CHNS.
The polynomial orders are chosen by AIC. The AIC criteria chooses among symmetric
and asymmetric polynomial order(up to the fifth order), for example, age2*Retire means
that second order polynomial specification is chosen by the AIC criteria for the right-side
approximation, age2*(1-Retire) means that second order polynomial specification is chosen
for the left-side approximation.The polynomial orders are chosen by AIC.
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Table 3.15: Mechanism: the Effect of Retirement on Different Saving Rate Group
Low saving rate group High saving rate group
Total Food Work Core Total Food Work Core
retire -0.072 0.008 -0.299 -0.221 -0.084 -0.024 -0.462** -0.123
(0.178)(0.163) (0.202) (0.154) (0.070) (0.243) (0.164) (0.130)
age*Retire -0.026*** 0.000
(0.007) (0.067)
age2*Retire -0.005
(0.014)
age3*Retire 0.000
(0.001)
age2*(1-Retire) -0.002 -0.004***-0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
age3*(1-Retire) 0.000 -0.000 0.000***
(0.000)(0.000) (0.000)
age -0.006 0.001 -0.033* 0.003 0.010 0.008 -0.020 -0.005
(0.014)(0.013) (0.013) (0.009) (0.005) (0.007) (0.011) (0.009)
age2 -0.000 -0.001
(0.001)(0.001)
R-sqr 0.420 0.491 0.306 0.238 0.444 0.404 0.298 0.275
N 2569 2569 2569 2569 2566 2566 2566 2566
Note: Standard errors are clustered at province-age level. ∗ ∗ ∗ significant at 1 %; ∗∗
significant at 5 %; ∗ significant at 10 %.
All the regressions control for year dummies and province dummies.
The polynomial orders are chosen by AIC. The AIC criteria chooses among symmetric
and asymmetric polynomial order(up to the fifth order), for example, age2*Retire
means that second order polynomial specification is chosen by the AIC criteria for
the right-side approximation, age2*(1-Retire) means that second order polynomial
specification is chosen for the left-side approximation.The polynomial orders are chosen
by AIC.
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Table 3.16: Mechanism: the Effect of Expected Retirement on Expenditure
Categories
(1) (2) (3) (4)
change in change in change in change in
food work-related core-non total
expenditure expenditure expenditure expendituree
OLS
actual retirement -0.048 -0.097* -0.024 -0.107**
at year t+1 (0.050) (0.058) (0.050) (0.047)
N 6045 5647 6100 5091
R-sq 0.018 0.044 0.036 0.037
2SLS
actual retirement 0.244 -0.798 1.649 0.316
at year t+1 (0.980) (0.906) (1.088) (0.795)
N 4153 3956 4243 3585
actual retirement at year t+1
First Stage
expected year t+1 0.102***
retirement at year t (0.022)
F-test 20.52
Note: Standard errors are clustered at province-age level. ∗ ∗ ∗ significant at 1 %;
∗∗ significant at 5 %; ∗ significant at 10 %.
This analysis is based on the China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study
(CHARLS). Subjective retirement expectations are used as an instrument for actual
retirement. Each column shows the effect of retirement on the change of main
subaggregated categories and total nondurable expenditure, respectively.
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Figures
(a) Mean Profile
(b) Variance Profile
Figure 3.1: Life Cycle Pattern of Total Non-durable Expenditure
Note: The regression based nondurable expenditures profile have been shown in graph
(a) and (b), respectively. The age effects are given by controlling for year and family
composition controls, with age 25 as the baseline group. Due to few extreme values
at age 26, the coefficient plot at age 26 exhibits a big variation. Graph (a) gives
the evolution of mean of total nondurable expenditure across life cycle, while total
nondurable expenditure is disaggregated to three main categories in graph(b).
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(a) Fraction of retirees
(b) Density of the running variable
Figure 3.2: First Stage—The Effect of Mandatory Retirement Age on Retirement
Note: Panel(a): Cells are the proportion of people in each age from age 50 to 70. The
solid lines and dashed lines are local linear fitted outcomes and associated confidence
intervals, respectively, on either side of the age 60 cutoff.
Panel(b): It plots the density of households at each age over the total number of
households with household age between 50 and 70.
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(a) Household Size (b) Number of Children
(c) Above high school education (d) couple
(e) Retirement Status of the Spouse (f) Minority
Figure 3.3: Balance Test—The Effect of Retirement on Predetermined Variables
Note: Cells are the household head in each age from age 50 to 70. The solid lines
and dashed lines are local linear fitted outcomes and associated confidence intervals,
respectively, on either side of the age 60 cutoff.
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(a) Total nondurable expenditures (b) food expenditures
(c) work related expenditures (d) Core-nondurable expenditures
Figure 3.4: Reduced Form—The Effect of Retirement on Main Expenditure
Categories
Note: Cells are the household head in each age from age 50 to 70. The solid lines
and dashed lines are local linear fitted outcomes and associated confidence intervals,
respectively, on either side of the age 60 cutoff.
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Figure 3.5: Robustness Check: Quadratic Polynomial Regressions — the First
Stage
Note: Cells are the proportion of people in each age from age 50 to 70. The solid
lines and dashed lines are the predicted outcomes and associated confidence intervals,
respectively.
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(a) Household Size (b) Number of Children
(c) Above high school education (d) couple
(e) Retirement Status of the Spouse (f) Minority
Figure 3.6: Robustness Check: Quadratic Polynomial Regressions — Balance Test
Note: Cells are the household head in each age from age 50 to 70. The solid lines and
dashed lines are the predicted outcomes and associated confidence intervals, respectively.
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(a) Total nondurable expenditures (b) food expenditures
(c) work related expenditures (d) Core-nondurable expenditures
Figure 3.7: Robustness Check: Quadratic Polynomial Regressions — Reduced
Form Estimation
Note: Cells are the household head in each age from age 50 to 70. The solid lines and
dashed lines are the predicted outcomes and associated confidence intervals, respectively.
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(a) the number of grandchildren living with household head
(b) the amount of family transfer from non-coresident children
Figure 3.8: Mechanism: Household Composition and Family Transfer
Note: Panel (a) shows local linear estimation of the number of grandchildren living with
household heads. Panel (b) shows local linear estimation of the logged amount of family
transfer from non-coresident children.
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Figure 3.9: Mechanism: The Fraction of Retirees in the CHNS Sample
Note: It shows local linear estimation of fraction of retirees in the CHNS sample. The
solid lines and dashed lines are local linear fitted outcomes and associated confidence
intervals, respectively, on either side of the age 60 cutoff.
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(a) Food shopping time of the individual
(b) Food shopping time of the household
Figure 3.10: Mechanism: Food Shopping Time in the CHNS Sample
Note: This graph is analysed based on the CHNS dataset. Cells are the household head
in each age from age 50 to 70. Panel (a) shows the food shopping time pattern of the
household head only for low educated group (left panel) and high educated group (right
panel). Panel (b) shows the household food shopping time pattern for low educated
group (left panel) and high educated group (right panel).
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(a) Food preparing time of the individual
(b) Food preparing time of the household
Figure 3.11: Mechanism: Food Preparing Time in the CHNS Sample
Note: This graph is analysed based on the CHNS dataset. Cells are the household head
in each age from age 50 to 70. Panel (a) shows the food preparing time pattern of the
household head only for low educated group (left panel) and high educated group (right
panel). Panel (b) shows the household food preparing time pattern for low educated
group (left panel) and high educated group (right panel).
160
References
Adam, S. and M. Brewer (2005). Take-up of family credit and working families’ tax
credit: final report.
Aguiar, M. and E. Hurst (2005). Consumption versus. expenditure. Journal of Political
Economy 113 (5), 919–948.
Aguiar, M. and E. Hurst (2013). Deconstructing lifecycle expenditure. Journal of
Political Economy 121 (3), 437–492.
Aguila, E., O. Attanasio, and C. Meghir (2011). Changes in consumption at retirement:
evidence from panel data. Review of Economics and Statistics 93 (3), 1094–1099.
Almond, D., H. Li, and S. Zhang (2013). Land reform and sex selection in china. NBER
Working Paper No. 19153 .
Andrabi, T., J. Das, A. I. Khwaja, and T. Zajonc (2009). Do value-added estimates add
value? accounting for learning dynamics. Harvard Kennedy School of Government
Working Paper (4435671).
Andrabi, T., J. Das, A. I. Khwaja, and T. Zajonc (2011). Do value-added estimates
add value? accounting for learning dynamics. American Economic Journal: Applied
Economics 3 (3), 29–54.
Angrist, J., V. Lavy, and A. Schlosser (2010). Multiple experiments for the causal link
between the quantity and quality of children. Journal of Labor Economics 28 (4),
773–824.
Angrist, J. D. and V. Lavy (1999). Using maimonides’ rule to estimate the effect of
class size on student achievement. Quarterly Journal of Economics 114 (2), 533–75.
Angrist, J. D. and J.-S. Pischke (2008). Mostly harmless econometrics: An empiricist’s
companion. Princeton university press.
161
Banerjee, A., X. Meng, and N. Qian (2010). The life cycle model and household savings:
Micro evidence from urban china. National Bureau of Economic Research.
Banks, J., R. Blundell, and S. Tanner (1998). Is there a retirement-savings puzzle?
American Economic Review 88 (4), 769–788.
Barrett, G. F. and M. Brzozowski (2012). Food expenditure and involuntary retirement:
Resolving the retirement-consumption puzzle. American Journal of Agricultural
Economics 94 (4), 945–955.
Battistin, Erich, A. B. E. R. and G. Weber (2009). The retirement consumption puzzle:
Evidence from a regression discontinuity approach. American Economic Review ,
2209–2226.
Becker, G. S. (1965). A theory of the allocation of time. The economic journal 75 (299),
493–517.
Becker, G. S. . and N. Tomes (1976). Child endowments and the quantity and quality
of children. Journal of Political Economy 84 (4), S143–62.
Becker, G. S. and T. Nigel (1973). On the interaction between quantity and quality of
children. Journal of Political Economy 81 (2), 279–288.
Becker, G. S. and T. Nigel (1976). Child endowments and the quantity and quality of
children. Journal of Political Economy 84 (4), 143–162.
Bernal, R. (2008). The effect of maternal employment and child care on children’s
cognitive development. International Economic Review 49 (4), 1173–1209.
Bernal, R. and M. P. Keane (2010). Quasi-structural estimation of a model of childcare
choices and child cognitive ability production. Journal of Econometrics 156 (1), 164–
189.
Bernal, R. and M. P. Keane (2011). Child care choices and children’s cognitive
achievement: The case of single mothers. Journal of Labor Economics 29 (3), 459–512.
Bernheim, B. D., J. Skinner, and S. Weinberg (2001). What accounts for the variation
in retirement wealth among us households? American Economic Review , 832–857.
Black, S. E., P. J. Devereux, and K. G. Salvanes (2005). The more the merrier? the
effect of family size and birth order on children’s education. The Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 669–700.
162
Blau, D. M. (1999). The effect of income on child development. Review of Economics
and Statistics 81 (2), 261–276.
Blundell, R., M. Brewer, and M. Francesconi (2008). Job changes and hours
changes: understanding the path of labor supply adjustment. Journal of Labor
Economics 26 (3), 421–453.
Blundell, R., M. Brewer, and A. Shephard (2005). Evaluating the labour market impact
of working families’ tax credit using difference-in-differences.
Brewer, M., M. Francesconi, P. Gregg, and J. Grogger (2009). Feature: In-work benefit
reform in a cross-national perspective-introduction. The Economic Journal 119 (535),
F1–F14.
Browning, M., T. F. Crossley, and M. Lührmann (2014). Durable purchases over the
later life cycle. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 78 (2), 145–169.
Chamon, M. D. and E. S. Prasad (2010). Why are saving rates of urban households in
china rising? American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 93–130.
Chiappori, P.-A. (1992). Collective labor supply and welfare. Journal of political
Economy , 437–467.
Clark-Kauffman, E., G. J. Duncan, and P. Morris (2003). How welfare policies affect
child and adolescent achievement. The American Economic Review 93 (2), 299–303.
Dahl, G. B. and L. Lochner (2012). The impact of family income on child achievement:
Evidence from the earned income tax credit. The American Economic Review 102 (5),
1927–1956.
Das Gupta, M., J. Zhenghua, L. Bohua, X. Zhenming, W. Chung, and B. Hwa-Ok
(2003). Why is son preference so persistent in east and south asia? a cross-
country study of china, india and the republic of korea. The Journal of Development
Studies 40 (2), 153–187.
Deaton, A. (1997). The analysis of household surveys: a microeconometric approach to
development policy. World Bank Publications.
Deaton, A. and J. Muellbauer (1980). An almost ideal demand system. The American
economic review , 312–326.
163
Del Bono, E., M. Francesconi, Y. Kelly, and A. Sacker (2016). Early maternal time
investment and early child outcomes. The Economic Journal 126 (596).
Dominitz, J. (1998). Earnings expectations, revisions, and realizations. Review of
Economics and statistics 80 (3), 374–388.
Dong, Y. and D. T. Yang (2016). Mandatory retirement and the consumption puzzle:
Prices decline or quantities decline? SSRN 2744760 .
Dooley, M. and J. Stewart (2004). Family income and child outcomes in canada.
Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d’économique 37 (4), 898–917.
Duncan, G. J., P. L. Chase-Lansdale, et al. (2000). Welfare reform and child well-being.
Citeseer.
Duncan, G. J., W. J. Yeung, J. Brooks-Gunn, and J. R. Smith (1998). How much does
childhood poverty affect the life chances of children? American sociological review ,
406–423.
Eissa, N. and J. B. Liebman (1996). Labor supply response to the earned income tax
credit. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 111 (2), 605–637.
Fisher, L., D. Dixon, J. Herson, R. Frankowski, M. Hearron, and K. E. Peace (1989).
Intention to treat in clinical trials.
Fisher, P. (2016). British tax credit simplification, the intra-household distribution of
income and family consumption. Oxford Economic Papers 68 (2), 444–464.
Francesconi, M., H. Rainer, and W. Van der Klaauw (2008). Unintended consequences
of welfare reform: the case of divorced parents.
Francesconi, M. and W. Van der Klaauw (2007). The socioeconomic consequences of
"in-work" benefit reform for british lone mothers. Journal of Human Resources 42 (1),
1–31.
Gelman, A. and G. Imbens (2014). Why high-order polynomials should not be used
in regression discontinuity designs. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic
Research.
Giles, J., D. Wang, and C. Zhao (2010). Can chinaâĂŹs rural elderly count on support
from adult children? implications of rural-to-urban migration. Journal of Population
Ageing 3 (3-4), 183–204.
164
Gregg, P., S. Harkness, and S. Smith (2009). Welfare reform and lone parents in the
uk. The economic journal 119 (535), F38–F65.
Grogger, J. and L. A. Karoly (2009). The effects of work-conditioned transfers on
marriage and child well-being: A review. The Economic Journal 119 (535), F15–F37.
Grogger, J., L. A. Karoly, and J. Grogger (2009). Welfare reform: Effects of a decade
of change. Harvard University Press.
Hahn, J., P. Todd, and W. Van der Klaauw (2001). Identification and estimation of
treatment effects with a regression-discontinuity design. Econometrica 69 (1), 201–
209.
Haider, S. J. and M. Stephens (2007). Is there a retirement-consumption puzzle?
evidence using subjective retirement expectations. The review of economics and
statistics 89 (2), 247–264.
Heckman, J. J. (2006). Skill formation and the economics of investing in disadvantaged
children. Science 312 (5782), 1900–1902.
Huang, W., X. Lei, and Y. Zhao (2016). One-child policy and the rise of man-made
twins. Review of Economics and Statistics 98 (3), 467âĂŞ476.
Hurst, E. (2008). The retirement of a consumption puzzle. National Bureau of Economic
Research No. w13789 .
Imbens, G. W. and J. D. Angrist (1994). Identification and estimation of local average
treatment effects. Econometrica 62 (2), 467–475.
Imbens, G. W. and T. Lemieux (2008). Regression discontinuity designs: A guide to
practice. Journal of econometrics 142 (2), 615–635.
Lee, D. S. and D. Card (2008). Regression discontinuity inference with specification
error. Journal of Econometrics 142 (2), 655–674.
Lee, D. S. and T. Lemieux (2010). Regression discontinuity designs in economics.
Journal of Economic Literature 48, 281–355.
Lee, J. (2008). Sibling size and investment in children’s education: An asian instrument.
Journal of Population Economics 21 (4), 855–875.
165
Lei, X., J. Strauss, M. Tian, and Y. Zhao (2015). Living arrangements of the elderly
in china: evidence from the charls national baseline. China economic journal 8 (3),
191–214.
Li, H., X. Shi, B. Wu, et al. (2015). The retirement consumption puzzle in china.
American Economic Review papers and proceedings 105 (5), 437–41.
Li, H., J. Zhang, and Y. Zhu (2008). The quantity-quality trade-off of children in a
developing country: Identification using chinese twins. Demography 45 (1), 223–243.
Li, Z. (2012). The basic old-age insurance of china: Challenges and countermeasures.
World Pension Summit .
Lin, M.-J., N. Qian, and J.-T. Liu (2008). More women missing, fewer girls dying:
The impact of abortion on sex ratios at birth and excess female mortality in taiwan.
National Bureau of Economic Research No. 14541 .
Liu, H. (2014). The quality–quantity trade-off: evidence from the relaxation of china’s
one-child policy. Journal of Population Economics 27 (2), 565–602.
McCrary, J. (2008). Manipulation of the running variable in the regression discontinuity
design: A density test. Journal of Econometrics 142 (2), 698–714.
McElroy, M. and D. T. Yang (2000). Carrots and sticks: fertility effects of china’s
population policies. The American economic review 90 (2), 389–392.
Meng, X. and R. Gregory (2007). Exploring the impact of interrupted education on
earnings: the educational cost of the chinese cultural revolution.
Miller, A. R. and L. Zhang (2009). The effects of welfare reform on the academic
performance of children in low-income households. Journal of policy Analysis and
Management 28 (4), 577–599.
Milligan, K. and M. Stabile (2011). Do child tax benefits affect the well-being of
children? evidence from canadian child benefit expansions. American Economic
Journal: Economic Policy 3 (3), 175–205.
Modigliani, F. and R. Brumberg (1954). Utility analysis and the consumption function:
An interpretation of cross-section data. Franco Modigliani 1.
166
Modigliani, F. and S. L. Cao (2004). The chinese saving puzzle and the life-cycle
hypothesis. Journal of economic literature 42 (1), 145–170.
Mogstad, M. and M. Wiswall (2016). Testing the quantity–quality model of fertility:
Estimation using unrestricted family size models. Quantitative Economics 7 (1), 157–
192.
Qian, N. (2009). Quantity-quality and the one child policy: The only-child disadvantage
in school enrollment in rural china. National Bureau of Economic Research No. 14973 .
Rodriguez, G. (2007). Lecture notes on generalized linear models.
http://data.princeton.edu/wws509/notes/ 4.
Rosenzweig, M. R. and K. I. Wolpin (1980). Testing the quantity-quality fertility model:
The use of twins as a natural experiment. Econometrica, 227–240.
Rosenzweig, M. R. and J. Zhang (2009). Do population control policies induce more
human capital investment? twins, birth weight and china’s "one-child" policy. The
Review of Economic Studies 76 (3), 1149–1174.
Schultz, T. P. (2007). Population policies, fertility, women’s human capital, and child
quality. Handbook of development economics 4, 3249–3303.
Shonkoff, J. P., D. A. Phillips, et al. (2000). From neurons to neighborhoods: The
science of early childhood development. National Academies Press.
Silva, J. S., S. Tenreyro, and K. Wei (2014). Estimating the extensive margin of trade.
Journal of International Economics 93 (1), 67–75.
Smith, S. (2006). The retirement-consumption puzzle and involuntary early retirement:
Evidence from the british household panel survey. The Economic Journal 116 (510),
C130–C148.
Stancanelli, E. G. and A. Van Soest (2012). Retirement and home production:
A regression discontinuity approach. American Economic Review papers and
proceedings 102 (3), 600–605.
Stephens Jr, M. (2004). Job loss expectations, realizations, and household consumption
behavior. Review of Economics and statistics 86 (1), 253–269.
167
Thistlethwaite, D. L. and D. T. Campbell (1960). Regression-discontinuity analysis: An
alternative to the ex post facto experiment. Journal of Educational psychology 51 (6),
309.
Todd, P. E. and K. I. Wolpin (2003). On the specification and estimation of the
production function for cognitive achievement. The Economic Journal 113 (485),
F3–F33.
Todd, P. E. and K. I. Wolpin (2007). The production of cognitive achievement in
children: Home, school, and racial test score gaps. Journal of Human capital 1 (1),
91–136.
Van der Klaauw, W. (2002). Estimating the effect of financial aid offers on
college enrollment: A regression–discontinuity approach. International Economic
Review 43 (4), 1249–1287.
Wang, W. and F. Famoye (1997). Modeling household fertility decisions with generalized
poisson regression. Journal of Population Economics 10 (3), 273–283.
Wei, S.-J. and X. Zhang (2011). The competitive saving motive: Evidence from rising
sex ratios and savings rates in china. Journal of Political Economy 119 (3), 511–564.
Willis, R. J. (1973). A new approach to the economic theory of fertility behavior.
Journal of political Economy 81 (2), S14–S64.
Windmeijer, F. A. and J. M. Santos Silva (1997). Endogeneity in count data models:
an application to demand for health care. Journal of applied econometrics 12 (3),
281–294.
Winkelmann, R. and K. F. Zimmermann (1994). Count data models for demographic
data. Mathematical Population Studies 4 (3), 205–221.
Wooldridge, J. M. (2010). Econometric analysis of cross section and panel data. MIT
press.
Yang, D. T. (2012). Aggregate savings and external imbalances in china. The Journal
of Economic Perspectives 26 (4), 125–146.
Yi, Z., T. Ping, G. Baochang, X. Yi, L. Bohua, and L. Yongpiing (1993). Causes
and implications of the recent increase in the reported sex ratio at birth in china.
Population and Development Review , 283–302.
168
Zaslow, M. J., K. A. Moore, J. L. Brooks, P. A. Morris, K. Tout, Z. A. Redd, and C. A.
Emig (2002). Experimental studies of welfare reform and children. The future of
children, 79–95.
169
